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ABSTRACT	
	
	
ATOMIC	AMBITIONS:	A	ROLE‐THEORETIC	ANALYSIS	OF	BRAZILIAN	
AND	INDIAN	QUESTS	FOR	NUCLEAR	CAPABILITY	
	
Reimold,	Benjamin	A.	
	MA,	Department	of	International	Relations	
Supervisor:	Assist.	Prof.	Dr.	Özgür	Özdamar	
September	2014	
	
This	 thesis	 uses	 role	 theory	 to	 investigate	 the	motivations	 of	 national	 leaders	
considering	 the	 acquisition	 of	 nuclear	 weapons.	 	 The	 correlation	 between	
expressed	 roles	 and	 proliferation	 decisionmaking	 is	 examined	 in	 the	 cases	 of	
Brazil	 and	 India	within	 the	 framework	 of	 a	most	 similar	 systems	 design.	 	 The	
material	and	ideational	sources	of	Brazilian	and	Indian	national	role	conceptions	
are	traced	using	a	model	developed	by	Marijke	Breuning	(2011).		In	the	Brazilian	
case,	 the	expressed	national	role	conceptions	are	 found	to	be	 inconsistent	with	
acquisition	of	nuclear	weaponry,	whereas	in	the	Indian	case,	nuclear	explosives	
were	seen	as	powerful	symbols	consistent	with	the	role	conceptions	of	national	
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leaders.	 	 The	 insights	 yielded	 by	 role	 theory	 in	 these	 cases	 provide	 a	 valuable	
addition	to	the	existing	nonproliferation	literature.		
	
Key	Words:	Nuclear	Proliferation,	Role	Theory,	Nuclear	Weapons,	Brazil,	India	
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ÖZET	
	
	
ATOMİK	DÜŞLER:	BREZİLYA’NIN	VE	HİNDİSTAN’IN	NÜKLEER	SİLAH	
ARAYIŞINI	ROL	TEORİSİYLE	ANLAMAK	
Reimold,	Benjamin	A.	
Yüksek	Lisans,	Uluslararası	İlişkiler	Bölümü	
Tez	Yöneticisi:	Yrd.	Doç.	Dr.	Özgür	Özdamar	
Eylül	2014	
Bu	 çalışma,	 Rol	 Teorisi	 aracılığıyla	 ülkelerin	 liderlerinin	 nükeer	 silahlanma	
konusundaki	motivasyonlarını	araştırmaktadır.		Çalısmanın	vakası	olarak	seçılen	
Brezilya	ve	Hindistan	örnekleri	üzerinden,	bu	ülke	liderlerinin	benimsediği	roller	
ve	 bu	 rollerden	 kaynaklanan	 nükleer	 silahlanma	 kararları	 arasındaki	 bağları	
incelemıştır.	 	Bu	analizde	seçilen	 iki	vaka	birbiriyle	en	cok	benzeyen	sistemleri	
arastırma	 metoduyla	 karşılaştırılmıştır.	 	 Marjike	 Breuning	 (2011)	 tarafından	
geliştirilen	 modele	 göre	 liderlerin	 rol	 kavrayışlarının	 hem	 maddi	 hem	 de	
düşünsel	 katmanları	 değerlendirilmiştir.	 	 Bu	 çalışmayla,	 Brezilya	 vakasında	
liderler	 tarafından	 ifade	 edilen	 milli	 rol	 kavrayışlarının,	 nükleer	 silahlanma	
politikası	 ile	 uyusmadigi	 bulunmustur.	 	 Aksine,	 Hindistan	 vakasında,	 nükleer	
patlayıcıların	bir	statü	sembolü	olarak	algılandığı	ve	liderlerin	benimsediği	milli	
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rol	kavrayışlarıyla	 tutarlı	olduğu	saptanmiştir.	Bu	çalışmayla	Rol	Teorisi’nin	bu	
vakalardaki	 gözlemlerinin	 nükleer	 silahların	 yayılması	 literatürene	 katkı	
sağladığı	savunulmuştur.	
Anahtar	 Kelimeler:	 Nükleer	 Sılahların	 Yayılması,	 Rol	 Teorisi,	 	 Nükleer	 Silah,	
Brezilya,	Hindistan	 	
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CHAPTER	1:	
	
INTRODUCTION	
	
	
The	 role	 of	 nuclear	weapons	 in	world	 politics	 has	 been	 a	 popular	 topic	
ever	since	 the	possibility	of	a	super	weapon	harnessing	 the	power	of	 the	atom	
was	first	introduced.	 	 In	today’s	international	relations	(IR)	 literature,	the	topic	
of	 nuclear	 proliferation	 has	 fluctuated	 in	 importance,	 with	 many	 scholars	
warning	of	“cascades”	of	states	acquiring	nuclear	weapons	and	of	the	dangers	of	
acquiring	 civilian	 nuclear	 capabilities.	 	 Why	 do	 some	 states	 seek	 nuclear	
weapons?	 	While	 there	are	many	diverse	answers	 to	 this	question,	 the	 current	
state	 of	 understanding	 nuclear	 proliferation	 has	 been	 hindered	 by	 a	 limited	
understanding	 of	 the	 symbolism	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 and	 a	 state‐centric	
approach	to	nuclear	decisionmaking	that	obscures	the	complex	processes	behind	
the	choice	to	go	nuclear.	
 At	first	glance,	there	does	not	seem	to	be	much	of	a	puzzle	when	it	comes	
to	nuclear	proliferation—most	scholars	conclude	that	states	that	feel	threatened	
or	isolated	may	turn	to	nuclear	weapons	as	a	means	to	balance	external	threats	
or	solve	their	security	dilemmas.		Most	of	the	literature	addresses	the	issue	from	
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this	framework.		Yet	the	vast	majority	of	threatened	states	do	not	turn	to	nuclear	
weapons	for	their	security.		Still	more	puzzling,	the	number	of	states	that	possess	
the	technical	capabilities	to	produce	nuclear	weaponry	is	large	and	growing,	yet	
the	 number	 of	 nuclear‐armed	 states	 has	 remained	 low.	 	 Argentina	 and	 Brazil	
renounced	 their	 nuclear	 ambitions	 and	 imbedded	 their	 nuclear	 industries	 in	
both	regional	and	international	safeguards	regimes.		In	fact,	a	greater	number	of	
states	 have	 given	 up	 nuclear	 weapons	 in	 the	 past	 25	 years	 (South	 Africa,	
Kazakhstan,	 Ukraine,	 and	 Belarus)	 than	 have	 acquired	 them	 (North	 Korea,	
Pakistan).		Surely	there	must	be	a	deeper	and	more	detailed	explanation	for	why	
some	 states	 decide	 that	 the	 long	 and	 expensive	 road	 to	 nuclear	 armament	 is	
worth	the	hardship.		
Additionally,	 there	 are	 significant	 obstacles	 to	 studying	 nuclear	
decisionmaking	from	a	practical	point	of	view	as	well.	 	First,	there	are	a	limited	
number	 of	 cases—only	 nine	 states	 (the	 US,	 Russian	 Federation,	 China,	 UK,	
France,	 Israel,	 India,	 Pakistan,	 and	 North	 Korea)	 have	 acquired	 a	 nuclear	
weapons	 capability.	 	 Second,	 the	 unique	 characteristics	 and	 situation	 of	 each	
state	make	comparative	 study	difficult.	 	 Scott	 Sagan	 (2011)	points	out	 that	 the	
reasons	for	some	states’	decisions	to	pursue	nuclear	weapons	programs	are	still	
unclear,	even	though	each	case	is	very	high‐profile.		He	highlights	the	difficulty	of	
even	establishing	when	each	state	started	exploring	the	possibility	of	a	nuclear	
weapons	program	and	in	what	year	these	plans	were	abandoned	(Sagan,	2011,	p.	
227).	 	 The	 secrecy	 surrounding	 nuclear	 weapons	 programs	 hinders	 scholars’	
efforts	to	gather	even	these	very	basic	facts	for	comparative	study.	
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Realist	 perspectives	 appear	 to	 be	 well‐suited	 to	 approach	 the	
proliferation	puzzle,	 since	 they	all	 focus	on	how	states	seek	to	help	 themselves	
through	acquiring	power	and	advantage	vis‐à‐vis	other	states	 through	material	
capabilities.		Classical	realist	perspectives	focus	on	external	pressures	that	states	
interpret	as	threats	to	their	survival.		Acquiring	nuclear	weapons,	therefore,	is	a	
rational	means	 to	maximize	power	 in	 an	uncertain	world	 (Morgenthau,	 1948).		
Lewis	Dunn	 and	Herman	Kahn,	 for	 example,	 lists	 deterrence	 of	 nuclear‐armed	
rivals	 as	 key	 reasons	 for	 many	 states’	 interest	 in	 nuclear	 weapons	 programs	
(1976,	p.	vii).	 	Quests	 for	regional	 status	are	also	 listed	as	contributing	 factors,	
but	the	origins	of	these	desires	are	usually	not	examined	in	detail.		According	to	
realists,	states	see	nuclear	weapons	as	“playing‐field	levelers”—acquiring	atomic	
weaponry	 allows	 states	 to	 compensate	 for	 weaknesses	 in	 their	 conventional	
capabilities	(Pakistan,	North	Korea).		
In	contrast,	neorealists’	emphasis	on	structural	factors	seems	more	apt	at	
explaining	why	certain	states	choose	to	“go	nuclear”	while	others	seem	to	seek	
other	 means	 of	 securing	 themselves.	 Structural	 realist	 scholars	 trace	 nuclear	
decisions	 to	 world	 system	 dynamics,	 namely	 the	 balance	 of	 power	 (polarity),	
great	power	politics,	and	security	dilemmas	(Mearsheimer,	1990;	Waltz,	1981).		
Structural	 realists	 differ	 in	 their	 understandings	 of	 the	 implications	 of	 these	
dynamics,	but	all	base	their	analysis	on	their	basic	understanding	of	the	state	as	
a	 comparable	 unit.	 	 Neorealism’s	 parsimonious	 approach	 regards	 domestic	
politics,	 individual	 leaders,	 and	 regime	 types	 as	 irrelevant	 for	 the	 behavior	 of	
states	 in	 the	 anarchic	 world	 system.	 	 States’	 behavior	 boils	 down	 to	 ensuring	
their	survival	in	response	to	the	constant	defining	force	of	anarchy.	This	focus	on	
the	security	dilemma	and	the	“individualistic	pursuit	of	security”	 (Jervis,	1982)	
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leads	 structural	 realists	 to	 view	 states	 as	 seekers	 of	 self‐help	 in	 a	 zero‐sum	
environment.	From	this	perspective,	states	are	seen	as	jostling	for	position	with	
respect	 to	 each	 other;	 seeking	 relative	 advantages	 vis‐à‐vis	 other	 states	 and	
threatening	 to	 use	 force	 if	 necessary.	 	 One	 state’s	 development	 of	 nuclear	
weapons	will	cause	other	states	to	feel	threatened	and	trigger	them	developing	
their	own	weapons	programs	 in	a	chain‐like	response.	Thus	realist	accounts	of	
proliferation	 focus	 on	 assessment	 of	 states’	 technical	 capabilities	 since	 it	 is	
assumed	 that	 in	 the	absence	of	 security	guarantees,	 states	will	 seek	 to	 convert	
their	technical	capacity	into	nuclear	weapons.	
Challenging	these	assumptions,	Etel	Solingen	points	out	many	“dogs	that	
didn’t	 bark”—states	 that	 didn’t	 turn	 to	 nuclear	 weapons	 even	 while	 facing	
security	 vulnerabilities	 according	 to	 the	 realist	 criteria	 (2007,	 p.	 25).	 Egypt,	
Japan,	South	Korea,	and	Taiwan	all	were	threatened	by	nuclear	armed	neighbors	
and	regional	 rivals,	yet	 refrained	 from	establishing	nuclear	weapons	programs.	
The	 realist	 response	 is	 that	 states	 that	 have	 powerful	 alliances	 or	 nuclear	
guarantees	may	 not	 feel	 a	 need	 to	 develop	 nuclear	weapons,	 yet	North	Korea,	
Iraq,	 Israel,	 and	 Pakistan	 all	 pursued	 nuclear	weapons	 programs	while	 having	
security	 guarantees	with	 the	 US	 and	 USSR.	 On	 the	 flipside,	 when	 Libya,	 South	
Africa,	Argentina,	and	Brazil	each	decided	to	formally	renounce	nuclear	weapons,	
security	 guarantees	 from	 nuclear	 powers	 did	 not	 play	 a	 role	 in	 any	 of	 those	
nations’	decisions	(Solingen,	2007,	p.	25).		This	has	occurred	at	the	same	time	as	
a	 developing	 norm	 of	 non‐use	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 has	 been	 observed	 by	 an	
emerging	 group	 of	 scholars,	 led	 by	 Nina	 Tannenwald	 (1999).	 	 Tannenwald’s	
concept	 of	 “nuclear	 taboo”	 traces	 the	 formation	 of	 this	 norm	 through	
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investigating	the	decisions	of	US	policymakers	through	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	
(1999).			
This	more	complex	picture	of	the	proliferation	issue	leads	to	the	research	
question	 of	 this	 thesis—why	 do	 some	 states	 pursue	 nuclear	 weaponry,	 while	
other	states	do	not,	even	if	they	possess	the	technical	capability	to	acquire	them?			
This	 thesis	 investigates	 the	 underlying	 motivations	 behind	 the	 choice	 to	 “go	
nuclear”.	 	 In	 framing	 the	 issue	 of	 proliferation	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 choice,	 this	 thesis	
answers	this	question	through	interrogating	the	mindsets	of	national	leaders	and	
the	 domestic	 processes	 surrounding	 them.	 	 In	 doing	 so,	 any	 investigation	 of	
nuclear	proliferation	must	 enter	 the	 “black	box”	 of	 the	 state	 to	 interrogate	 the	
dynamics	 unseen	 by	 the	 approaches	 described	 above	 (Hudson,	 2005,	 p.	 2).		
Domestic	 dynamics	 have	 a	 profound	 impact	 on	 a	 country’s	 foreign	 policy	
behavior,	and	policymakers	play	an	integral	role	in	the	international	trajectories	
of	 their	nations.	 	The	perspectives	offered	by	the	Foreign	Policy	Analysis	(FPA)	
subfield	 address	 these	 motivations	 and	 domestic	 processes	 through	
methodologically	 rigorous	 approaches.	 	 This	 thesis	 utilizes	 role	 theory	 to	 shed	
light	 on	 these	 dynamics	 and	 seeks	 to	 explain	 proliferation	 using	 a	 broader	
perspective.			
First	 developed	 in	 the	 disciplines	 of	 sociology,	 social	 psychology,	 and	
anthropology	(Neiman	&	Hughes,	1951;	Sarbin	&	Allen,	1968;	Turner,	1956),	role	
theory	 was	 introduced	 to	 international	 relations	 and	 FPA	 by	 Kal	 Holsti	 in	 his	
seminal	work	on	national	role	conceptions	(NRC)	(1970).		Holsti	postulated	that	
national	leaders	understand	their	country’s	foreign	policy	in	terms	of	fulfilling	a	
role	 within	 a	 social	 environment	 with	 other	 states.	 	 This	 role	 conception	 is	
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formed	in	the	minds	of	policymakers	as	they	draw	on	both	domestic	sources	and	
external	prescriptions	 from	other	states.	 	As	such,	 role	 theory	models	 the	 links	
between	 the	domestic	processes	and	mindsets	of	 leaders	on	 the	one	hand,	and	
the	prescriptions	of	the	international	system	on	the	other.	 	This	ability	to	place	
domestic	dynamics	in	the	context	of	the	tensions	between	structure	and	agency	
makes	role	theory	a	promising	framework	of	analysis	for	investigating	the	puzzle	
of	nuclear	proliferation.			
	 This	thesis	investigates	the	relationship	between	national	role	conception	
and	proliferation	policy.		In	defining	national	role	conception	as	the	independent	
variable	of	analysis,	 the	sources	of	 this	NRC	are	also	explored	in	depth.	 	This	 is	
accomplished	 through	 the	 use	 of	 an	 model	 developed	 by	 Marijke	 Breuning	
(2011).		The	links	between	the	independent	variable	and	proliferation	policy,	the	
dependent	 variable	 in	 this	 analysis,	 are	 investigated	 through	 tracing	 what	
decisions	related	to	nuclear	weaponry	are	made	by	national	policymakers	in	the	
study.			
This	plan	 is	applied	 to	 two	cases	 in	a	comparative	most	similar	systems	
design	(MSSD)	format.	 	Brazil	and	India	were	chosen	for	this	analysis	based	on	
their	merits	as	comparable	cases.		As	will	be	shown	in	the	pages	to	follow,	Brazil	
and	India	can	be	considered	comparable	cases	based	on	their	similar	capabilities,	
history	of	non‐alignment,	desire	for	great	power	status/permanent	membership	
on	the	United	Nations	Security	Council	(UNSC),	and	the	level	of	development	of	
their	nuclear	industries.		In	the	case	of	Brazil,	the	military	government	of	1965‐
1985	considered	acquiring	nuclear	weaponry,	 yet	 in	 the	end,	Brazil	 formalized	
its	rejection	of	nuclear	weapons	and	entered	the	Nuclear	Nonproliferation	Treaty	
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(NPT)	as	a	non‐nuclear	weapons	 state	 (NNWS).	 	 India,	on	 the	other	hand,	 first	
detonated	 a	 nuclear	 test	 device	 in	 1974,	 but	 did	 not	 move	 to	 weaponize	 the	
technology	 until	 after	 a	 second	 series	 of	 tests	 in	 1998.	 	 India	 and	 its	 rival	
Pakistan	both	remain	outside	the	NPT	regime.		The	different	policy	outcomes	in	
these	cases	allow	the	dynamics	which	led	to	this	divergence	to	be	investigated.			
The	 structure	 of	 the	 thesis	 is	 as	 follows:	 first,	 the	 existing	 role	 theory	
literature	 is	reviewed	and	this	thesis’	contribution	placed	in	the	context	of	 that	
literature.		Next,	the	research	design,	variables	and	hypothesis,	theoretic	model,	
and	methodology	are	established	 in	detail.	 	The	model	 is	 applied	 to	 two	 cases,	
Brazil	and	India,	identifying	the	sources	of	national	role	conceptions	in	each	case	
and	tracing	the	relationship	between	these	NRCs	and	the	actual	policy	pursued	
by	the	national	leaders.		In	the	final	section	the	model	is	applied	to	the	unfolding	
case	of	Iran’s	nuclear	program	and	the	broader	implications	and	significance	of	
the	findings	are	discussed.		 	
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CHAPTER	2:	
	
LITERATURE	REVIEW	
	
	
2.1.	 Introduction	
	 Role	theory	has	received	little	attention	in	the	discipline	of	IR	as	a	whole,	
but	 it	has	been	experiencing	a	 resurgence	recently	as	Constructivist‐influenced	
perspectives	become	more	common‐place	in	IR.	 	As	more	scholars	focus	on	the	
importance	 of	 identity	 and	 non‐material	 factors	 in	 international	 politics,	 role	
theory	has	 recaptured	 the	attention	of	many	outside	of	 its	 traditional	 realm	of	
FPA.	 	 This	 literature	 review	 will	 begin	 with	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 historical	
development	of	role	theory	and	an	outline	of	its	basic	concepts,	and	then	proceed	
to	a	discussion	of	some	of	the	major	divisions	and	differences	within	role	theory	
scholarship.	 	 Finally,	 the	 current	 study’s	 contribution	 and	 placement	 in	 this	
literature	will	be	discussed.			
	
2.2	 Historical	Development	
	 Before	its	introduction	to	the	study	of	international	relations,	role	theory	
experienced	 a	 long	 development	 in	 other	 social	 science	 disciplines,	 namely	
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sociology,	social	psychology,	and	anthropology	(Neiman	&	Hughes,	1951;	Sarbin	
&	Allen,	1968;	Turner,	1956).	 	The	idea	of	using	the	concept	of	 ‘role’	to	capture	
the	 relationship	 individuals	 have	 with	 a	 larger	 social	 group	 gained	 traction	
within	 international	 relations	 scholarship	 after	 K.	 J.	 Holsti’s	 seminal	 work	
adapted	 the	 role‐based	 approach	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 describing	 the	 foreign	
policies	 of	 states	 (1970).	 	 Holsti’s	 study	 identified	 17	 roles	 through	 analyzing	
statements	made	by	foreign	policy	decision	makers	from	71	nations.		According	
to	Holsti,	the	sources	of	these	roles	are	mainly	geopolitical	and	material	factors,	
rather	than	ideational	or	cultural.	 	When	ideational	sources	of	role	conceptions	
do	appear	 in	Holsti’s	 analysis,	 they	appear	 almost	 exclusively	 in	 the	 context	of	
the	 bipolar	 Cold	 War	 climate.	 	 Overall,	 Holsti’s	 work	 paved	 the	 way	 for	 role	
theory	to	be	picked	up	by	others	as	a	theoretical	tool	in	FPA.	
	 Prompted	by	 this	 initial	 effort,	 the	 first	decades	of	 role	 theory	works	 in	
international	 relations	 focused	mainly	 on	 adapting	 the	 theoretical	 terminology	
and	frameworks	present	in	sociological	role	theory	to	the	study	of	international	
relations.		Although	this	process	resulted	in	a	rich	theoretical	vocabulary	able	to	
characterize	a	wide	variety	of	non‐material	sources	of	foreign	policy,	role	theory	
as	 a	 framework	 for	 analysis	 never	 caught	 the	 attention	 of	 the	 greater	
international	 relations	 scholarship.	 	 Role	 theory’s	 theoretic	 framework	 was	
solidified	 through	 the	 publication	 of	 Role	 Theory	 and	 Foreign	 Policy	 Analysis,	
edited	by	Stephen	G.	Walker	(1987).		Walker	(1987)	sets	four	key	questions	that	
a	“robust”	theory	of	roles	should	ask:	
5. What	is	a	role?	
6. What	are	its	sources?	
7. Under	what	conditions	do	various	roles	emerge?	
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8. Why	are	these	conditions	relevant?		
Borrowed	from	the	language	of	the	theatre,	the	concept	of	role	has	proved	
to	 be	 a	 rich	 cornerstone	 on	 which	 to	 build	 the	 theoretical	 vocabulary	 of	 role	
theory.		Generally,	role	theory	scholars	define	role	as	behavior	stemming	from	a	
normative	 understanding	 of	 a	 certain	 pattern.	 	 Holsti	 defined	 the	 term	 role	 as	
behavior	(both	decisions	and	actions),	informed	by	the	“norms	and	expectations	
cultures,	societies,	institutions,	or	groups	attach	to	particular	positions”	(1970,	p.	
239).		Phillipe	G.	Le	Prestre	defines	role	as	“expected	behavior	based	on	certain	
rules”	(1997,	p.	4).		Bruce	Biddle	takes	a	slightly	different	definition,	stating	that	
roles	are	shared,	normative,	expectations	that	prescribe	behavior	(1986).			
	 Holsti	 draws	 a	 line	 of	 distinction	 between	 role	 and	 role	 behavior	 or	
performance,	where	 the	 former	 is	 the	actor’s	 ideal	 conceptualization,	while	 the	
latter	 is	 the	 actual	 enaction	 of	 that	 conception.	 	 Generally	 in	 the	 context	 of	
international	 politics,	 role	 performance	 refers	 to	 foreign	 policy	 decisions	 and	
behavior.		According	to	role	theory,	the	source	of	positions	which	form	the	basis	
for	role	performance	 is	 twofold:	role	prescriptions,	or	normative	projections	on	
the	position	from	culture	and	social	institutions,	and	role	conceptions,	the	actor’s	
own	understanding	of	the	position	and	appropriate	behavior.	 	Holsti	states	that		
the	resulting	social	behavior	is	a	“combination	of	self‐defined	goals	and	norms	of	
conduct,	 a	 variety	 of	 situational	 variables,	 and	 social	 norms	 and	 expectations”	
(1970,	p.	239).		In	making	this	observation,	Holsti	gave	importance	to	norms	and	
social	 interaction	 in	 international	 politics	 before	 the	 constructivist	 turn	 in	 IR	
decades	later.		In	role	theory,	the	actor’s	own	agency	to	create	role	conceptions	is	
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dubbed	the	“ego”,	while	the	normative	role	of	external	factors	is	summarized	as	
the	“alter”,	both	terms	stemming	from	social	psychology.			
	 In	the	real	world,	actors	often	find	themselves	having	the	opportunity	to	
perform	 more	 than	 one	 role	 in	 a	 given	 situation.	 	 When	 these	 positions	
contradict	each	other,	the	result	is	interrole	conflict	(Barnett,	1993;	Cronin,	2001;	
Tewes,	1998).	 	Barnett	(1993)	 looks	at	 the	role	conflict	 that	arises	when	states	
are	members	of	 institutions	with	 conflicting	or	 inconsistent	 role	 requirements.		
He	uses	the	example	of	the	‘Arab	states	system’	with	its	conflict	over	respect	for	
sovereignty	on	the	one	hand	and	Pan‐Arabic	attempts	at	unification	on	the	other.			
	 Cronin	(2001)	argues	that	superpowers	face	tension	between	the	role	of	
hegemon	 and	 that	 of	 great	 power,	 between	 the	 demands	 of	 leadership	 of	 the	
international	system	and	of	exercising	superior	material	capability.	 	He	looks	at	
the	 example	 of	 the	 US‐UN	 relationship	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 handling	 of	 Iraq	
between	 1991‐1999	 and	 finds	 that	 the	 United	 States	 sometimes	 chooses	 to	
submit	itself	to	UN	procedure,	while	in	other	cases	choosing	for	more	unilateral	
action,	behavior	he	attributes	to	role	conflict	inherent	in	the	position	of	being	a	
superpower.			
	 Finally,	 Tewes	 (1998)	 examines	 Germany’s	 attitude	 towards	 EU	
enlargement	 in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	(CEE)	 in	 the	post‐Cold	War	period.		
He	 describes	 how	 Germany’s	 role	 within	 the	 EU	 of	 pushing	 for	 deeper	
integration	 was	 challenged	 by	 the	 prospect	 of	 eastern	 expansion.	 	 Tewes	
chronicles	how	Germany	under	Helmut	Khol’s	 leadership	 attempted	 to	 resolve	
this	 role	 conflict	 through	 first	 denial,	 then	 through	 oscillating	 between	 the	
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conflicting	 roles,	 then	 finally	 by	 attempting	 to	 link	 the	 two	 contradictory	 roles	
into	a	role	merger	(Tewes,	1998,	p.	127).	
	 Another	key	aspect	of	role	theory	is	the	audience.		The	audience	observes	
the	process	of	role	formation	and	enaction	and	may	passively	or	actively	interact	
with	 the	performance,	 as	 long	as	 the	 actor’s	 behavior	 is	 public	 and	observable	
(Thies,	2013,	p.	35).	 	The	response	of	 the	audience,	either	negative	or	positive,	
serves	as	feedback	that	helps	to	shape	future	role	behavior.		According	to	Sarbin	
and	Allen	(1968,	p.	534)	,	the	audience	validates	the	appropriateness	of	the	role	
while	giving	cues	 on	expected	patterns	of	behavior.	 	This	 is	 reinforced	 through	
positive	and	negative	feedback	in	response	to	the	actor’s	role	enaction,	with	the	
audience	tending	to	reward	stable	role	behavior	over	time.				
	 The	 process	 of	 settling	 into	 a	 ‘proper’	 role	 is	 known	 as	 role	 location.		
Based	on	what	it	infers	from	the	audience,	as	well	as	its	own	perceptions	of	the	
prescriptions	and	expectations	associated	with	the	position,	the	actor	locates	the	
role	and	deems	it	appropriate	for	the	situation.		Thies	(2012,	2013)	equates	role	
location	with	state	socialization	and	views	determination	of	roles	as	a	bargaining	
process	involving	the	actor’s	perceptions	of	the	positions	of	both	self	and	other.		
In	contrast,	Walker	(1981,	1987)	views	this	process	through	the	lens	of	exchange	
theory.	 	 According	 to	 Walker,	 the	 distance	 between	 role	 conceptions	 and	
structural	 cues	 is	 directly	 related	 to	 the	 level	 of	 stability	 and	 ambiguity	 of	 the	
role	 location	process.	 	When	 the	actor’s	 role	 conception	and	 the	 cues	 from	 the	
audience	are	consistent	with	one	another,	the	role	location	process	is	relatively	
smooth	 and	 the	 structure	 tends	 to	 reward	 actors	 with	 conceptions	 consistent	
with	its	cues.		When	significant	inconsistencies	exist	between	the	two,	however,	
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the	role	location	process	becomes	one	of	conflict	as	the	audience	seeks	to	force	
the	actor	into	an	appropriate	role	through	punishment	or	aggression.	
	 With	a	few	notable	exceptions	(e.g.	Walker,	1987),	most	studies	that	used	
role	 theory	 during	 this	 period	 were	 located	 strictly	 within	 FPA	 and	 did	 not	
attempt	to	dialogue	with	wider	theoretical	debates	in	IR.		Those	that	did	engage,	
did	so	almost	exclusively	within	a	narrow	structural	realist	framework	(Walker,	
1979,	1987,	1992;	Wish,	1980).	 	These	studies	were	produced	overwhelmingly	
by	 American	 scholars	 grounded	 in	 the	 use	 of	 cognitive	 approaches	 to	 foreign	
policy	analysis.		This	group	received	company	with	the	advent	of	Constructivism.	
	 With	 Wendt’s	 oft‐cited	 article	 on	 the	 social	 construction	 of	 anarchy	
(1992),	 role	 theory	 was	 adopted	 by	 a	 new	 series	 of	 scholars	 attempting	 to	
account	for	ideas,	identity,	and	other	social	factors	in	the	foreign	policy	of	states.		
Responding	 to	 Wendt’s	 challenge	 to	 develop	 an	 empirical	 framework	 which	
incorporated	social	constitution	of	actors	at	its	core,	academics	began	using	role	
theory	 to	 discuss	 questions	 of	 identity	 in	 foreign	 policy.	 	 Whereas	 American	
scholars	 tended	 to	 focus	 on	 cognitive	 (and	 therefore	 more	 unit‐level)	
approaches,	these	mainly	European	scholars	tended	to	have	a	more	structural	or	
systemic	focus.		In	the	next	section,	the	major	divisions	between	these	two	camps	
will	 be	 explored	 with	 respect	 to	 their	 definition	 of	 role,	 relationship	 with	 the	
structure‐agency	 debate,	 and	methodology.	 	 After	 this,	 a	 third	 group	 of	works	
motivated	by	integrating	role	theory	into	IR	theory	will	be	presented.	
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2.3	 Structure	and	agency:	diversity	of	perspectives	in	role	theory	
	 In	 the	 years	 since	 Holsti	 first	 introduced	 the	 language	 of	 roles	 to	 the	
discipline	 of	 foreign	policy	 analysis,	 scholars	 have	developed	 a	wide	 variety	 of	
perspectives	 on	 how	 roles	 explain	 different	 aspects	 of	 international	 politics.		
Although	an	initial	group	of	scholars	began	to	both	expound	Holsti’s	theoretical	
framework	 and	 apply	 it	 	 to	 specific	 cases	 in	 international	 politics	 (e.g.	 Shih,	
1988),	the	impact	of	role	theory	was	not	really	felt	outside	of	the	scope	of	FPA.		
Constructivism	brought	 a	 renewed	 interest	 in	 the	 role	 of	 identity,	 culture,	 and	
social	interaction	to	a	wider	audience	in	IR	(Checkel,	1998;	Weldes,	1996;	Wendt,	
1992,	 1999),	 and	 provided	 an	 impetus	 for	 a	 new	 wave	 of	 norms‐based	 role	
theory	scholarship	(Thies	&	Breuning,	2012).		The	current	state	of	role	theory	in	
IR	can	be	divided	into	two	rough	camps	based	on	their	relationship	to	IR	theory:	
one	group	of	 role	 theory	 scholars	have	 studied	 foreign	policy	at	 the	 state‐level	
while	remaining	within	the	traditional	bounds	of	FPA,	while	the	other	has	been	
more	open	 to	 incorporating	constructivist	 insights	on	national	 identity	and	 the	
importance	of	ideology	and	norms	in	foreign	policy	decision	making.		This	trend	
follows	wider	trends	within	the	FPA	discipline	as	a	whole	(Kaarbo,	2003).		In	the	
following	sections,	these	groupings	will	be	explored	further.	
	
Structuralist Perspectives 
	 In	his	seminal	study,	Holsi	identified	17	distinct	role	conceptions	through	
an	 analysis	 of	 statements	 uttered	 by	 the	 foreign	 policy	makers	 of	 71	 different	
states.	 	 The	 sources	 of	 Holsti’s	 role	 conceptions	 are	 mainly	 geographic	 and	
material	factors,	rather	than	ideational	or	cultural.	 	The	only	exceptions	are	the	
ideational	 motives	 expressed	 by	 mainly	 Communist‐bloc	 states,	 yet	 these	
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sources	are	assigned	no	meaning	outside	the	bipolar	framework	of	the	Cold	War.		
After	introducing	the	concepts	of	role	tension	and	role	conflict,	Holsti	pairs	roles	
he	 deems	 to	 be	 incompatible	 to	 look	 for	 the	 signs	 of	 the	 stress	 actors	 caught	
between	contradictory	role	conceptions.	 	Holsti	focused	on	states’	relationships	
with	the	Cold	War	conflict	(satellite,	non‐aligned,	faithful	ally,	etc.)	as	their	main	
role	in	the	international	system.		With	the	end	of	the	climate	of	bipolarity,	states	
began	 to	 express	 their	 identities	 in	 new	 ways	 outside	 of	 the	 old	 Cold	 War	
framework.		Perhaps	anticipating	how	his	work	might	be	misused,	Holsti	warned	
that	 “careless	 use	 of	 these	 terms	 may	 hide	 more	 than	 they	 explain	 about	 a	
government’s	 foreign	 policies”	 (1970,	 p.	 308).	 	 Overall,	 Holsti’s	 contribution	
remains	relevant	today—he	introduced	the	theoretical	language	still	in	use—but	
remains	limited	by	the	historical	context	of	when	it	was	written.			
	 Wish	 (1980)	 followed	 Holsti	 in	 producing	 a	 large‐n	 sample	 of	 NRCs,	
looking	 not	 just	 at	 relationships	 with	 superpowers,	 but	 at	 more	 regional	
relationships	 as	 well.	 	 Her	 study	 attempted	 to	 categorize	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	
national	 role	 conceptions,	 not	 just	 “the	 perceptions	 of	 the	 superpowers	 (Wish,	
1980,	p.	535).		These	conceptions	were	then	compared	with	actual	foreign	policy	
behavior	using	the	Comparative	Research	on	the	Events	of	Nations	(CREON)	data	
set.	 	Wish	 came	 to	many	 similar	 conclusions	 as	Holsti	 using	a	wider	 sample	of	
data	while	 focusing	more	 on	 role	 performance	 rather	 than	 the	 sources	 of	 role	
conceptions.	 	 Wish’s	 major	 contribution	 to	 the	 role	 theory	 literature	 was	 the	
finding	that	leaders	from	the	same	state	had	more	similarity	in	role	conceptions	
with	respect	to	each	other	when	compared	with	those	of	other	states.			
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	 Although	 Wish’s	 key	 finding	 seemed	 to	 indicate	 the	 importance	 of	
domestic	 sources	 of	 national	 role	 conception,	 subsequent	 studies	 concentrated	
on	 other,	more	 structural	 dimensions	 of	 role	 theory.	 	Walker	 (1987)	 seeks	 to	
merge	role	 theory	with	structural	 realism	 in	connection	with	Waltz’s	Theory	of	
International	 Politics	 (1979).	 	 Walker	 understands	 the	 self‐help	 nature	 of	 the	
Waltzian	international	system	to	emphasize	foreign	policy	behavior	of	states	as	
the	 primary	 means	 for	 advancing	 domestic	 policy	 goals.	 	 Following	 Waltz’s	
separation	 of	 levels	 of	 analysis,	Walker	 proposes	 four	mechanisms	 to	 describe	
the	 interaction	 between	 unit	 and	 structure.	 	 First,	 the	 previously	 mentioned	
exchange	 process	 incorporates	 the	 cues	 and	 response	 of	 the	 audience	 to	 the	
actor’s	role	conceptions.	 	Second,	the	role	location	process	describes	the	actor’s	
incorporation	of	cues	and	its	own	internal	perceptions	to	arrive	at	a	shared	set	of	
role	 expectations.	 	 Third,	Walker	proposes	 a	process	 of	 role	 conflict	 to	 explain	
what	 happens	 when	 these	 shared	 expectations	 break	 down.	 	 Finally,	 Walker	
theorizes	that	an	institution‐building	process	formalizes	the	expectations	formed	
through	the	previous	processes,	informing	future	role	conceptions.			
	 Walker	then	tests	these	propositions	through	a	study	of	states	seeking	aid	
in	the	context	of	the	Cold	War.		He	observed	that	states	that	provided	aid	did	so	
when	 it	was	beneficial	 for	 their	own	domestic	contexts.	 	When	aid	was	denied,	
the	would‐be	recipient	would	either	turn	to	another	source	or	continue	to	persist	
in	asking	for	assistance.		Walker	saw	at	the	heart	of	the	patron‐client	relationship	
a	drive	for	each	state	to	pursue	its	own	domestic	policy	goals.		When	these	goals	
became	unachievable	due	to	negative	pushback	from	other	states	in	the	system,	
he	observed	a	type	of	negotiation,	which	he	modeled	using	a	modified	version	of	
exchange	 theory.	 	 Walker	 identifies	 five	 basic	 roles	 states	 can	 play	 in	 the	
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international	 system:	 consumer,	 producer,	 belligerent,	 facilitator,	 and	
provocateur.	 	In	the	end,	Walker	showed	how	a	closer	connection	between	role	
theory	 and	 other	 perspectives	 (most	 significantly	 IR	 theory)	 could	 result	 in	
important	 insights.	 	Yet	 the	roles	he	 identified	remain	chained	to	 the	Cold	War	
context	he	was	attempting	 to	explain,	and	his	 focus	on	structure	prevented	his	
analysis	from	benefiting	from	a	more	detailed	focus	on	domestic	factors	affecting	
the	 role	 location	 process.	 	 Other	 studies	 would	 fill	 in	 the	 domestic	 gaps,	
providing	additional	insights.	
	 For	example,	Chafetz,	et	al.	examine	the	decisions	of	the	Belorussian	and	
Ukrainian	 governments	 to	 give	 their	 inherited	 Soviet	 nuclear	weapons	back	 to	
the	newly‐formed	Russian	Federation	using	a	role	theory‐based	framework.		The	
authors	looked	at	statements	by	decision	makers	at	the	highest	level	concerning	
foreign	 and	 defense	 policy	 to	 determine	 their	 national	 role	 conceptions.		
According	to	the	authors,	roles	give	actors	“a	stable	sense	of	 identity”	(Chafetz,	
Abramson,	&	Grillot,	1996,	p.	733).	 	Chafetz,	et	al.	 took	the	original	 list	of	roles	
identified	 by	 Holsti	 (1970)	 and	 categorized	 them	 as	 “roles	 that	 guide	 states	
toward,	roles	that	guide	states	away	from,	and	roles	that	are	indeterminate	with	
respect	to	compliance	with	the	nuclear	non‐proliferation	regime”	(1996,	p.	733).		
They	 identify	 four	 roles	which	 tend	 to	 lead	 towards	 seeking	 nuclear	weapons:	
regional	leader,	global	system	leader,	regional	protector,	and	anti‐imperialist.			
	 Chafetz,	 et	 al.	 hypothesized	 that	Belarus	would	 be	 likely	 to	 return	 their	
nuclear	weapons	easily	because	 the	Belorussian	NRCs	 they	 identified	were	not	
associated	with	nuclear	 proliferation.	 	 In	 contrast,	 the	Ukraine	would	 consider	
retaining	 a	 nuclear	 deterrent	 in	 keeping	with	 Ukrainian	 leaders’	 perception	 of	
their	 nation’s	 role	 as	 a	 leader	 in	 the	 region	 and	 balancer	 against	 Russian	
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influence.	 	 After	 concluding	 their	 analysis,	 Chafetz,	 et	 al.	 acknowledge	 that	 the	
roles	 they	 identified	 neither	 predict	 nor	 explain	 policy	 decisions	 regarding	
nuclear	weapons—they	conclude	that	there	must	be	a	“third	factor”	or	variable	
which	contributes	to	a	desire	for	nuclear	weapons	(1996,	p.	749).		Chafetz,	et	al.	
have	been	 criticized	 for	 conflating	 role	 and	 identity,	 at	 times	using	both	 terms	
interchangeably	(Kaarbo,	2003).		This	conflation	has	the	potential	to	obscure	the	
subtle	yet	important	differences	between	identity	and	other	sources	of	role,	and	
the	role	itself.		In	addition,	Kaarbo	points	out	that	this	enables	other	scholars	to	
reinvent	 the	 “role	 wheel”	 with	 a	 focus	 on	 identity,	 missing	 the	 potential	
contributions	 of	 a	 more	 rigorous	 role	 theory	 (2003).			
	 Philippe	G.	Le	Prestre’s	important	edited	volume,	Role	Quests	in	the	Post‐
Cold	War	Era	(1997),	provides	a	comprehensive	example	of	a	role	theory	based	
analysis	 of	 post	 Cold	War	 policy	making.	 	 Through	 individual	 chapters	 on	 the	
USA	 (Chotard,	 1997;	 Le	 Prestre,	 1997),	 Russian	 Federation/USSR	 (Thibault	 &	
Levesque,	 1997),	 China	 (Beylerian	 &	 Canivet,	 1997),	 Japan	 (MacLeod,	 1997b),	
Canada	(Donneur	&	Alain,	1997),	Germany	(LeTourneau	&	Rakel,	1997),	France	
(Thumerelle	&	Le	Prestre,	1997),	and	the	UK	(MacLeod,	1997a),	 the	authors	of	
Role	 Quests	 examine	 how	 these	 states	 experienced	 the	 dynamic	 conditions	 in	
international	 politics	 from	 1989‐1993.	 	 	 All	 the	 authors	 used	 a	 unified	
methodolgy	 (rare	 for	 edited	 volumes),	 yet	 each	 author	 was	 given	 enough	
discrecion	to	develop	their	own	interpretation—a	strategy	which	contributes	to	
the	success	of	 the	authors’	analysis.	 	 In	his	 introduction	 to	 the	book	Le	Prestre	
describes	the	methodology	and	identifies	the	three	central	variables	of	the	study:	
identity,	status,	and	role.		Yet	because	each	individual	author	defines	these	terms	
slightly	 differently	 based	 on	 the	 state	 they	 are	 studying,	 distinguishing	 the	
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conceptual	 differences	 between	 status,	 identity,	 and	 role	 is	 difficult	 and	 the	
relationship	between	them	is	unclear.		This	makes	it	difficult	to	compare	cases	to	
each	other	given	discrepencies	in	the	understanding	of	role	used	by	the	authors.			
	 Rather	than	identifying	a	single	formulaic	pathway	for	the	development	of	
national	roles,	Le	Prestre	deems	 identity	and	status	as	 two	“poles	of	 influence”	
which	 comprise	 internal	 and	 external	 determinants	 on	 the	 expressed	 roles.		
According	to	Le	Prestre,	the	balance	of	contribution	from	identity	and	status	may	
vary	 from	 state	 to	 state.	 	 However,	 as	 Kuzma	 points	 out	 in	 her	 review	 article		
(1998),	Le	Prestre	et	al.	fail	to	show	role	theory	as	capable	of	producing	foreign	
policy	insights	that	other	existing	FPA	approaches	are	not	already	making	with	a	
higher	 level	of	detail.	 	While	 the	scope	of	 the	work	done	by	Le	Prestre	et	al.	 is	
certainly	impressive,	their	work	falls	short	of	taking	advantage	of	the	rich	social	
aspect	of	role	theory,	opting	instead	for	a	more	structural	variant.			
	 More	recent	work	in	this	camp	of	role	theory	includes	Walker,	Malici,	and	
Schafer’s	 edited	 volume	 (2011).	 	 Walker	 et	 al.	 advocate	 for	 the	 merging	 of	
cognitive	 approaches	 to	 FPA	 borrowed	 from	 behavioral	 psychology	 with	
Waltzian	structural	IR	theory.		Walker	proposes	a	“binary	role	theory”	to	explain	
the	 exercise	 of	 social	 power	 (foreign	 policy	 behavior)	 and	 cognitive	 power	
(bounded	 rationality).	 	 He	 deems	 his	 conceptualization	 as	 “binary”	 because	 in	
realism	 all	 power	 is	 distributed	 as	 either	 symmetrical	 or	 asymmetrical,	 and	
interests	 either	 as	 vital	 or	 secondary.	 	 According	 to	Walker,	 role	 location	 is	 a	
process	of	both	“navigation	and	construction.		The	interactions	of	Ego	and	Alter	
communicate,	 define,	 construct,	 and	 alter	 a	 definition	 of	 the	 social	 self‐in‐
situation”	(Walker	et	al.,	2011,	p.	270).		According	to	the	authors,	the	relationship	
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between	 Ego	 and	 Alter	 is	 a	 recursive	 (two‐way)	 system	 seeking	 equilibrium.		
That	 is,	 the	 system	 tends	 towards	 stability	 as	 Ego	 and	 Alter	 resolve	 their	
diametrical	oppositions	through	an	adaptive,	recursive	relationship.			
Walker	 et	 al.’s	 major	 contribution	 to	 the	 literature	 is	 their	
conceptualization	of	this	process	of	role	location	as	a	recursive	interaction	of	Ego	
and	Alter.	 	 For	Walker,	 Ego	 is	 the	 cognitive	dimension	of	 the	 decision	maker’s	
own	 viewpoint;	 Alter	 represents	 the	 material,	 geographic,	 and	 structural	
dictations	of	the	system	on	the	actor’s	available	options.		While	significant	for	its	
attempt	 to	 incorporate	 behavioral	 and	 structural	 theories	 of	 foreign	 policy	
analysis,	 Walker	 et	 al.	 leave	 the	 sources	 of	 decision	 makers’	 own	 identity	
conceptions	 unexplored.	 	 Identity	 components	 such	 as	 culture,	 history,	 and	
nationalism	 are	 assumed	 to	 be	 incorporated	 in	 individual	 leaders’	 cognitive	
processes.			This	enables	Walker,	et	al.	to	connect	their	structural	role	theory	to	a	
cognitive	theory	of	leader’s	operational	codes.		Ultimately,	Walker,	et	al.	portray	
role	 theory	 as	 a	 flexible	 and	 relevant	 tool	 for	 viewing	 both	 micro	 and	
macroscopic	processes	in	international	politics.			
Overall,	 without	 a	 proper	 treatment	 of	 the	 ideational	 sources	 of	 role	
conceptions,	 structurally‐focused	 role	 theory	 approaches	 have	 limited	 insights	
for	a	world	no	longer	defined	by	the	Cold	War	conflict.		From	a	more	theoretical	
perspective,	 the	 continued	 focus	 on	 structural	 factors	 comes	 at	 the	 expense	 of	
incorporating	social	 identities	 in	 the	analysis.	 	When	compared	with	other	FPA	
perspectives	 that	 are	 more	 grounded	 in	 models	 of	 domestic	 politics,	 these	
behavioral	 models	 seem	 to	 have	 much	 more	 predictive	 power.	 	 Yet	 for	 other	
scholars,	role	theory’s	value	comes	from	its	inclusion	of	socialization	processes,	
norms,	and	 ideational	variables	 to	 the	study	of	 foreign	policy	and	 international	
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politics.		In	the	next	section,	this	group	of	scholars	will	be	introduced,	as	well	as	
several	recent	attempts	to	use	role	theory	to	connect	FPA	with	wider	discourses	
in	IR	theory.	
	
Agent‐Centered Perspectives 
More	recent	role	theory	research	has	moved	away	from	limited	structural	
perspectives	 and	 towards	 a	 more	 agent‐centered	 approach.	 	 Rather	 than	
focusing	 on	 how	 role	 conceptions	 are	 “handed	 down”	 by	 the	 rigidity	 of	 the	
international	system,	these	scholars	have	focused	more	on	the	actors’	own	NRCs	
and	 their	 ideational	 and	 material	 sources.	 	 However,	 this	 stream	 within	 role	
theory	 would	 benefit	 from	 lessons	 learned	 in	 FPA	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 the	
international‐domestic	 foreign	 policy	 nexus	 and	 the	 cognitive	 processes	 of	
leaders.		Overall,	constructivist	scholars	have	been	‘rediscovering’	role	theory	as	
a	 methodologically	 rigorous	 tool	 for	 studying	 the	 interaction	 between	 agency	
and	structure,	a	key	focus	of	the	constructivist	paradigm.	
In	 her	 chapter	 of	 Harnisch,	 Frank,	 and	 Maull’s	 edited	 volume	 (2011),	
Marijke	 Breuning	 locates	 current	 role	 theory	 scholarship	 within	 the	 wider	
theoretical	 discussion	 about	 the	 relationship	 between	 agency	 and	 structure,	
while	 remaining	 committed	 to	 empirical	 efforts	 to	 identify	 generalities	 in	
international	 politics	 through	 hypothesis	 testing,	 falsification,	 and	
methodological	consistency.		A	focus	on	roles,	according	to	Breuning,	holds	great	
promise	 because	 at	 a	 fundamental	 level	 constructivism	 understands	 foreign	
policy	 behavior	 as	 both	 being	 a	 product	 of	 a	 socialization	 process	 as	 well	 as	
having	 a	 socially‐interpreted	 meaning.	 	 Role	 theory	 in	 turn,	 offers	 the	
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constructivist	 paradigm	 an	 empirical	 toolkit	 capable	 of	 identifying	 patterns	 in	
complex	 cases	 without	 oversimplification.	 	 Breuning	 points	 out	 how	
constructivist	work	on	identity	and	self‐image	largely	ignores	previous	work	on	
those	 topics	 within	 role	 theory.	 	 She	 observes	 that	 like	 most	 role	 theorists,	
constructivist	 scholars	 are	 attempting	 to	 view	 states’	 behavior	 not	 just	 as	 the	
consequence	of	their	material	capabilities,	but	rather	understand	the	perspective	
of	decision‐makers	and	their	interpretations	of	their	social	context.		
Breuning	pieces	together	a	comprehensive	framework	for	understanding	
the	agency‐structure	problem	centered	around	the	national	role	conception.		She	
views	 the	national	 role	 conception	 as	defined	by	policymakers	 and	 relevant	 to	
specific	 issues	 and	 geographic	 contexts.	 	 She	 classifies	 the	 sources	 of	 role	
conceptions	 as	 ideational	 and	material.	 	 Ideational	 sources	 of	 role	 include	 the	
decision	 maker’s	 perception	 of	 the	 state’s	 identity,	 cultural	 heritage,	 and	
domestic	 audience.	 	 Material	 sources	 summarize	 the	 decision	 maker’s	
assessment	 of	 capability	 and	 opportunity	 to	 act.	 	 These	 sources	 feed	 into	 a	
national	 role	 conception,	 which	 is	 then	 enacted	 through	 actual	 foreign	 policy	
behavior.			
First	and	foremost,	the	phrase	“decision	maker’s	perception”	is	important	
because	 the	 actor	 in	 question	 has	 cognitive	 agency	 to	 determine	 the	 relative	
importance	 of	 these	 various	 inputs	 to	 the	 role	 conception.	 	 In	 addition,	 even	
seemingly‐easily	 quantified	 concepts	 like	material	 capability	 prove	 difficult	 for	
researchers	 to	 nail	 down	 objectively,	 let	 alone	 complex	 variables	 like	 culture,	
history,	and	national	identity.	 	This	brings	together	a	focus	on	the	agency	of	the	
actor	in	question	with	a	cognitive	model	present	to	describe	the	role	conception	
process.				
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Bruening	sees	the	inputs	of	an	actor’s	national	role	conception	as	twofold:	
she	breaks	them	down	into	the	decision	maker’s	own	perceptions	of	the	state’s	
identity	 and	 of	material	 capabilities.	 	 The	 decision	maker’s	 perception	 of	 their	
state’s	 unique	 identity,	 cultural	 heritage,	 formative	 events	 in	 history,	 and	
domestic	 audience	 all	 contribute	 to	 the	 ideational	 sources	 of	 national	 role	
conceptions.	 	Structural	sources	of	role	conception	contain	the	decisionmaker’s	
perception	 of	 the	 state’s	 usable	 power	 resources,	 (i.e.	material	 capabilities)	 as	
calculated	relative	to	other	relevant	states	and	the	opportunity	to	act	given	their	
perception	of	 their	 circumstances	 (both	 in	 the	 long	 and	 short‐term)	 (Breuning	
2011,	p.	26).	
Some	 role	 theory	 scholars	 concentrate	 their	 efforts	 on	 the	 interaction	
between	structural	and	unit	levels,	while	others	place	the	decision	maker	at	the	
heart	of	their	analysis.		Aggestam	(2004)	compares	the	role	statements	of	three	
states,	 Britain,	 France,	 and	 Germany,	 with	 regards	 to	 both	 domestic	 and	
supranational	 levels	 of	 analysis.	 	 She	defines	 role	 conception	 as	 a	 collection	 of	
norms	 that	 catalog	 expected	 behavior,	 a	 ‘road	map’	 used	 by	 policy	 makers	 to	
simplify	 the	 decisionmaking	 process.	 	 Aggestam	 breaks	 her	 analysis	 into	 two	
sections:	 a	 focus	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 policymakers’	 understanding	 of	
national	identity	and	foreign	policy	behavior,	and	a	section	on	‘Europeanization’,	
or	 the	 effects	 of	 state	 socialization	on	 individual	 national	 foreign	policies.	 	 She	
further	develops	a	framework	for	analyzing	these	structural	role	prescriptions	in	
the	 context	 of	 the	 prospect	 of	 a	 single	 European	 Union	 foreign	 policy	 in	 her	
chapter	of	Elgström	and	Smith’s	edited	volume	(Aggestam,	2003).		Generally,	the	
contributers	 to	 Elgström	 and	 Smith	 (2003)	 look	 at	 ideas,	 norms	 and	 their	
institutional	acceptance.		The	authors	remain	well	within	realm	of	constructivist	
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high‐level	 theorizing	and	 rarely	 investigate	 individual	decision	makers	or	unit‐
level	 processes.	 	 Yet	 in	 this	 social	 environment,	 change	 clearly	 occurs	 through	
such	 unit‐level	 processes.	 	 Overall,	 Elgström	 and	 Smith	 and	 their	 contributers	
would	have	benefited	from	devoting	more	attention	to	the	unit‐level	sources	of	
norm	development	in	the	European	Union	context.	
In	contrast,	Bruening	(1995)	focuses	directly	on	the	unit	level	through	her	
emphasis	of	 the	centrality	of	decison	makers.	 	Breuning	uses	a	similar	systems	
design	 to	 compare	 the	Netherlands,	 Belgium	 and	Great	 Britain	with	 respect	 to	
their	foreign	aid	policies.		She	organizes	her	research	typologies	according	to	two	
questions	 actors	 face:	 first,	 does	 the	 international	 environment	 generally	
constrain	 them	 or	 present	 opportunities	 for	 action,	 and	 second,	 is	 the	
international	environment	essentially	orderly	or	anarchic	in	nature?		This	yields	
four	different	 role	 conceptions	 for	 comparison:	Good	Neighbor	 (constraint	 and	
orderly	environment),	Merchant	(constraint	and	anarchic	environment),	Power	
Broker	 (opportunity	and	anarchic	environment),	 and	Activist	 (opportunity	and	
orderly	environment).	 	Breuning	specifies	 that	 these	 roles	are	 issue	specific,	 in	
this	 case	 referring	 to	 each	 nation’s	 foreign	 aid	 policy.	 	 Breuning	 looks	 for	
evidence	 of	 these	 role	 conceptions	 through	 content	 analysis	 of	 parliamentary	
debate	on	the	issue.	 	She	then	examined	the	relative	size	and	type	(bilateral	vs.	
multilateral)	of	each	states’	foreign	assistance	budget.		In	her	analysis,	Breuning	
assumes	that	“individual	differences	between	decision	makers	who	represent	the	
same	state	are	bounded	by	parameters	defined	by	their	commonalities”	(1995,	p.	
253)	 and	 finds	 that	 national	 decision	makers	 consistently	 emphasize	 the	 same	
reasons	 for	 foreign	assistance	 regardless	of	party.	 	Overall,	Bruening’s	 analysis	
emphasizes	 the	 centrality	 of	 decision	 makers	 to	 a	 role	 theory‐based	 research	
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program	 and	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 role	 concept	 for	 tracing	 the	 rhetoric	 of	
decision	makers	to	the	actual	policy	actions.			
Within	 the	 camp	 of	 scholars	 influenced	 by	 Wendt’s	 work	 on	 identity	
formation	through	interaction,	two	subgroups	can	be	identified.		Some	scholars,	
including	 Catalinac	 (2007)	 and	Walker,	 et	 al.	 (2011),	 incorporate	 elements	 of	
Wendt’s	identity	theory	while	continuing	to	focus	on	the	resulting	foreign	policy	
behavior	in	keeping	with	the	FPA	research	program.	 	Others,	 including	Trondal	
(2001),	Tewes	(1998),	Aggestam	(2003,	2004),	and	Brittingham	(2007)	use	role	
theory	as	a	tool	to	explore	the	foreign	policy	implications	of	identity.			
Trondal	 (2001)	 uses	 role	 theory	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 bridge	 the	
constructivist‐institutionalist	divide.	 	According	to	Trondal,	organization	theory	
is	 focused	 on	 the	 structural	 constraints	 of	 the	 behavior	 of	 individuals	 in	 an	
institutional	setting.		Constructivism,	on	the	other	hand,	puts	central	features	of	
the	self	as	variables,	such	as	identity,	role	conception,	norms,	etc.		Trondal	states	
that	 constructivism	 is	 mainly	 abstract	 and	 theoretical	 in	 nature,	 lending	 itself	
well	to	integrative	efforts	with	other	existing	perspectives	in	IR		She	investigates	
the	 role	 conceptions	 of	 national	 government	 officials	 who	 participate	 in	 EU	
committees,	asking	whether	they	personally	consider	their	role	primarily	issue‐
area	 expert,	 national	 representative,	 or	 supranational	 agent.	 	 Through	 these	
interviews	with	decision	makers,	Trondal	observes	a	‘logic	of	appropriateness’	in	
how	policy	makers	display	different	roles	based	on	their	institutional	contexts.	
Like	 Trondal’s	 study	 (2001),	 Catalinac	 (2007)	 turns	 to	 a	 form	 of	 role	
theory	 in	 order	 to	 substantiate	 the	 abstract	 constructivist	 framework	 she	 is	
using	 to	 explain	 why	 Japan	 reacted	 differently	 to	 international	 calls	 for	 its	
participation	 the	 1991	 and	 2003	 Iraq	 Wars.	 	 Catalinac	 examined	 decision	
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makers’	rhetoric	regarding	the	question	of	Japanese	involvement	in	the	conflict	
and	 summarized	 the	 statements	 into	 three	 roles	 expressed	during	 this	 debate:	
Pacifist,	Pragmatic	Multilateralist,	and	Centrist.	 	She	only	views	role	statements	
directly	associated	with	the	Iraq	war	decision,	looking	at	both	the	content	of	the	
statements	and	the	level	of	contestation	of	the	referent	identity	in	the	context	of	
the	statement.			
While	 Catalinac	 is	 concerned	 with	 a	 single	 decision	 point,	 Brittingham	
(2007)	 takes	 a	 broader	 look	 at	 identity	 and	 nationalism	 through	 a	 role‐based	
perspective	 in	 his	 article	 on	 Chinese	 nationalism.	 	 Brittingham	 defines	 role	 as	
“identity	 mobilized	 in	 a	 specific	 situation”	 (2007,	 p.	 16),	 and	 therefore	 treats	
Chinese	nationalism	as	a	role	or	specific	manifestation	of	Chinese	identity.		This	
seems	to	contradict	his	claims	that	Chinese	nationalism	can	be	understood	as	a	
reactive	 response	 to	 international	 events	 rather	 than	 domestic	 political	
manipulation.			
Overall,	while	constructivist	perspectives	in	role	theory	have	successfully	
shifted	 the	 focus	 from	 structural	 treatments	 of	 role	 to	 more	 identity‐based	
accounts,	this	literature	suffers	from	a	lack	of	methodological	consistency.		There	
is	 very	 little	 agreement	 even	on	what	 constitutes	 a	 role—is	 role	 a	 grouping	 of	
associated	norms	 (e.g.	 Catalinac	 2007),	 is	 it	 a	mobilization	 of	 self‐identity	 (e.g.	
Brittingham	2007),	 or	 understood	 best	 in	 a	 social	 context	 (eg.	 Trondal	 2001)?		
Without	much	methodological	consistency,	it	is	difficult	to	find	common	points	of	
reference	with	the	other	strands	in	the	role	theory	literature.		Although	there	are	
quite	 a	 few	 constructivists	 who	 have	 used	 role	 theory	 as	 part	 of	 their	 own	
interest	 in	 identity,	 there	are	 few	constructivist	scholars	 interested	 in	engaging	
the	whole	of	the	role	theory	literature	and	advancing	it	as	a	valid	methodology.		
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In	 response	 to	 these	 trends,	 a	 third	 group	 of	 role	 theory	 scholars	 has	 been	
advocating	for	more	fundamental	integration	of	role	theory	with	IR	theory.			
	
Integrationist	Perspectives	
	 This	group	of	role	 theorists	seeks	to	 integrate	role	 theory	and	IR	theory	
through	 developing	 methodological	 consistency	 and	 engaging	 concepts	 within	
the	realm	of	IR	theory	instead	of	remaining	confined	to	the	more	narrow	scope	of	
FPA.	 	 While	 remaining	 focused	 on	 foreign	 policy	 behavior	 of	 states,	 these	
scholars	 are	 interested	 in	 questions	 also	 being	 addressed	 by	 IR	 theory.	 	 The	
contributors	to	the	recent	(2012)	special	issue	of	Foreign	Policy	Analysis	suggest	
several	 avenues	 regarding	 this	 integration.	 	 Thies	 (2012,	 2013)	 has	 pursued	 a	
focus	 on	 the	 socialization	 of	 states,	 Harnisch	 (2012)	 explores	 interactionist	
perspectives	on	foreign	policy	learning,	and	Bengsson	and	Elgström	(2012)	focus	
on	 the	mutually‐constitutive	 tension	 between	 agency	 and	 structure	 in	 the	 role	
performance	 of	 actors	 and	 its	 change	 over	 time.	 	 Overall,	 Thies	 and	 Bruening	
(2012)	 call	 for	 a	 return	 to	 the	 methodological	 rigor	 of	 earlier	 role	 theory	
scholarship	 with	 an	 openness	 to	 the	 constructivist	 emphasis	 on	 identity.		
Similarly,	 they	 advocate	 a	 more	 nuanced	 understanding	 of	 role	 theory	 which	
would	 better	 incorporate	 the	 agency‐structure	 paradigm,	 while	 retaining	 the	
sound	empirical	methodology	which	allows	 for	 scholars	 to	give	policy‐relevant	
advice	(2012,	pp.	2–3).	
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2.4	 Evaluation	
This	brief	survey	of	the	role	theory	literature	has	shown	the	diversity	and	
richness	 of	 role‐based	 perspectives	 in	 international	 relations.	 	 In	 this	 section,	
trends	 previously	 identified	 in	 the	 literature	 and	 the	 present	 survey’s	
contribution	and	placement	will	be	explored.	 	Overall,	the	role	theory	literature	
has	 experienced	 trends	 towards	 a	 balanced	 understanding	 of	 the	 identity	 and	
systemic	 contributions	 to	 role	 conceptions	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 deepening	
connections	with	IR	theory.			
Culture	 and	 national	 identity	 are	 important	 sources	 of	 the	 role	
conceptions	of	policy	makers.		Wish	(1980)	observed	that	leaders	from	the	same	
state	have	more	 similar	 role	 conceptions	 than	with	 the	 leaders	of	other	 states.		
Hudson	and	Sampson	postulate	that	leaders	are	successful	when	“they	articulate	
a	 vision	 of	 the	nation’s	 role	 in	world	 affairs	 that	 corresponds	 to	deep,	 cultural	
beliefs	about	the	nation”	(1999,	p.	669).		In	effect,	a	nation’s	culture	and	history	
are	crucial	sources	of	 its	role	conception	set.	 	Shih’s	(1988)	analysis	of	Chinese	
political	and	philosophical	thought	is	an	impressive	example	of	how	culture	and	
history	 can	 be	 incorporated	 into	 a	 role‐theoretical	 analysis.	 	 Shih	 criticizes	
Holsti’s	“inductive”	typology	as	being	devoid	of	the	“richness	of	human	cultures”	
(1988,	 p.	 600),	 and	 argues	 that	 national	 role	 conceptions	 are	 cultural	 and	
historical	 products.	 	 Shih	 identifies	 a	 collection	 of	 contributions	 to	 Chinese	
identity,	and	postulates	that	which	ones	rise	to	the	top	at	any	particular	time	is	
more	 a	 result	 of	 leadership	 style	 and	 “domestic	 balance	 of	 power”	 than	
international	 structure	 (1988,	 p.	 626).	 	 Overall	 however,	 culture	 and	 national	
identity	 have	 been	 somewhat	 haphazardly	 incorporated	 into	 role	 theory	
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analyses,	 and	 the	 literature	 would	 benefit	 from	 studies	 using	 a	 more	 robust	
methodology	to	investigate	their	contributions.			
One	problem	with	many	works	 in	 the	 role	 theory	 literature	 is	 that	 they	
are	 too	broad,	 either	 focusing	on	many	states	and	many	 issue	 contexts	 (Holsti,	
1970;	 Wish,	 1980),	 or	 focusing	 on	 only	 a	 single	 state	 in	 many	 foreign	 policy	
contexts	(Catalinac,	2007;	Shih,	1988).		Studies	based	around	comparing	multiple	
states	with	respect	to	a	single	issue	tend	to	have	much	more	significant	insights	
(Breuning,	1995;	Chafetz	et	al.,	1996;	Maull,	1990).			
	 	On	a	 related	note,	Breuning	 identifies	 four	broad	areas	of	weakness	 for	
further	 empirical	 research	 in	 role	 theory.	 	 First,	 she	 suggests	 incorporating	
prospect	 theory’s	 understanding	 of	 decision	makers’	 perspectives	 and	 insights	
on	decision	framing	by	leaders.		Leaders	often	use	their	experience	and	opinions	
surrounding	prior	events	to	frame	their	opinions	about	the	current	issue	at	hand.		
This	may	involve	the	use	of	analogies,	a	phenomenon	explored	by	(Chafetz	et	al.,	
1996).	 	 Second,	 investigating	 the	 relationship	 between	 general	 ideas	 held	 by	
citizens	 and	 the	 role	 conceptions	 of	 leaders	 shows	promise	 as	 another	 area	 of	
future	research.	 	Shih’s	work	on	the	 ideological	and	cultural	sources	of	Chinese	
political	thought	(1988)	is	an	important	example	but	falls	short	of	sketching	out	
the	 connections	 specific	 leaders	make	with	 these	 ideas	as	 they	are	held	by	 the	
general	 population.	 	 Future	 role	 theory	 scholarship	 would	 benefit	 from	
investigating	how	widely	role	conceptions	held	by	 the	decisionmaking	elite	are	
shared	by	their	average	citizens.			
Bruening	 identifies	adaptation	and	change	of	role	conceptions	over	time	
as	a	 third	area	 for	 further	research	 in	role	 theory.	 	What	sort	of	 factors	 lead	to	
change	 in	 national	 role	 conceptions?	 	 How	much	 agency	 do	 individual	 leaders	
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have	 to	be	role	 innovators,	and	what	sort	of	pushback	do	 they	experience	 from	
their	societies?		A	fourth	area	for	further	research	is	investigating	how	decision	
makers	 hold	multiple	 roles	 simultaneously.	 	 Holsti	 tallies	 the	 number	 of	 roles	
expressed	by	different	states	in	his	study	(1970)	and	Breuning	(1995)	finds	that	
analyzing	the	role	conceptions	of	a	small	group	of	states	with	respect	to	a	single	
issue	 to	 be	 fruitful.	 	 Focusing	 on	 multiple	 role	 conceptions,	 whether	 they	 are	
acted	upon	or	not,	gives	role	theorists	access	to	the	process	of	decision‐making	
and	the	how	different	streams	of	thought	are	reflected	in	the	debate	surrounding	
foreign	policy.		In	addition,	two	states’	foreign	policy	behavior	may	be	identical,	
but	they	may	be	acting	from	completely	different	role	conceptions—focusing	on	
multiple	role	conceptions	helps	identify	these	and	other	subtleties.			
	
2.5	 Conclusion	and	Contributions	
	 In	 conclusion,	 role	 theory	 has	 experienced	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 different	
usages	in	the	study	of	international	politics.	 	Beginning	with	Holsti’s	adaptation	
of	 the	 role‐based	 perspective	 from	 social	 psychology,	 role	 theory	 has	
experienced	 several	 waves	 of	 scholarship	 focusing	 on	 both	 structural	 and	
ideational	sources	of	roles.		Many	early	works	in	role	theory	scholarship	viewed	
roles	through	the	lens	of	the	Cold	War	dynamic,	while	subsequent	studies	took	a	
less	 structural	 and	 more	 domestic	 approach.	 	 This	 shift	 was	 paralleled	 by	 a	
growing	interest	in	identity	in	IR	after	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	and	the	advent	of	
constructivism.	 	While	 a	 few	 studies	 attempted	 to	 connect	 role‐based	work	 to	
broader	 trends	 in	 IR	 theory,	generally	 the	 insights	of	 role	 theory	did	not	 reach	
beyond	a	 limited	FPA‐focused	audience.	 	 	The	continued	 importance	of	culture,	
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cognitive	 processes	 of	 decision	 makers,	 and	 a	 renewed	 interest	 in	 the	
relationship	between	agency	and	structure	will	ensure	that	role	theory	remains	a	
relevant	option	for	scholars	seeking	to	explain	the	dynamics	of	state	behavior	in	
the	international	system	for	many	years	to	come.			
	 In	 light	 of	 this	 evaluation,	 the	 contribution	 of	 this	 current	 study	will	 be	
now	be	 explored.	 	On	 the	one	hand,	 the	question	of	nuclear	weapons	has	 long	
been	 dominated	 by	 structurally‐focused	 approaches,	 so	 external	 role	
prescriptions	regarding	nuclear	weapons	policy	must	be	taken	into	account.		On	
the	other	hand,	the	contribution	of	identity	has	been	underexplored	so	far	in	the	
literature,	with	 the	most	 obvious	 example	 being	 the	 conflation	 of	 identity	 and	
role	 by	 Chafetz,	 et	 al.	 in	 their	 piece	 on	 nuclear	 weapons	 acquisition.	 	 The	
connection	 between	 nuclear	weapons	 and	 identity	 has	 been	 explored	 in	 other	
disciplines	 (e.	 g.	Abraham,	1998,	2009),	 but	understudied	 in	 IR	 and	FPA.	 	This	
study	attempts	 to	 contribute	 to	both	 the	 fleshing‐out	of	 identity	 as	 a	 source	of	
role	 conception	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 bridging	 a	 role	 theory‐based	 analysis	
with	wider	trends	in	IR	theory.		
	 This	thesis	seeks	to	contribute	to	the	role	theory	and	nuclear	proliferation	
literature	 through	 tracing	 the	material	 and	 ideational	 sources	 of	 national	 role	
conceptions.	 	Additionally,	 it	will	 identify	policymakers’	dissatisfaction	with	the	
international	 hierarchical	 status	 quo,	 with	 a	 special	 focus	 on	 factors	 which	
contribute	 to	 policymakers	 expressing	 roles	 conceptions	 in	 confrontational	 or	
oppositional	ways.	 	The	thesis	employs	the	model	proposed	by	Breuning	in	her	
2011	 book	 chapter	 on	 role	 theory,	 a	 model	 which	 follows	 the	 role	 formation	
process	 starting	 with	 material	 and	 ideational	 sources	 of	 national	 role	
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conceptions	and	connecting	these	conceptions	to	actual	foreign	policy	behavior.		
This	model	is	explained	in	more	detail	in	the	following	section,	which	describes	
the	methodology	of	this	the	thesis.			
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CHAPTER	3	
	
METHODOLOGY	
	
	
	
3.1.	 Introduction	
In	 this	 chapter,	 the	 thesis	methodology	 is	 established.	 	 This	project	will	
use	 a	most	 similar	 systems	 design	 to	 compare	 two	 historical	 cases	 of	 nuclear	
proliferation	 using	 role	 theory.	 	 After	 discussing	 various	 role‐based	 typologies	
already	present	in	the	literature,	I	propose	my	own	modified	version	of	Holsti’s	
identified	 roles	 through	 investigating	 the	 statements	 of	 policymakers	 where	
possible.	 	The	application	of	this	typology	to	the	cases	and	the	overall	structure	
of	 the	 case	 study	 analysis	 will	 be	 outlined,	 with	 emphasis	 placed	 on	 locating	
decision	makers’	 role	 conceptions	 in	 the	wider	 context	 of	 their	 states’	 foreign	
policy,	history,	and	societal	norms.			
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3.2.	 Model	and	Hypothesis	
	 This	section	introduces	the	theoretical	model	and	hypothesis	of	the	thesis.		
This	study	uses	a	model	based	on	a	role	theory	framework	developed	by	Marijke	
Breuning	 (2011).	 	 Her	 framework	 incorporates	 both	 material	 and	 ideational	
inputs	of	the	national	role	conceptions	held	by	policymakers.		Breuning’s	model	
captures	 the	 essence	 of	 role	 theory’s	 position	 between	 structural	 and	 agent‐
focused	 approaches	 by	 highlighting	 the	 mechanics	 of	 role	 conceptions	 in	 the	
minds	of	decision	makers.	 	This	cognitive	model	is	displayed	in	Figure	1	below:	
	
Figure	1:	Breuning	model	of	national	role	conception	process	(Breuning,	2011)	
According	 to	 Breuning,	 the	 sources	 of	 policy	 makers’	 national	 role	
conceptions	can	be	grouped	into	two	categories:	ideational	and	material	(2011).		
Ideational	 sources	 consist	 of	 the	 decision	 maker’s	 perception	 of	 their	 state’s	
identity,	cultural	heritage,	and	public	opinion	(Breuning,	2011,	p.	26).		Of	special	
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interest	is	the	decision	maker’s	perception	of	key	events	and	phenomena	in	their	
state’s	history	which	have	contributed	 to	an	understanding	of	national	 identity	
for	some	segment	of	the	population.		The	material	sources	of	role	conception,	on	
the	other	hand,	consist	of	the	decision	maker’s	perception	of	their	state’s	relative	
power	capabilities	with	respect	to	other	states	and	their	understanding	of	their	
state’s	 “opportunity	 to	 act”,	 or	 their	 perception	 of	 a	 particular	 environment	
surrounding	a	decision	(both	temporary	and	enduring)	(Breuning,	2011,	p.	26).	
In	her	chapter,	Breuning	emphasizes	that	national	role	conceptions	can	be	
linked	 to	 particular	 foreign	 policy	 issues	 and	 or	 specific	 geographies	 (2011,	 p.	
32).	 	 This	 point	makes	 the	model	 flexible	 and	 applicable	 to	 describe	 and	 yield	
explanatory	 power	 to	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 foreign	 policy	 events.	 	 Nuclear	
proliferation	as	a	foreign	policy	phenomenon	is	no	exception.	 	The	next	section	
will	 present	 a	 modified	 version	 of	 Breuning’s	 model	 specific	 for	 nuclear	
proliferation.	
Proliferation‐Specific	Model	
	 In	 the	 proliferation‐specific	 model,	 decision	makers	 are	 faced	with	 two	
crucial	questions:	What	should	be	our	country’s	role	in	this	policy	area,	and	Are	we	
a	 country	 that	 should	 possess	nuclear	weapons?	 	 In	 answering	 these	 questions,	
leaders	 turn	 to	 two	 sources	 of	 input:	 their	 perception	 of	 their	 state’s	material	
capabilities,	 and	 their	 perception	 of	 the	 ideational	 factors	 of	 national	 identity,	
culture,	 history,	 and	 domestic	 audience.	 	 This	 is	 displayed	 visually	 in	 Figure	 2	
below:	
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Figure	2:	Role‐based	framework	for	nuclear	decisionmaking	process	showing	ideational	
and	material	inputs,	based	on	(Breuning,	2011)	
The	ideational	inputs	consist	of	the	leader(s)’	perceptions	of	their	state’s	
national	identity,	culture	and	history.	 	Specifically,	the	model	characterizes	how	
key	 decision	 makers	 view	 the	 identity	 of	 their	 state	 in	 two	 key	 areas:	 the	
trajectory	 of	 their	 state’s	 history	 and	 content	 of	 their	 state’s	 cultural	 heritage.		
Furthermore,	 the	model	 investigates	 the	extent	 to	which	 these	perceptions	are	
colored	 by	 an	 oppositional	 attitude	 towards	 other	 states	 and	 ethno‐religious	
identities.	 	The	model	asks	questions	such	as:	How	do	elites	make	reference	 to	
past	periods	of	grandeur	in	their	state’s	history?		What	type	of	language	do	elites	
use	 to	 refer	 to	 the	 state’s	 traditional	 enemies?	 	 How	 do	 elites	 desire	 for	 their	
state’s	 culture	 and	 history	 to	 be	 perceived	 by	 the	world?	 	 The	model	 answers	
these	 questions	 through	 investigating	policy	makers’	 references	 to	 culture	 and	
history	in	significant	speeches	and	memoirs	(when	available).			
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On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 model	 defines	 the	 material	 inputs	 of	 nuclear	
policymaking	 as	 policymakers’	 perceptions	 of	 their	 nation’s	 relevant	 technical	
capabilities	 and	 their	 nation’s	 security	 environment.	 	 Many	 studies	 in	 the	 so‐
called	“supply‐side”	literature	(as	characterized	by	(Sagan,	2011))	have	worked	
to	 define	 which	 factors	 indicate	 that	 a	 country’s	 technical	 capabilities	 	 has	
reached	 a	 sufficient	 level.	 	 Jo	 and	 Gartzke	 measure	 the	 presence	 of	 uranium	
deposits,	 metallurgists,	 chemical	 engineers,	 nuclear	 engineers/physicists,	
chemists,	 electronics	 and	 explosive	 specialists,	 nitric	 acid	 production	 capacity,	
and	electricity	production	capacity	as	an	indicator	of	the	production	capabilities	
of	a	particular	state	(2007,	p.	173).		These	indicators	provide	an	important	base	
for	any	nuclear	program,	but	paint	with	too	wide	of	a	brush	to	be	useful	for	this	
analysis.			
In	order	to	avoid	the	valid	criticism	of	a	broad	focus	on	national	technical	
capabilities,	 this	analysis	 focuses	on	 the	process	of	acquisition	of	key	 fuel	cycle	
facilities	 and	 (where	 available)	 indicators	 of	 weaponization.	 	 Rather	 than	
focusing	 on	 the	 presence	 or	 absence	 of	 industrial	 capabilities	 needed	 for	 a	
nuclear	weapons	program,	 the	model	 attempts	 to	 capture	 the	perceptions	 and	
intentions	of	policy	makers	of	nuclear	technology	and	the	prospect	of	acquiring	
nuclear	explosives.	 	The	model	 focuses	therefore	on	the	key	components	of	 the	
nuclear	fuel	cycle	and	how	closely	involved	the	state’s	leaders	were	involved	in	
the	decisions	leading	to	their	acquisition	and	construction.		These	indicators	are	
summarized	in	Table	1	below:	
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Table	1:	Summary	of	key	fuel	cycle	facilities		
Technical	Capability	 Facility	Description	
Source	of	Fissile	Material	
	
Domestic	source	of	uranium	or	thorium	ore		
					
Research	Reactor		 Operational	domestic	research	reactor	capable	of	a	sustained	nuclear	chain	reaction		
Conversion	Facility		 Converts	uranium	ore	into	uranium	hexafluoride	gas	(necessary	for	enrichment)		
Enrichment	Capability		 Increases	the	percentage	of	uranium‐235	in	the	fuel,	enabling	a	sustainable	chain	reaction		
Reprocessing	Capability	 Recovers	fissile	material	from	spent	fuel—may	be	used	to	acquire	plutonium	for	use	in	weapons	or	future	fuel	
	The	 nuclear	 fuel	 cycle	 consists	 of	 a	 series	 of	 steps	 by	 which	 natural	
uranium	or	thorium	is	taken	from	its	natural	state	and	prepared	for	use	as	fuel	in	
nuclear	reactors.		Uranium	or	thorium	is	mined	from	the	ground,	converted	from	
a	 natural	 ore	 into	 a	 chemical	 state	 which	 can	 be	 enriched	 to	 a	 suitable	 level,	
enriched	 in	 order	 to	 be	 able	 to	 sustain	 a	 continuous	 chain	 reaction.	 	 This	
enriched	material	is	then	chemically	converted	to	metal	and	fabricated	into	fuel	
which	 can	be	used	 in	a	nuclear	 reactor.	 	After	being	used	 in	a	 reactor,	 the	 fuel	
may	be	 reprocessed,	 extracting	both	unused	uranium	and	plutonium	produced	
through	the	absorption	of	neutrons	by	uranium	atoms	over	the	course	of	normal	
reactor	operations1.	
																																																													
1	Two	excellent	and	accessible	texts	on	the	technical	details	of	nuclear	proliferation	for	curious	
readers	are	Nuclear	Nonproliferation:	A	Primer,	by	Gary	T.	Gardner	(1994),	and	Nuclear	
Safeguards,	Security	and	Nonproliferation:	Achieving	Security	with	Technology	and	Policy,	edited	
by	James	Doyle	(2008).	
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These	 fuel	 cycle	 steps	 and	 their	 associated	 facilities	 are	 important	
because	 their	 acquisition	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 represents	 a	 series	 of	 significant	
decision	thresholds	for	a	state’s	policy	makers,	and	on	the	other,	the	technology	
is	controlled	by	the	nuclear	non‐proliferation	regime	because	of	its	potential	for	
use	 in	weapons	production.	 	By	 focusing	on	the	timeline	of	acquisition	of	 these	
facilities	and	the	role	of	policy	makers	 in	 their	acquisition,	 the	model	gathers	a	
more	complete	and	accurate	picture	of	a	state’s	nuclear	capabilities	and	decision	
makers’	perceptions	of	those	capabilities.			
The	 other	 component	 of	 the	 modified	 model	 is	 the	 decision	 maker’s	
perception	of	 their	state’s	security	environment.	 	Breuning	refers	 to	 this	as	 the	
policy	makers’	perception	of	the	“opportunity	to	act”,	or	their	assessment	of	the	
circumstances	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 decision	 (2011,	 p.	 26).	 	 After	 a	 survey	 of	 the	
literature	 on	 each	 case	 to	 determine	 the	major	 security	 threats	 in	 each	 state’s	
foreign	policy,	the	development	of	key	events	in	relations	with	rivals	are	traced	
with	emphasis	on	their	influence	on	nuclear	decision	making.		The	presence	of	a	
neighbor	or	rival	with	an	existing	or	developing	nuclear	capability	looms	large	in	
the	minds	of	policy	makers.		A	history	of	armed	conflict	with	a	regional	rival	also	
affects	 the	security	environment	and	the	attitude	of	policy	makers	 towards	 the	
prospect	of	acquiring	nuclear	explosives.			
Taken	 together,	 the	 ideational	 and	 material	 inputs	 inform	 the	 leaders’	
NRCs	and	the	subsequent	role	performance,	i.e.	what	route	the	state	takes	with	
regards	to	the	pursuit	of	nuclear	weaponry.		This	role	performance	is	evaluated	
in	terms	of	two	key	components:	first,	what	is	the	policy	pursued	(ex:	signing	the	
NPT,	 authorizing	a	 clandestine	nuclear	program),	 and	 second,	how	seriously	 is	
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that	policy	pursued	(e.g.,	 acquisition	of	 technology,	allocation	of	resources).	 	 In	
the	next	section,	the	specific	role	typology	used	to	evaluate	this	decision	process	
will	be	explained	in	greater	detail.	
	
Role	Typologies	
As	has	already	been	seen	in	the	survey	of	the	role	theory	literature,	there	
is	a	variety	of	perspectives	on	what	exactly	constitutes	a	national	role	conception	
in	 the	 study	 of	 foreign	 policy.	 	 In	 this	 section	 I	 will	 discuss	 the	 significant	
examples	of	successful	role‐based	typologies	from	the	literature	and	propose	my	
own	modified	 set	of	 roles	 to	 look	 for	 in	 the	 case	 studies.	 	As	mentioned	 in	 the	
previous	 chapter,	 role	 theory	 studies	 have	 utilized	 a	 variety	 of	 typologies	 to	
describe	the	foreign	policy	behavior	of	states.		With	respect	to	methodology,	the	
existing	 role	 theory	 literature	generally	 consists	of	works	either	based	directly	
on	 or	 derived	 from	 Holsti’s	 original	 1970	 study.	 	 Before	 expounding	 on	 these	
perspectives,	the	findings	of	Holsti	himself	with	regards	to	this	thesis’s	cases	will	
be	investigated.	
	 Holsti	(1970)	found	evidence	for	17	distinct	role	conceptions	through	his	
analysis	of	foreign	policy	references	in	the	significant	speeches	of	policymakers.		
In	his	analysis,	Holsti	 identifies	India	as	holding	the	following	role	conceptions:	
regional	 leader,	 subsystem	 leader,	 active	 independent,	 liberation‐supporter,	
mediator‐integrator,	 independent,	 and	 internal	 developer	 (pg.	 276).	 	 Holsti	
mentions	 the	 difficulty	 of	 finding	 specific	 foreign	 policy	 objectives	 in	 the	
speeches	of	many	South	American	leaders;	he	attributes	just	three	roles	to	Brazil	
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during	 the	 time	period:	 internal	developer,	regional‐subsystem	collaborator,	and	
independent	(pg	275).			
Much	 has	 transpired	 in	 international	 politics	 since	 Holsti	 wrote	 his	
seminal	study	 in	1970.	 	As	has	been	previously	mentioned,	 the	end	of	 the	Cold	
War	 brought	 new	 freedom	 and	 challenges	 for	 states	 formerly	 caught	 between	
the	limited	foreign	policy	options	the	conflict	between	the	United	States	and	the	
Soviet	 Union	 allowed.	 	 Brazil	 and	 India	 are	 no	 exception.	 	While	 providing	 an	
invaluable	 starting	 point,	 the	 work	 started	 by	 Holsti	 must	 be	 continued	 and	
expanded	by	more	recent	scholarship.			
This	 study	builds	on	 the	work	of	Chafetz,	Abramson,	and	Grillot	 (1996),	
who	 modified	 Holsti’s	 (1970)	 original	 roles	 and	 looked	 for	 connections	 with	
proliferative	 foreign	 policy	 behavior.	 	 They	 classify	 Holsti’s	 roles	 into	 three	
groups—roles	which	guide	states	towards,	roles	which	guide	states	away	from,	
and	roles	which	have	no	effect	on	a	state’s	nuclear	proliferation	policy.	 	Within	
that	first	group,	they	specify	four	roles	which	seem	to	describe	states	which	seek	
nuclear	weapons:	 regional	 leader,	global	 system	 leader,	 regional	protector,	and	
anti‐imperialist	(Chafetz	et	al.,	1996,	p.	733).	
According	 to	 Chafetz	 et	 al.,	 nuclear	 weapons	 can	 be	 viewed	 by	 states	
holding	 these	 conceptions	 in	 different	 ways.	 	 For	 regional	 and	 global	 system	
leaders,	 they	 contend,	 nuclear	 weapons	 symbolize	 strength	 and	 leadership,	 a	
belief	which	is	reinforced	by	the	existing	nuclear	powers	and	their	position	in	the	
international	 system.	 	 For	 regional	 protectors,	 nuclear	 weapons	 can	 be	 an	
important	part	 of	 their	 desires	 to	protect	 their	 regions	 and	 allies,	 or	 carve	out	
spheres	 of	 influence.	 	 Finally,	 for	 countries	 holding	 an	 anti‐imperialist	 role	
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conception,	nuclear	weapons	can	be	a	“necessary	tool	for	overturning	the	status	
quo”	(Chafetz	et	al.,	1996,	p.	733).		A	summary	of	the	examples	Chafetz	et	al.	give	
for	each	of	these	four	roles	is	provided	in	Table	2	below:	
Table	2:	Summary	of	roles	identified	by	Chafetz	et	al.	(1996)	as	proliferation‐prone	
Role	Type	 Role	Description	
Examples	of	states	articulating	the	role	
conception:	
Regional	Leader	 Provide	leadership	in	delimited	geographic	
or	functional	area	
	
India,	Iran,	Brazil,	Iraq	
Global	System	Leader	 Lead	other	states	in	creating	and	
maintaining	an	
emerging	world	order	
	
United	States,	Russia	
Regional	Protector	 Provide	protection	for	
adjacent	regions	
United	States	,	Russia,	France	
Anti‐Imperialist	 Act	as	agent	of	struggle	against	
imperialist	threats	
Brazil	(before	1990),	India,	Iran,	North	
Korea,	Iraq,	India,	Libya	
	
Chafetz	 et	 al.	 test	 this	 typology	 using	 the	 cases	 of	 Belarus	 and	 Ukraine	
during	 the	 period	 immediately	 following	 their	 independence	 from	 the	 USSR.		
During	 this	 period,	 despite	 their	 close	 similarity,	 Belarus	 and	 Ukraine	 follow	
different	 paths	 regarding	 the	 nuclear	 weapons	 they	 inherited	 from	 the	 USSR.		
Belarus	 immediately	 promised	 to	 send	 its	 weapons	 back	 and	 enter	 the	
nonproliferation	regime	as	a	non	nuclear	weapons	state,	while	Ukraine	hesitated,	
dragging	 its	 feet	both	on	the	NPT	and	returning	the	weapons	 for	2	years	while	
the	country’s	role	was	debated	domestically.			
Chafetz	et	al.	hypothesize	that	Belarus	gave	up	its	nuclear	weapons	easily	
because	 its	 national	 role	 conceptions	 were	 not	 consistent	 with	 possession	 of	
nuclear	weapons.		Ukraine,	on	the	other	hand,	had	some	elements	calling	for	the	
national	role	conception	of	a	regional	or	great	power,	which	caused	its	policy	on	
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the	future	of	its	inherited	nuclear	weapons	to	be	uncertain.		However,	Chafetz	et	
al.	 hypothesize	 that	 the	 external	 role	 prescriptions	 from	 both	 the	 Russian	
Federation	and	the	international	community	encouraged	a	different	emphasis	of	
national	 role	 which	 was	 prohibitive	 to	 the	 continued	 possession	 of	 nuclear	
weapons	and	which	caused	Ukraine	to	return	the	weapons	and	enter	the	NPT	as	
a	non	nuclear	weapons	state,	albeit	later	than	Belarus.			
As	seen	 in	Table	2	above,	Chafetz	et	al.	 identify	both	 India	and	Brazil	as	
expressing	regional	leader	and	regional	protector	role	conceptions,	and	indicate	
that	 this	 role	 conception	 led	 to	 both	 of	 them	 dabbling	 in	 behavior	 which	 ran	
contrary	 to	 the	 nonproliferation	 regime.	 	 Yet	 their	 study	 does	 not	 offer	 any	
insight	into	why	India	would	pursue	nuclear	weapons	while	Brazil	did	not,	if	they	
share	 similar	 role	 conceptions.	 	 Why	 is	 the	 policy	 outcome	 different	 in	 these	
cases?	 	 The	 framework	 used	 by	 Chafetz	 et	 al.	 has	 limited	 answers	 for	 this	
question.	
In	 addition,	 by	 strictly	 using	 Holsti’s	 framework,	 which	 was	 heavily‐
influenced	by	 the	Cold	War,	Chafetz	et	al.	miss	out	on	more	recent	 scholarship	
conducted	 in	 the	 area	 of	 identity	 and	 foreign	 policy.	 	 Their	 typology	 remains	
limited	by	the	bipolar	Cold	War	environment	in	which	Holsti	devised	his	original	
list	of	 roles.	 	 In	 the	post‐Cold	War	world,	 leaders	no	 longer	 feel	 constrained	 to	
refer	 to	 their	 state’s	 relationship	 with	 the	 wider	 worldwide	 distribution	 of	
alliances.		For	some	cases	this	allows	more	freedom	in	the	expression	of	national	
roles,	for	others,	the	lack	of	clear	role	prescriptions	from	the	bipolar	system	has	
resulted	in	uncertainty	in	the	post‐Cold	War	era.			
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Chafetz	 et	 al.	 (1996),	 Sagan	 (2011),	 and	 others	 have	 identified	
associations	between	states’	dissatisfaction	with	the	status	quo	and	the	pursuit	
of	nuclear	weapons,	yet	the	vast	majority	of	dissatisfied	states	do	not	seek	such	
weaponry.	 	 Jo	 and	 Gartzke	 (2007)	 identify	 technical	 factors,	 yet	 many	 states	
possess	 the	 technical	 capability	and	 “nuclear	 latency”	necessary	 for	 a	weapons	
program	 without	 expressing	 any	 desire	 for	 a	 nuclear	 explosive.	 	 Even	 some	
states	 classified	 as	 both	 “dissatisfied”	 and	 technically	 capable	 (i.e.	 Brazil)	 have	
refrained	 from	 pursuing	 nuclear	 weapons.	 	 Clearly	 this	 points	 to	 holes	 in	 the	
existing	scholarship	in	nuclear	proliferation	and	role	theory.		This	thesis	seeks	to	
contribute	to	the	role	theory	and	nuclear	proliferation	literature	through	tracing	
the	material	and	ideational	sources	of	national	role	conceptions.			
I	 argue	 that	 these	 regional	 leader	 and	 protector	 role	 conceptions	 as	
defined	by	Chafetz	et	al.	(1996)	are	too	vague	to	yield	much	insight	into	the	cases	
of	 Brazil	 and	 India.	 	 While	 this	 study	 builds	 on	 the	 work	 of	 Chafetz	 et	 al.	 by	
exploring	 the	 relationship	 between	 nuclear	 weapons	 policy	 and	 national	 role	
conception,	I	argue	that	this	regional	power	role	conception	needs	more	detail	in	
order	 to	 be	 useful.	 	 In	 the	 next	 section,	 this	 study’s	 hypothesis	 and	 main	
argument	will	be	detailed.	
	
Hypothesis	
As	has	already	been	argued,	only	a	small	number	of	states	have	pursued	
nuclear	 weapons,	 and	 even	 fewer	 have	 actually	 produced	 nuclear	 explosives,	
even	as	many	are	classified	as	regional	or	“middle”	powers.		I	argue	that	the	key	
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dimension	which	differentiates	these	states	holding	regional	leader	conceptions	
is	 their	 relationship	 with	 their	 region	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 the	 larger	
international	system	on	the	other.		I	hypothesize	that	in	situations	where	there	is	
an	 oppositional	 conception	 of	 a	 state’s	 regional	 role,	 both	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
region	and	to	the	international	system,	those	states	will	be	more	likely	to	pursue	
nuclear	 explosives.	 	 Although	 other	 states	 holding	 a	 regional	 leader	 role	
conception	may	 exhibit	 proliferative	 tendencies,	 in	 the	 long	 run	 the	 pursuit	 of	
nuclear	weapons	by	 these	 states	becomes	untenable	because	 it	 is	unsupported	
by	the	competitive,	but	not	oppositional,	national	role	conception	held	by	those	
states’	policymakers.			
Hymans	defines	this	distinction	between	oppositional	and	competitive	as	
primarily	 emanating	 from	 the	 level	 of	 connection	 of	 national	 identity	with	 the	
relationship	with	the	rival	(2006,	p.	22).		In	cases	where	this	identity	is	drawn	in	
stark	 contrast	 and	 opposition	 to	 the	 ‘other’,	 this	 conception	 is	 labeled	 as	
“oppositional”.	 	 In	 other	 cases,	 while	 this	 stark	 contrasting	 identity	 is	 absent,	
difference	is	still	emphasized	and	national	identity	and	objectives	are	defined	in	
unique	terms—these	cases	are	labeled	as	“competitive”	(Hymans,	2006,	pp.	22‐
23).			
In	other	words,	 in	 cases	where	policymakers	have	oppositional	national	
role	conceptions	with	regards	to	both	their	country’s	immediate	region	and	the	
larger	 international	 system,	 policymakers	 will	 be	 more	 likely	 to	 turn	 their	
nuclear	technical	capabilities	into	a	nuclear	explosive,	especially	in	the	presence	
of	 a	 perceived	 threat.	 	 In	 cases	 where	 policymakers	 hold	 ambiguous,	
inconsistently	 oppositional,	 or	 non‐oppositional	 competitive	 national	 role	
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conceptions	with	 regards	 to	 the	 region	and	system,	nuclear	explosives	become	
an	undesirable	and	untenable	policy	position.		This	is	visually	depicted	in	Figures	
3‐5	below:	
Figure	3:	Relationship	between	oppositional	regional	role	conception	and	nuclear	
weapons	acquisition	attempts	
	
Figure	4:	Relationship	between	hybrid	oppositional	and	competitive	regional	role	
conception	and	nuclear	weapons	acquisition	attempts	
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Figure	5:	Relationship	between	competitive	regional	role	conception	and	nuclear	
weapons	acquisition	attempts	
	
In	 applying	 this	 hypothesis	 to	 the	 cases,	 I	 argue	 that	 Brazil’s	 lack	 of	 a	
strong	 and	 consistent	 regional	 rival	 and	 a	 competitive	 attitude	 towards	 the	
international	system	informs	Brazil’s	regional	leader	NRC.		Although	its	military	
leaders	 seriously	 considered	 pursuing	 a	 nuclear	 explosive,	 ultimately	 this	
position	 was	 exposed	 as	 inconsistent	 with	 Brazil’s	 understanding	 of	 itself	 as	
playing	a	role	of	regional	unifier	and	South	American	standard‐bearer,	and	Brazil	
formally	renounced	its	nuclear	ambitions	and	entered	the	NPT	as	a	non	nuclear	
weapons	state.		Indian	policymakers,	on	the	other	hand,	were	faced	with	two	key	
decisions—the	first	about	the	acquisition	of	a	peaceful	nuclear	explosive	(PNE),	
and	 the	 second	about	weaponizing	 that	 technology	decades	 later.	 	 I	 argue	 that	
these	 decisions	 illustrate	 two	 different	 elements	 of	 India’s	 regional	 role	
conception—the	first	decision	can	be	understood	as	being	consistent	with	India’s	
expression	 of	 strong	 opposition	 to	 the	 existing	 international	 order	 and	 anti‐
imperialist	 sentiment,	 while	 the	 second	 decision	 is	 directly	 tied	 to	 Indian	
policymakers’	understanding	of	 their	nation’s	regional	role	 in	direct	opposition	
to	Pakistan.	 	The	fact	that	 in	the	Indian	case	these	two	decisions	were	made	by	
leaders	 hailing	 from	 dramatically	 different	 ideological	 traditions	 further	
48	
	
emphasizes	the	 importance	of	 the	 influence	of	policymakers	made	by	Breuning	
and	others.				
	
3.3.	 Research	Design	 	
In	 this	 section	 the	 content	 and	 reasoning	 behind	 the	 thesis’s	 overall	
research	design	will	 be	 explained.	 	 This	 study	 employs	 a	most	 similar	 systems	
design	 (MSSD)	 to	 compare	 two	 historical	 cases	 with	 regards	 to	 their	 nuclear	
decisionmaking.	 	 In	 this	 section,	 the	 logic	 behind	 the	 case	 selection	 will	 be	
detailed	and	the	comparability	of	the	cases	will	be	established.	
Comparability	of	Cases	
In	 this	 section	 the	 selection	 and	 comparability	 of	 the	 cases	 will	 be	
established	 with	 respect	 to	 national	 attributes,	 technical	 capabilities,	 security	
environments,	and	foreign	policy	themes.		These	factors	have	been	summarized	
in	Table	3	below.			
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Table		3:	MSSD	Comparison	of	Brazil	and	India	
	 Brazil	 India Source(s)	
General	Industry/Technology	 Sufficient Sufficient (Jo	&	Gartzke	2007)
	
Latent	Nuclear	Capability	 Sufficient Sufficient (Jo	&	Gartzke	2007)
	
Sensitive	nuclear	assistance	 West	Germany,	
United	States	
Canada,	United	
States	
		
(Solingen	1993)	
	
	
NPT	Status	 Late	ratification	
(waited	until	1998)	
	
Unratified (UNODA,	2014)		
	
	
Nuclear	allies/security	guarantees	 None None (Solingen,	2007)	
	
Desire	for	great	power	
status/UNSC	permanent	
membership	
	
Yes Yes (Alden	&	Vieira,	2005)
(Stuenkel,	2010,	2013)	
Regime	type	 Military	
dictatorship	(until	
1985);	Democracy	
	
Democracy (Barletta,	1997)	
(Cohen,	2001)	
Threat	from	nuclear‐armed	
neighbor	
No China	(1970s)	
Pakistan	(1990s)	
	
(Hymans	2006)	
(Perkovich,	1999)	
Neighbor	with	threatening	nuclear	
power	program	
	
Yes	(Argentina) Yes	(Pakistan) (Doyle,	2008b)	
History	of	colonialism	(date	of	
independence)	
Portugal	(1822) Great	Britain,	
Portugal	(1947,	
1961)	
	
(Levine,	1999)	
(Cohen,	2001)	
Demographics:	Multi‐ethnic,	multi‐
cultural	populations,	unequal	
income	distribution	
	
Yes Yes (Levine,	1999)	
(Cohen,	2001)	
Contemporary	BRICS	designation2	
	
Yes Yes (Tett,	2010)	
Nuclear	Test(s)	 None 1974,	1998 (Perkovich,	1999)
	
																																																													
2	BRICS,	which	stands	for	Brazil‐Russia‐India‐China‐South	Africa,	is	an	acronym	coined	by	
Goldman	Sachs	chief	economist	Jim	O’Neill	in	2001	to	describe	the	next	generation	of	emerging	
powerhouses	in	the	global	economy.		More	at:	http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/112ca932‐00ab‐
11df‐ae8d‐00144feabdc0.html	
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Brazil	 and	 India	 are	 comparable	 cases	 by	 virtue	 of	 similar	 national	
attributes:	 international	 standing,	 socio‐economic	 background,	 and	 material	
capabilities.		Both	states	have	a	history	of	colonialism,	multi‐cultural	populations,	
and	 have	 been	 designated	 as	 members	 of	 the	 contemporary	 “BRICS”	 (Brazil‐
Russia‐India‐China,‐South	 Africa)	 grouping.	 	 Both	 states	 have	 also	 expressed	
their	 desires	 to	 be	 included	 as	 permanent	 members	 of	 the	 United	 Nations	
Security	Council	(UNSC).		As	a	sign	of	their	standing	in	the	world,	Brazil	and	India	
are	some	of	the	states	most	frequently	elected	to	serve	on	the	UNSC.	 	Since	the	
founding	 of	 the	 UNSC	 68	 years	 ago,	 either	 India	 (seven	 terms)	 or	 Brazil	 (nine	
terms)	 have	 been	 elected	 as	 non‐permanent	 members	 for	 32	 of	 those	 years	
(United	 Nations,	 2014).			
	 Brazil	and	India	also	both	clearly	have	the	technical	capabilities	to	pursue	
nuclear	 weapons.	 	 Jo	 and	 Gartzke	measure	 the	 presence	 of	 uranium	 deposits,	
metallurgists,	 chemical	 engineers,	 nuclear	 engineers/physicists/chemists,	
electronic/explosive	 specialists,	 nitric	 acid	 production	 capacity,	 and	 electricity	
production	capacity	as	an	indicator	of	the	production	capabilities	of	a	particular	
state	(2007,	p.	173).	 	According	to	their	dataset,	both	India	and	Brazil	receive	a	
perfect	score	 for	 the	presence	of	all	seven	of	 these	 indicators.	 	 India	and	Brazil	
received	sensitive	nuclear	assistance	with	their	civilian	power	programs—India	
from	 Canada	 and	 Brazil	 from	 West	 Germany	 (Solingen,	 1993),	 acquiring	
significant	components	of	the	nuclear	fuel	cycle	necessary	to	produce	fissionable	
material.	 	 India	 and	 Brazil	 both	 have	 decades	 of	 experience	 operating	 nuclear	
power	 plants	 and	 possess	 significant	 facilities	 for	 fundamental	 research	 in	
physics.			
51	
	
Finally,	 it	can	be	argued	that	Brazil	and	India	have	similar	proliferation‐
related	security	factors.		India	and	Brazil	have	had	tense	relationships	with	their	
neighbors—India	 and	 China	 fought	 a	 brief	 border	war	 in	 1962	 and	Brazil	 and	
Argentina	 have	 experienced	many	 years	 of	 strained	 relations,	 including	 a	 long	
dispute	over	water	rights	and	the	Itaipu	Dam.		India	has	been	in	various	stages	of	
conflict	with	Pakistan	since	their	formation	as	a	result	of	the	Partition	of	India	in	
1947.	 	 Of	 course,	 Argentina	 and	 Pakistan	 do	 not	 represent	 the	 same	 level	 of	
rivalry—Pakistan	and	 India	have	 fought	many	bitter	wars	and	skirmishes	over	
the	years,	whereas	the	rivalry	between	Argentina	and	Brazil	was	more	rooted	in	
a	 historic	 competition	 for	 dominance	 in	 South	 America.	 	 Still,	 one	 significant	
security	 indicator	 in	 the	 model	 is	 the	 presence	 of	 regional	 rivals	 pursuing	
potentially	 proliferative	 nuclear	 power	 programs,	 and	 both	 Argentina	 and	
Pakistan	pursued	such	programs.			
If	 Brazil	 and	 India	 were	 both	 in	 situations	 found	 to	 be	 consistent	 with	
nuclear	proliferation,	why	did	India	pursue	a	nuclear	explosive	while	Brazil	did	
not?	 	 In	 this	 thesis,	 I	 argue	 that	 this	 question	 is	 answered	 by	 conceptual	
differences	in	the	minds	of	policymakers	regarding	their	state’s	national	identity.		
Specifically,	 investigating	the	differences	between	the	national	role	conceptions	
held	by	Brazilian	and	Indian	policy	makers	will	yield	important	insights	into	why	
Brazil	 renounced	 its	 nuclear	 ambitions,	 while	 India	 pursued	 first	 a	 “peaceful	
nuclear	 explosive”	 (PNE)	 in	 the	 1970s,	 and	 then	 weaponized	 the	 technology	
almost	two	decades	later.		The	study’s	case	study	structure	is	outlined	in	the	next	
section.	
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3.4	 Case	Study	Structure	
	 The	methodology	of	this	thesis	seeks	to	place	the	role	statements	of	policy	
makers	 in	 their	 proper	 domestic,	 historic,	 and	 issue‐specific	 contexts.	 	 The	
evaluations	 of	 the	 cases	 selected	 follows	 a	 comparative	 historical	 case	 study	
based	on	analysis	of	both	 secondary	 sources	and	original	 speech	acts	of	policy	
makers.		Each	case	study	is	investigated	from	a	number	of	important	angles,	after	
which	the	findings	are	discussed.		
	 First,	 for	 each	 case	 I	 evaluate	 the	 general	 foreign	 policy	 position	 of	 the	
state	 in	 detail	 and	 extrapolate	 general	 trends	 from	 the	 existing	 literature	
available.		Foreign	policy	behavior	and	philosophy	will	be	viewed	in	terms	of	the	
larger	 historical	 and	 cultural	 picture	 of	 each	 state.	 	 Second,	 the	 material	 and	
security	inputs	of	nuclear	decisionmaking	will	be	discussed	in	detail,	specifically	
focusing	on	the	leader’s	perception	of	their	state’s	latent	nuclear	capabilities	and	
opportunity	 to	 act.	 	 Third,	 the	 ideational	 inputs	 will	 be	 investigated;	 this	 will	
consist	of	 the	 leader’s	perception	of	national	 identity,	references	to	culture	and	
history,	and	addresses	to	his/her	domestic	audience.	
With	this	background	in	place,	the	role	conceptions	of	each	leader	will	be	
determined	based	on	their	perception	of	both	the	ideational	and	material	factors,	
expressed	 through	 public	 statements	 and	 memoirs.	 	 Key	 indicators	 are	
policymakers’	references	to	their	state	vis‐à‐vis	other	states,	allusions	to	nuclear	
weapons	 as	 a	 symbol	 of	 power	 and	 status,	 and	 references	 to	 technological	
progress	as	a	national	achievement.		Ultimately	this	provides	the	leader’s	answer	
to	the	question,	are	we	a	country	that	should	possess	nuclear	weapons	or	not?		The	
final	stage	of	analysis	will	assess	the	application	of	this	nuclear	role	conception	
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to	 actual	 policy.	 	Does	 the	 leader	 steer	 his/her	 country	 towards	 the	pursuit	 of	
nuclear	weapons?		If	so,	how	seriously	do	they	pursue	them?	
	 To	 summarize,	 this	 section	discussed	 the	methodological	 underpinnings	
of	the	thesis.		First,	the	most	similar	systems	design	comparison	between	Brazil	
and	India	was	established.		I	examined	the	role	typologies	used	in	the	literature	
in	 finer	 detail	 and	 developed	my	 own	 derivative	 typology	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 this	
thesis.	 	 Finally,	 the	 case	 study	 structure	 was	 outlined,	 emphasizing	 how	 the	
identification	 of	 policymaker’s	 national	 role	 conceptions	 will	 be	 placed	within	
the	 wider	 context	 of	 the	 policymakers’	 perceptions	 of	 material	 and	 ideational	
factors.	 	 In	 the	 next	 chapter,	 the	 cases	 of	 Brazil	 and	 India	 will	 be	 evaluated	
according	to	this	framework.	
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CHAPTER	4	
	
BRAZIL:	A	BRIDGE	FROM	THE	“WEST”	TO	THE	“REST?”	
	
	
In	 this	 chapter,	 the	 historical	 case	 of	 Brazil’s	 nuclear	 program	 will	 be	
explored.		First,	the	general	foreign	policy	positions	of	Brazil	will	be	reviewed	in	
order	to	establish	the	context	for	the	material	and	ideational	analysis.		Then	the	
material	and	ideational	inputs	of	Brazilian	national	role	conceptions	in	the	minds	
of	 policymakers	 will	 be	 discussed	 in	 detail.	 	 In	 the	 final	 section,	 the	 role	
conceptions	and	their	linkages	to	this	role	formation	process	will	be	explored.	
	
4.1. Case	Study	Structure	
As	has	already	been	discussed	at	length	in	the	previous	section,	the	case	
study	 structure	 is	 founded	 on	 the	 Breuning	 model	 of	 national	 role	 formation	
(Breuning,	 2011).	 	 This	model	 has	 been	 adapted	 to	 the	 policy	 area	 of	 nuclear	
proliferation,	and	reproduced	again	below	in	Figure	6:	
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Figure	6:	Role‐based	 framework	 for	nuclear	decisionmaking	process	showing	 ideational	
and	material	inputs,	based	on	(Breuning,	2011)	
After	a	general	review	of	Brazilian	foreign	policy	and	history,	the	material	
and	 ideational	 inputs	 of	 Brazilian	 national	 role	 conceptions	 are	 explored	 in	
detail.		Then	the	national	role	conceptions	of	Brazilian	foreign	policy	are	detailed	
with	 reference	 to	 these	 material	 and	 ideational	 inputs.	 	 Finally,	 the	 role	
enactment	 of	 Brazilian	 policymakers	 is	 evaluated	 according	 to	 the	 hypotheses	
presented	in	the	previous	chapter.			
Before	 embarking	 on	 the	 case	 study,	 the	 timeframe	 of	 analysis	must	 be	
established.		The	aim	of	this	case	analysis	is	to	capture	key	moments	in	Brazilian	
nuclear	 decision	 making,	 and	 as	 such,	 the	 existing	 scholarship	 has	 been	
consulted	 to	 determine	 an	 appropriate	 analysis	 timeframe.	 	 Barletta	 (1997)	
begins	his	analysis	of	 the	Brazilian	military’s	parallel	nuclear	program	with	the	
technology	 transfer	 deal	 inked	 in	 1975	 between	 Brazil	 and	 West	 Germany.		
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Kassenova’s	 (2014)	 	 analysis	 has	 a	 much	 broader	 scope,	 and	 begins	 with	
Brazilian	President	Artur	da	Costa	e	Silva’s	decision	in	1967	to	push	to	acquire	
the	 full	 nuclear	 fuel	 cycle.	 	 Doyle	 (2008a)	 takes	 a	 similar	 view,	 beginning	 his	
analysis	of	Argentina	and	Brazil	 in	the	late	1960s,	with	special	attention	on	the	
1975	West	Germany‐Brazil	deal.		After	a	brief	summary	of	Brazilian	progress	in	
the	nuclear	industry	before	1975	to	set	the	proper	context,	my	analysis	will	focus	
on	Brazilian	nuclear	decision	making	during	the	period	of	1975‐1991.			
The	endpoint	of	1991	was	selected	for	a	number	of	reasons.		Barletta	also	
concludes	his	analysis	in	1991,	citing	Brazilian	commitment	to	full	ratification	of	
the	 Treaty	 of	 Tlatelolco,	 establishing	 a	 Nuclear	 Weapons	 Free	 Zone	 in	 Latin	
America	and	the	Caribbean	(1997,	p.	2).		Brazil	also	signed	a	bilateral	safeguards	
agreement	with	 rival	 Argentina	 in	 1991,	 and	 agreed	 to	 allow	 IAEA	 inspectors	
access	 to	previously‐undeclared	 facilities	associated	with	 the	military’s	parallel	
program	 (Doyle,	 2008a,	 p.	 317).	 	 In	 the	 next	 section,	 a	 general	 overview	 of	
Brazilian	 foreign	 policy	 is	 presented	 to	 establish	 context	 for	 the	 rest	 of	 the	
analysis.	
	
4.2. General	Foreign	Policy	Outlook	
	 In	this	section,	I	extrapolate	general	trends	from	the	available	literature	to	
establish	a	basic	understanding	of	the	foreign	policy	positions	of	Brazil.		Overall,	
Brazil’s	 foreign	policy	has	been	 influenced	greatly	by	 its	geographic	 location	 in	
South	 America	 and	 proximity	 to	 the	 United	 States.	 	 The	 content	 of	 Brazilian	
foreign	 policy	 often	 has	 been	 found	 to	 be	 shaped	 extensively	 by	 the	 trending	
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domestic	 economic	 development	 strategy.	 	 After	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	
determinants	of	Brazilian	foreign	policy,	I	will	elaborate	on	trends	in	the	content	
of	Brazilian	foreign	policy	in	the	20th	Century.		Finally,	both	the	determinants	and	
the	content	of	Brazilian	foreign	policy	will	be	placed	in	their	historical	context	as	
deduced	from	the	literature.			
	
A	Brief	History	of	Brazil	
The	 nation	 of	 Brazil	 has	 captured	 the	 imaginations	 of	 scholars	 and	
politicians	alike	ever	since	earning	its	independence	from	Portugal	in	1822.		The	
world’s	largest	Lusophone	(Portuguese‐speaking)	nation,	Brazil	occupies	almost	
half	(47.3	percent)	of	the	South	American	landmass	(Permanent	Mission	of	Brazil	
to	the	United	Nations,	2013).		Governed	first	as	an	Empire	from	1822‐1889,	then	
as	the	Old	Republic	from	1889‐1930,	Brazil’s	early	trajectory	was	closely	linked	
with	its	status	as	an	exporter	of	agricultural	and	mineral	raw	materials	(Gordon,	
2001,	p.	142).			
In	the	20th	Century,	Brazilian	leaders	realized	the	need	to	industrialize	as	
their	 society	 followed	 worldwide	 trends	 of	 urbanization	 and	 pursued	 policies	
aimed	at	 development.	 	 The	only	 South	American	nation	which	 entered	World	
War	II,	Brazil	played	a	very	active	role	in	the	establishment	of	the	United	Nations	
after	the	end	of	the	war.		Despite	extensive	lobbying	efforts,	Brazil	was	denied	a	
permanent	 seat	 on	 the	 Security	 Council,	 and	 instead	 was	 offered	 the	 poor	
consolation	prize	of	 giving	 the	opening	address	 to	 the	General	Assembly	every	
year	(Burges,	2009,	p.	21).	 	After	the	military	staged	a	coup	in	1964,	Brazil	was	
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governed	by	a	military	dictatorship	until	democratic	rule	returned	in	1985.		After	
the	end	of	the	Cold	War,	Brazil’s	economy	has	seen	a	resurgence	and	the	nation	
has	been	tagged	as	a	member	of	the	BRICS	group	of	developing	economies	(Tett,	
2010).			
	
Borders	and	Relations	with	Neighbors	
	 Brazil’s	foreign	policy	has	been	shaped	by	its	location	in	the	western	
hemisphere.		Brazil	ranks	5th	in	the	world	in	terms	of	both	population	and	
landmass	(Permanent	Mission	of	Brazil	to	the	United	Nations,	2013),	making	it	
one	of	the	few	truly	“continental	countries”	of	the	world	(Lafer,	2000).		Brazil	
also	is	one	of	the	states	with	the	highest	number	of	neighbors:	it	shares	a	border	
with	10	different	countries.		In	addition,	Brazil	has	not	experienced	drawn	out	
territorial	disputes	with	its	neighbors,	and	the	disputes	that	it	did	have	were	
solved	through	diplomatic	negotiation	rather	than	military	engagement	(Lafer,	
2000).		Brazil	has	the	additional	advantage	of	the	fact	that	these	negotiations	
occurred	early	in	Brazil’s	history,	largely	thanks	to	José	Maria	da	Silva	Paranhos,	
Jr.,	the	Baron	of	Rio	Branco.		Rio	Branco,	as	he	preferred	to	be	called,	successfully	
led	diplomatic	negotiations		to	resolve	all	of	Brazil’s	outstanding	territorial	
disputes	with	its	neighbors	between	1902	and	1912	while	he	was	the	Brazilian	
Minister	of	External	Affairs	(Lafer,	2000,	p.	214).		The	considerable	impact	of	Rio	
Branco	on	Brazilian	foreign	policy	will	be	revisited	in	later	sections.	
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Development	Policy	in	Brazil’s	Foreign	Relations	
The	 stability	 provided	 by	 the	 absence	 of	 serious	 conflicts	 with	 its	
neighbors	 has	 meant	 that	 Brazilian	 perceptions	 of	 their	 own	 insecurity	 are	
largely	framed	in	economic,	rather	than	strategic	terms.			One	implication	of	this	
is	 that	Brazilian	 foreign	policy	receives	 its	cues	 largely	 from	national	economic	
and	 development	 strategies.	 	 Historically,	 this	 theme	 has	 been	 present	 in	
Brazilian	foreign	policy	since	the	first	presidency	of	Getulio	Vargas	(1930‐1945),	
during	 which	 Brazil	 experienced	 a	 crippling	 economic	 contraction	 as	 the	
worldwide	coffee	market	utterly	collapsed	due	to	the	Great	Depression	(Burges,	
2009,	 p.	 20).	 	 This	 experience	 led	 to	 the	 rise	 of	 a	 desenvolvimentista	
(developmentalist)	 foreign	 policy	 as	 the	 Vargas	 administration	 sought	
international	 investment	 to	 build	 up	 Brazil’s	 nascent	 industrial	 capabilities,	
specifically	in	the	area	of	steel	production	(Burges,	2009,	p.	20).		It	was	not	until	
World	War	II,	however,	that	international	investment	began	to	flow	after	Brazil	
joined	the	Allies	in	1942	(Hirst,	2005).	
As	 the	 vision	 for	 the	 development	 of	 the	 economy	 changed,	 so	 did	 the	
nation’s	foreign	policy.		For	Brazilian	policy	makers,	foreign	policy	is	seen	as	the	
means	 to	 achieve	 development	 goals,	 rather	 than	 projecting	 power	 to	 achieve	
geopolitical	objectives.		Some	scholars	(Burges,	2012;	Daudelin,	2013;	Soares	de	
Lima	&	Hirst,	2006)	trace	shifts	in	foreign	policy	to	corresponding	changes	in	the	
development	 strategy	 adopted	 by	 the	 administration	 in	 power.	 	 Specifically,	
Brazil	engages	with	the	world	largely	to	fuel	its	development	at	home	and	fight	
its	woefully	high	levels	of	income	inequality	(Daudelin,	2013).			
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For	 example,	 Lima	 and	 Hirst	 (2006)	 identify	 two	 critical	 junctures	 in	
Brazilian	 foreign	 policy	 and	 trace	 their	 origins	 to	 shifts	 in	 domestic	 economic	
policy.	 	 The	 first	 juncture	 occurred	 in	 the	 1930s,	 as	 Brazil	 under	 Vargas’	
leadership	 shifted	 from	 a	 commodities‐export	 based	 economy	 to	 an	 import	
substitution	development	strategy.	 	The	second	juncture	occurred	in	the	1990s,	
as	the	decline	of	“protected	industrialization”	made	way	for	greater	integration	
into	 the	 global	 economy	 (Soares	 de	 Lima	&	Hirst,	 2006).	 	 This	 second	 foreign	
policy	 shift	 occurred	 under	 the	 leadership	 of	 President	 Fernando	 Henrique	
Cardoso	 (1995‐2002),	 who	 attempted	 to	 redefine	 the	 sense	 of	 Brazilian	
independence	 from	autonomy	through	distance	to	a	 logic	of	autonomy	through	
integration		in	the	world	economy	(Vigevani,	Oliveira,	&	Thompson,	2007,	p.	58).			
This	 developmentalist	 perspective	 is	 particularly	 relevant	 during	 the	
military	 regime’s	 stint	 in	power	 from	1964	 to	1985.	 	 The	military	 government	
evaluated	 Brazilian	 foreign	 policy	 primarily	 by	 how	 it	 served	 domestic	
development	 goals	 and	 provided	 economic	 benefits	 (Solingen,	 1990).		
Itamaraty’s	efforts	became	focused	on	the	dual	goal	of	opening	new	markets	for	
Brazilian	goods	and	attracting	foreign	investment	to	Brazil	in	a	policy	known	as	
“the	diplomacy	of	prosperity”	 (Solingen,	1990,	p.	132).	 	This	was	reinforced	by	
the	 1973	 oil	 crisis,	 where	 energy‐starved	 Brazil	 fundamentally	 reassessed	 its	
foreign	 policy,	 specifically	 towards	 OPEC	 countries	 and	 the	 developing	 world.		
Brazil	 sought	 to	 coordinate	 its	 diplomatic	 efforts	 in	 the	 developing	 world	 to	
foster	 the	 sale	 of	 technology	 and	 services	 to	 developing	 countries	 and	 OPEC	
nations,	 hoping	 to	 shift	 the	 balance	 of	 trade	with	Middle	 Eastern	 countries	 by	
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selling	 weapons	 in	 exchange	 for	 oil	 (Solingen,	 1990).	 	 In	 the	 next	 section,	
Brazilian	foreign	policy	will	be	discussed	with	relation	to	its	thematic	content.	
	
4.3. Brazilian	Foreign	Policy:	Thematic	Content	
	 Because	 of	 its	 limited	 ability	 to	 project	 economic	 and	 military	 power,	
Brazil	 is	 largely	 unable	 to	 act	 unilaterally	 on	 the	 global	 or	 even	 regional	 stage	
(Burges,	2012).		Instead,	Brazil	uses	a	series	of	multilateral	tactics	to	achieve	its	
goals	of	influencing	and	shaping	the	system	of	global	governance,	which	it	deems	
as	unjust	to	the	global	South	(Daudelin	&	Burges,	2011).		Brazilian	policymakers	
speak	of	their	nation’s	foreign	policy	in	terms	of	two	“axes:”	one	symmetric,	one	
asymmetric	(Alden	&	Vieira,	2005).			
	
Asymmetric	Axis:	Relations	with	“Core”	Countries	
Brazil’s	 relationships	 with	 the	 asymmetric	 axis	 of	 industrialized	 “core”	
nations	 largely	 consists	 of	 activity	 in	 international	 organizations	 (IOs).	 	 Since	
World	War	 I,	 Brazil	 has	 been	 an	 eager—if	 often	 sidelined—participant	 in	 the	
organs	of	global	governance.	 	Brazilian	policymakers	have	long	attempted	to	be	
present	at	the	negotiation	table	in	order	to	compose	the	statutes	of	new	organs	
and	rewrite	the	rules	of	existing	IOs.		Brazil	pushes	for	a	voice	in	global	decision‐
making	 and	 advocates	 for	 a	 more	 equal	 “distribution	 of	 decision‐making”	
between	the	global	North	and	South	(Burges,	2012,	p.	352).		In	general,	Brazil	has	
consistently	 worked	 hard	 to	 be	 one	 of	 the	 founding	 and	 active	 members	 of	
institutions	of	global	governance.			
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Policymakers	 identify	Brazil’s	 relationship	with	 the	 industrialized	“core”	
nations	of	the	world	as	asymmetric	 in	nature.	 	 In	order	to	improve	its	standing	
with	 these	 core	 nations,	 Brazil	 pursues	 a	 partnership	 with	 the	 United	 States,	
while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 working	 multilaterally	 to	 improve	 its	 standing	
internationally.	 	This	multilateral	dialogue	occurs	on	the	symmetric	axis,	where	
Brazil	places	its	relationships	with	states	it	views	as	peers	or	equals.		Specifically,	
Brazil	seeks	to	identify	with	states	under	similar	pressure	from	the	asymmetric	
axis	 and	 become	 a	 rallying	 point	 for	 these	 states	 to	 improve	 their	 bargaining	
position.		This	activity	primarily	occurs	in	the	context	of	important	international	
organizations	 such	 as	 the	 UN	 or	 GATT/WTO.	 	 In	 addition,	 Brazil	 has	 been	
responsible	for	the	foundation	of	a	plethora	of	new	multilateral	partnerships	and	
for	a	as	well	 as	 strengthening	 integration	across	 the	South	American	continent	
(Mercosur/Mercosul,	 UNASUL/UNASOL,	 Rio	 Group,	 etc.).	 	 In	 both	 types	 of	
organizations,	Brazil	 attempts	 to	 rewrite	 the	 rules	 that	 govern	 the	structure	of	
international	governance	and	be	in	a	position	to	shape	the	writing	of	new	rules	
as	the	occasion	presents	itself	(Alden	&	Vieira,	2005).			
	
Symmetric	Axis:	Relations	with	“Peripheral”	Countries	
In	relations	with	states	on	the	symmetric	axis,	Brazil	pursues	a	series	of	
strategies	 to	magnify	 its	 own	 effectiveness	 in	 the	 international	 arena.	 	 One	 of	
these	is	“collectivizing”	Brazilian	objectives,	bringing	other	states	on	board	with	
the	 Brazilian	 position	 during	 the	 course	 of	 multilateral	 negotiations	 (Burges,	
2012).		The	flipside	of	this	tactic	is	the	Brazilian	effort	to	create	consensus	along	
the	symmetric	axis	in	such	a	way	that	benefits	the	Brazilian	position	with	respect	
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to	asymmetrical	relations.	 	This	is	supported	by	Brazilian	technical	competence	
and	technical	capabilities	which	allow	policy	makers	 to	 follow	the	 trajectory	of	
complex	multilateral	economic	negotiations.	
	
Relations	with	the	United	States	
Another	key	component	of	Brazilian	foreign	policy	is	its	relationship	with	
the	United	States.	 	The	partnership	has	ebbed	and	 flowed	over	 the	years	given	
the	 different	 governments	 in	 power	 in	 Brasilia	 and	 Washington.	 	 In	 general,	
cultivating	deeper	relations	with	Brazil	has	not	been	high	on	the	list	of	American	
priorities,	even	in	times	of	cordiality	(Sweig,	2010,	p.	2).	 	This	 is	 in	spite	of	 the	
fact	that	the	two	nations	share	strikingly	similar	histories	of	European	discovery	
and	 colonization,	 dealing	 with	 the	 sociological	 implications	 of	 slavery,	 and	 of	
welcoming	 immigrant	 communities	 from	 Europe	 and	 around	 the	 world.	 	 The	
United	 States’	 historical	 perspective	 on	 the	Western	 hemisphere,	 flowing	 from	
the	Monroe	Doctrine,	 has	 kept	 the	 two	 countries	 intertwined	 for	most	 of	 their	
histories.			
The	 United	 States	 was	 the	 first	 country	 to	 recognize	 Brazil’s	
independence	from	Portugal	in	1822	and	the	US	embassy	in	Rio	de	Janeiro	was	
the	 first	 American	 embassy	 in	 South	 America	 (Hirst,	 2005,	 p.	 2).	 	 Influential	
Brazilian	 foreign	 minister	 Rio	 Branco	 (1902‐12)	 prioritized	 his	 country’s	
relationship	with	the	United	States	both	as	a	buffer	against	European	incursion	
and	 as	 a	 reinforcement	 of	 entente	 between	 Brazil	 and	 its	 South	 American	
neighbors	 (Hirst,	 2005).	 	 Burges	 names	 Rio	 Branco’s	 strategy	 as	 a	 “Policy	 of	
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Approximation”—Rio	Branco	saw	Brazil’s	role	as	being	a	lesser	power	under	the	
sphere	 of	 US	 influence,	 supporting	 US	 leadership	 in	 dialogues	 with	 European	
powers	(Burges,	2009,	p.	19).		Fitting	his	country’s	policies	inside	the	context	of	
the	 Monroe	 Doctrine	 allowed	 Rio	 Branco	 to	 position	 Brazil	 to	 become	 the	
interlocutor	between	the	United	States	and	South	America,	a	position	which	was	
to	dominate	Brazilian	foreign	policy	for	many	years	to	come	(Smith,	2010).	
World	War	 II	marked	changes	 in	 the	Brazil‐US	partnership,	 as	Brazilian	
populist	 president	 Getúlio	 Vargas	 first	 pledged	 “nonaligned”	 assistance	 to	 the	
Allies	before	eventually	 joining	 the	war	on	 their	side	 in	1942	(Burges,	2009,	p.	
21).	 	 	 This	 assistance	 consisted	of	 allowing	 the	US	 to	build	 air	 bases	 along	 the	
northeastern	coast	to	conduct	anti‐submarine	missions	in	the	South	Atlantic	and	
fly	supply	missions	to	Africa.		These	bases	were	also	used	to	logistically	support	
the	Allied	 invasion	of	North	Africa	 in	1942	(Smith,	2010,	p.	121).	 	Brazil	sent	a	
contingent	 of	 soldiers	 and	 airmen	 to	 the	 Italian	 front	 in	 1944,	 the	 only	 South	
American	 nation	 to	 do	 so.	 	 However,	 this	 participation	 reinforced	 just	 how	
dependent	 Brazilian	 military	 remained	 on	 the	 United	 States—the	 Brazilian	
troops	not	only	carried	American	weapons,	but	also	wore	US‐supplied	uniforms	
and	ate	American	rations	(Perruci,	1995,	p.	377).				
After	the	end	of	the	war,	Brazil	was	a	very	vocal	advocate	in	the	formation	
of	 the	 United	 Nations,	 expecting	 to	 be	 rewarded	 for	 its	 wartime	 support.		
American	priorities	were	focused	on	the	rebuilding	of	Europe	however,	and	the	
much‐hoped‐for	industrialization	aid	never	materialized	(Smith,	2010).		Despite	
the	 objections	 of	 nationalist	 voices	 in	 Brazil,	 an	 agreement	 to	 supply	 the	
Brazilian	armed	forces	with	American	military	hardware	and	training	was	signed	
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in	1952	(Perruci,	1995).		Until	the	beginning	of	the	1960s,	a	vast	majority	of	the	
equipment	 used	 by	 the	 Brazilian	 military	 was	 supplied	 by	 the	 United	 States,	
giving	the	US	access	to	steer	the	institution	of	the	military	to	support	American	
policy	positions	(Perruci,	1995).	
By	 the	 1960s,	 the	 American	 foreign	 policy	 establishment	 was	 firmly	
focused	 on	 containing	 the	 spread	of	 communism	around	 the	world,	 and	Brazil	
was	 no	 exception.	 	 American	 fears	 about	 Brazil	 stemmed	 from	 Brazil’s	
increasingly	 assertive	 “independent	 foreign	policy”	 and	 protectionist	 economic	
policies	 in	 the	domestic	arena	(Smith,	2010).	 	Guided	by	the	administrations	of	
Janio	Quadros	 (1961)	and	 Joao	Goulart	 (1961‐64),	Brazil	 sought	 to	 increase	 its	
autonomy	and	seek	its	own	national	interests	independent	of	the	bipolar	world	
order,	with	implications	for	 its	relationship	with	the	United	States	(Hirst,	2005,	
p.	 7).	 	 One	 such	 consequence	 of	 the	 independent	 foreign	 policy	 was	 the	
nationalization	and	restriction	of	American	firms	operating	in	Brazil.		This	led	US	
authorities	to	expand	their	dialogue	with	Brazilian	institutions	separate	from	the	
Goulart	administration,	specifically	the	military,	which	was	growing	increasingly	
troubled	 by	 and	 hostile	 to	 the	 policies	 of	 Goulart	 (Smith,	 2010).	 	 In	 1964,	
responding	to	an	increased	worry	over	the	direction	of	the	country,	the	Brazilian	
military	stepped	in	and	overthrew	Goulart	in	a	coup.			
The	 coup	 against	 President	 João	 Goulart	 was	 quietly	 support	 by	 a	 US	
government	 worried	 about	 the	 spread	 of	 communism	 around	 the	 world	
(Skidmore,	1988).		Throughout	the	1960s,	Brazil’s	military	leaders	viewed	their	
country’s	 progress	 as	 inseparable	 from	 its	 relationship	 with	 the	 US.	 	 Brazil’s	
economy	 was	 highly	 dependent	 on	 US	 investment—in	 the	 1960s	 the	 US	 was	
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Brazil’s	 leading	 source	 of	 civilian	 capital	 and	military	 hardware,	 as	well	 as	 the	
most	popular	destination	for	Brazilian	products	(Skidmore,	1988,	p.	192).		Yet	by	
the	 mid	 1970s,	 the	 regime’s	 authoritarian	 policies—especially	 human	 rights	
abuses	 by	 the	 regime’s	 secret	 police—caused	 many	 in	 the	 US	 foreign	 policy	
establishment	to	lose	their	already‐tepid	enthusiasm	for	Brazil	(Smith,	2010).	
The	 underlying	 strains	 in	 this	 relationship	 were	 exposed	 during	 the	
presidency	 of	 Ernesto	 Geisel	 (1974‐78).	 	 Geisel’s	 foreign	 policy	 mantra	 of	
“responsible	 pragmatism”	 involved	 Brazil	 distancing	 itself	 from	 the	 US	 and	
expanding	 Brazil’s	 bilateral	 trade	 with	 other	 nations	 (Pinheiro,	 2013,	 p.	 119).		
The	 goal	 of	 this	 new	 “ecumenical”	 foreign	 policy	 outlook	 was	 the	 removal	 of	
external	 hindrances	 of	 Brazil’s	 progress	 in	 economic	 and	 technical	 sectors	
(Pinheiro,	 2013,	 p.	 122).	 	 This	 particularly	 manifested	 itself	 in	 the	 Geisel	
government’s	 pursuit	 of	 nuclear	 technology.	 	 Seeking	 the	 independence	 of	 the	
full	 nuclear	 fuel	 cycle,	 Brazil	 first	 approached	 the	 US,	 then	 West	 Germany	 to	
acquire	 the	 technical	 know‐how.	 	 The	 staunchly	 proliferation‐wary	 Carter	
administration	put	considerable	pressure	on	West	Germany	not	to	go	ahead	with	
the	deal,	while	also	putting	pressure	on	Geisel’s	government	based	on	its	human	
rights	violations.	 	 In	 the	end,	 although	 the	deal	was	 signed,	 the	US	was	able	 to	
effectively	 cripple	 the	 fledgling	 Brazilian	 nuclear	 program	 by	 slowing	 its	
momentum	and	preventing	the	transfer	of	key	technologies	(Skidmore,	1988).			
Overall,	 Brazil’s	 relationship	with	 the	 United	 States	 has	 been	 characterized	 by	
Daniel	van	Eeuwen	as	swinging	between	periods	of	 “conflictual	bipolarity”	and	
“cordial	rivalry”	(as	cited	in	Daudelin,	2013,	p.	211).		According	to	many	scholars,	
Brazil	 seeks	 partnership	 in	 its	 relationship	 with	 the	 United	 States,	 yet	 resists	
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conformity	to	American	demands.	 	These	challenges	to	the	status	quo	are	often	
perceived	as	rebellion	or	shielded	hostility	by	US	policymakers.	 	Burges	(2012)	
describes	 a	 desire	 of	 policymakers	 to	 be	 treated	 as	 equals	 by	 the	 US	 and	 a	
resentment	when	they	are	ignored	by	the	superpower.		Lafer	(2000)	provides	a	
contemporary	Brazilian	perspective	on	the	Monroe	Doctrine:	it	should	no	longer	
be	a	unilateral	declaration	by	 the	US,	but	 rather	 imbedded	 in	 the	 International	
Law	 of	 the	 Americas	 and	 subject	 to	 more	 multilateral	 input	 from	 the	 region	
(Lafer,	2000,	p.	219).		These	overtures	have	not	received	much	serious	attention	
from	 the	 US	 as	 a	 general	 rule.	 	 Overall,	 Brazil	 has	 always	 avoided	 direct	
confrontation	 in	 its	 relations	 with	 the	 United	 States,	 but	 relations	 have	
consistently	been	strained	through	crises	of	expectation	from	both	parties.			
	
Shift	from	Bilateral	to	Multilateral	Engagement	
Brazil’s	 foreign	 policy,	 while	 retaining	 common	 threads	 throughout	 the	
20th	Century,	has	undergone	several	 important	changes	over	 the	years.	 	One	of	
these	changes	is	the	shift	in	focus	from	bilateral	to	multilateral	engagement.		For	
many	 years,	 Brazil	 emphasized	 its	 bilateral	 agreements	with	 individual	 states,	
especially	 its	 relationship	with	 the	United	States.	 	This	began	 to	change	during	
the	military	 dictatorship	 era	 (1964‐1985)	 once	 the	 regime’s	 relationship	 with	
the	 US	 soured	 during	 the	 Geisel	 Administration.	 	 Specifically,	 President	 João	
Figueiredo	 (1979‐1985)	 began	 to	 emphasize	 Brazil’s	 Latin	 American	 identity	
through	reaching	out	to	other	leaders	in	the	region	and	starting	initiatives	aimed	
at	achieving	regional	consensus	over	specific	issues	(Saraiva,	2010,	p.	156).			
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Under	Figueiredo’s	leadership,	Brazil	signed	the	Tripartite	Agreement	on	
Corpus	and	 Itaipu	with	Paraguay	and	Argentina	 in	1979,	 ending	a	 complicated	
(and	 at	 times	 hostile)	 debate	 over	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 Itaipu	 dam	 built	 on	 the	
border	 between	 Paraguay	 and	 Brazil	 (Selcher,	 1985,	 p.	 25).	 	 Tensions	 with	
Argentina	were	 reduced	 further	when	 the	 two	nations’	 presidents	 visited	each	
other’s	 capitals	 in	 a	 show	 of	 openness	 in	 1980.	 	 Saraiva	 (2010)	 attributes	 the	
steps	taken	by	Brazil	towards	regional	engagement	at	the	end	of	the	1980s	back	
to	 these	 early	 actions	 by	 Figueiredo.	 	 By	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1980s,	 Brazil’s	
relationship	 with	 Argentina	 was	 almost	 unrecognizable,	 with	 the	 two	 nations	
signing	 the	 agreement	 that	 served	 as	 the	 foundation	 for	 Mercosur	 in	 1985.		
Assurances	 in	 the	area	of	nuclear	 technology	began	 the	 same	year	with	a	 joint	
presidential	 statement	 on	 Brazilian‐Argentine	 nuclear	 collaboration,	 and	
culminated	with	the	foundation	of	the	Brazilian‐Argentine	Agency	for	Accounting	
and	Control	of	Nuclear	Materials	(ABACC)	in	1991	(CNEA,	2014).	
	
Brazilian	Nuclear	Energy	Timeline	
Although	 Brazil’s	 interest	 in	 nuclear	 technology	 started	 early,	 with	
research	 in	atomic	physics	 taking	place	at	the	country’s	universities	as	early	as	
the	1930s,	the	story	of	nuclear	energy	in	Brazil	really	begins	with	the	Manhattan	
Project	during	World	War	II.	 	As	nations	around	the	world	scrambled	to	survey	
and	secure	 their	uranium	reserves,	Brazil	 entered	a	 secret	 agreement	with	 the	
United	States	to	provide	the	Manhattan	Project	with	raw	uranium	ore	procured	
from	Brazilian	mines	 (Patti,	2014).	 	This	arrangement	continued	until	 the	mid‐
1950s,	when	it	was	replaced	by	a	policy	of	“specific	compensation,”	largely	at	the	
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insistence	of	Brazilian	leaders	(Flemes,	2006,	p.	10).		A	key	turning	point	came	in	
1947,	when	Admiral	Alvaro	Alberto,	the	Brazilian	envoy	to	international	nuclear	
negotiations,	 proposed	 a	 Brazilian	 atomic	 energy	 program	 to	 a	meeting	 of	 the	
National	 Security	Council.	 	Admiral	Alberto	also	demanded	a	 seat	 for	Brazil	on	
the	proposed	international	governing	body	for	nuclear	energy	(Patti,	2014).	
The	Brazilian	efforts	to	acquire	nuclear	technology	experienced	a	period	
of	wheel‐spinning	in	the	early	1950s.	 	Although	Alberto	was	appointed	director	
of	 the	 newly‐founded	 National	 Research	 Council	 in	 1951,	 attempts	 to	 acquire	
nuclear	 technology	 internationally	 all	 fell	 flat.	 	 In	 1953‐54,	 Brazil	 approached	
both	France	and	West	Germany	about	signing	nuclear	technology	transfer	deals,	
but	neither	country	was	willing	at	 the	 time	(Patti,	2014).	 	Admiral	Alberto	was	
able	 to	 purchase	 centrifuges	 for	 investigating	 uranium	 enrichment	 from	 the	
University	of	Göttingen		in	West	Germany,	but	the	equipment	was	not	delivered	
because	 the	 US	 ordered	 the	 confiscation	 of	 the	 sensitive	 technology	 (Nedal	 &	
Coutto,	2014).		Finally	in	1955,	Brazil	signed	an	Atoms	for	Peace	agreement	with	
the	United	States,	with	the	first	research	reactor	completed	in	1957.		In	1956,	a	
Parliamentary	Commission	of	Inquiry	on	nuclear	energy	established	the	national	
Nuclear	Energy	Commission,	assigned	to	report	directly	to	the	Presidency	of	the	
Republic.		The	strategy	developed	by	the	commission	was	ambitious,	but	lacking	
in	strategic	application,	which	led	to	propagation	of	inefficiencies	in	the	Brazilian	
efforts.	
In	 1962,	 Brazil	 proposed	 to	 the	 United	Nations	 that	 a	 nuclear	weapons	
free	zone	be	proclaimed	in	Latin	America,	and	in	1967,	the	Treaty	of	Tlatelolco	
was	drafted	in	Mexico	City	(Solingen,	1990,	p.	142).		Although	Brazil	ratified	the	
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treaty	in	1978,	it	did	not	waive	the	provision	that	the	treaty	had	to	be	ratified	by	
all	parties	before	it	could	be	recognized	as	binding,	which	effectively	meant	that	
Brazil	 had	 no	 obligations	 under	 the	 treaty	 until	 every	 state	 in	 the	 region	 also	
ratified.		Argentina	also	did	not	waive	this	provision,	resulting	in	a	stalemate	that	
continued	 for	decades—Brazil	 did	not	 fully	 ratify	 the	Treaty	of	Tlatelolco	until	
1994	(Kassenova,	2014,	p.	52).			
In	1967,	Army	marshal‐turned	President	Artur	da	Costa	e	Silva	decided	to	
acquire	 the	 full	 nuclear	 fuel	 cycle,	 putting	 forth	 a	 plan	 that	 stipulated	 the	
purchase	of	nuclear	plants,	 fuel	cycle	 facilities,	and	a	national	atomic	 industrial	
and	research	park	(Patti,	2014).		These	plans	finally	began	to	take	concrete	shape	
in	1971	when	the	(Brazilian)	National	Nuclear	Energy	Commission	signed	a	deal	
with	 American	 firm	 Westinghouse	 and	 the	 US	 Atomic	 Energy	 Commission	 to	
purchase	 a	 pressurized	 water	 reactor.	 	 The	 deal	 included	 a	 fuel	 guarantee—
Westinghouse	was	to	provide	the	reactor	with	fuel	and	retain	possession	of	the	
spent	 fuel	 rods,	 effectively	 confining	 Brazil	 to	 the	 generation	 segment	 of	 the	
nuclear	 fuel	 cycle.	 	 For	 the	 next	 few	 years,	 Brazil	 continued	 to	 pressure	
Westinghouse	 to	 include	 enrichment	 and	 fuel	 fabrication	 technologies	 in	 the	
deal,	 while	 Westinghouse	 responded	 with	 offering	 to	 sell	 Brazil	 additional	
reactors.	 	 These	 efforts	 gained	 new	 urgency	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	 1973	 OPEC	 oil	
crisis.	 	 In	12	months,	Brazil’s	 imports	doubled	in	size	from	$6.2	billion	to	$12.4	
billion,	largely	as	a	result	of	the	skyrocketing	oil	prices	(Skidmore,	1988,	p.	180).		
That	 same	 year,	motivated	 by	 the	 need	 to	 find	 alternative	 energy	 sources,	 the	
Brazilian	 state	 electricity	 company	 Eletrobrás	 issued	 “Plan	 90,”	 a	 proposal	 to	
build	 12	 nuclear	 power	 plants	 in	 the	 country	 by	 the	 year	 1990,	 all	 to	 be	
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purchased	from	Westinghouse	at	the	cost	of	$10	billion	(Skidmore	1988,	pg	194),	
although	this	extension	did	not	gain	traction.					
	 In	1975,	facing	hardship	from	the	1973	oil	embargo	and	the	threat	of	the	
loss	of	the	Westinghouse	fuel	guarantee	(Doyle,	2008a,	p.	313),	Brazil	announced	
a	massive	agreement	with	West	German	consortium	Kraftwerk	Union	(KWU)	for	
acquiring	the	entire	nuclear	fuel	cycle.		Initially	valued	at	around	$10	billion,	the	
agreement	 consisted	 of	 the	 construction	 of	 eight	 nuclear	 power	 plants,	
prospecting	 for	 uranium	mining,	 enrichment	 technology	 transfer,	 and	 building	
up	 Brazilian	 heavy	 industry	 for	 domestic	 construction	 of	 nuclear	 plant	
components	(Solingen,	1990,	p.	138).		However,	faced	with	delays,	skyrocketing	
costs,	 and	 technical	 incompetency,	 implementation	 of	 the	 agreement	 slowly	
faded	 away	 by	 the	 mid‐1980s,	 leaving	 Brazil	 with	 a	 smattering	 of	 unfinished	
projects,	including	two	half‐completed	reactors.	 	The	deal	had	raised	suspicions	
regarding	Brazil’s	 intentions,	especially	since	the	transferred	technologies	were	
not	required	to	be	under	international	safeguards	(Doyle,	2008a).			
	 The	 unsafeguarded	 parallel	 research	 program	 was	 begun	 in	 the	 late	
1970s	 by	 the	 military	 with	 the	 support	 of	 CNEN.	 	 The	 Navy	 researched	
centrifuges	 for	 uranium	 enrichment	 and	 nuclear	 propulsion	 systems	 for	
submarines,	 while	 the	 Air	 Force	 pursued	 the	 laser	 enrichment	 method	 and	
embarked	on	feasibility	studies	on	constructing	a	nuclear	explosive.	 	The	Army	
built	an	experimental	graphite	research	reactor	which	could	be	used	to	produce	
plutonium	 (Doyle,	 2008a).	 	 Working	 under	 secrecy,	 civilian	 and	 military	
researchers	made	more	progress	 than	 the	declared	program,	although	 it	 is	not	
72	
	
believed	that	Brazil	ever	produced	significant	amounts	of	weapons‐grade	fissile	
material	(Doyle,	2008a,	p.	314).	
	 With	the	return	to	civilian	rule	in	1985,	the	Brazilian	public	increasingly	
associated	the	nuclear	programs	with	the	oppressive	military	regime.	 	As	more	
and	more	details	about	the	secret	parallel	program	were	released	to	the	public,	
policymakers	increasingly	were	under	pressure	to	expose	and	end	the	programs	
of	the	previous	regime.		At	the	same	time,	improving	relations	with	Argentina	led	
to	 increased	 cooperation	 in	 nuclear	 verification	 and	 safeguards.	 	 This	 was	
formalized	 in	1991	by	the	two	states	 in	a	bilateral	agreement	promising	to	use	
nuclear	technology	for	peaceful	purposes	only.		Along	with	this	agreement	came	
the	foundation	of	the	Brazilian‐Argentine	Agency	for	Accounting	and	Control	of	
Nuclear	 Materials	 (ABACC)	 tasked	 with	 enforcing	 the	 Common	 System	 of	
Accounting	and	Control	of	Nuclear	Materials	(SCCC)	agreed	on	by	the	two	states.		
As	part	of	 the	negotiations	 for	Argentine	and	Brazilian	accession	to	 the	NPT	as	
non	 nuclear	weapons	 states,	 the	 Quadripartite	 Agreement	was	 signed	 in	 1993	
between	the	IAEA,	ABACC,	Brazil,	and	Argentina	and	entered	into	force	in	March	
1994	 (Doyle,	 2008a).	 	 This	 agreement	 stipulates	 that	 Brazil	 and	 Argentina’s	
obligations	 to	 the	 IAEA	will	 be	 applied	 by	 the	ABACC	 in	 consultation	with	 the	
IAEA	 with	 limited	 verification	 efforts	 conducted	 by	 the	 IAEA	 to	 assure	 the	
trustworthiness	 of	 the	 ABACC’s	 conclusions	 (NTI,	 2013b).	 	 The	 Quadripartite	
Agreement	of	1993	paved	the	way	for	both	Argentina	and	Brazil	to	accede	to	the	
NPT	as	non	nuclear	weapons	states	in	1995	and	1998	respectively.	 	In	the	next	
section,	the	material	inputs	of	Brazilian	nuclear	policy	will	be	discussed.			
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4.4.	 Brazilian	Nuclear	Policy:	Material	Inputs	
	 In	this	section	I	summarize	the	material	inputs	of	Brazilian	nuclear	policy.		
The	 modified	 Breuning	 model	 defines	 the	 material	 inputs	 of	 nuclear	
policymaking	 as	 policymakers’	 perceptions	 of	 their	 nation’s	 relevant	 technical	
capabilities	 and	 their	 nation’s	 security	 environment	 (Breuning,	 2011).	 In	 the	
Brazilian	 case,	 these	 are	 the	 specifics	 of	 the	nuclear	 procurement	 strategy,	 the	
economic	 dilemma	 created	 by	 the	 1973	 oil	 embargo,	 and	 Brazil’s	 rivalry	with	
Argentina.	 	This	section	begins	with	an	overview	of	 the	history	of	 the	Brazilian	
nuclear	 program,	 focusing	 on	 the	 acquisition	 of	 key	 fuel	 cycle	 facilities	 as	
detailed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter.	 	 After	 this	 the	 period	 of	 1975‐1991	 will	 be	
discussed	 in	 detail,	 beginning	 with	 the	 signing	 of	 the	 Brazil‐West	 Germany	
nuclear	 cooperation	 deal,	 and	 ending	 with	 the	 Brazilian	 signing	 of	 a	 bilateral	
safeguards	agreement	with	Argentina	in	1991.	 	During	this	period,	the	shock	to	
the	Brazilian	economy	caused	by	the	1973	oil	embargo,	separate	developments	
in	 the	 relationship	 with	 Argentina,	 and	 the	 United	 States’	 opposition	 to	 the	
technical	details	of	the	nuclear	deal	with	West	Germany	set	the	tone	for	Brazilian	
role	conception	in	the	policy	area	of	nuclear	technology.			
	
Acquisition	of	key	fuel	cycle	facilities	
	 This	 section	 details	 the	 acquisition	 of	 key	 fuel	 cycle	 facilities	 by	 Brazil,	
which	are	summarized	in	Table	4	below:	
74	
	
	
	
Table	4:	Key	Brazilian	Fuel	Cycle	Facilities	
Technical	Capability	 Facility	Details	 Year	
Source	of	Fissile	Material	 Mines	at	Poços	de	Caldasand	Caetité
1952	
(first	survey)	
	
Operating	Research	
Reactor		
IEA‐R1	‘swimming	pool’	type	RR,	
São	Paulo 1957	
Argonauta,	first	domestically‐
designed/built	RR,	
Rio	de	Janeiro
1965	
Conversion	Facility		 Laboratory	facility:	Aramar	ExperimentalCenter,	Iperó Early	1980s	
Enrichment	Capability		
Industrial	facility:	
Aramar	Experimental	
Center,	Iperó 1987	
Commercial	production	facility:	
Resende	Nuclear	Fuel	Factory 2002	
Reprocessing	Capability	 None 															‐‐‐‐	
	
Domestic	Source	of	Fissile	Material:		
	 Brazil	began	organized	surveying	for	uranium	deposits	in	1952,	although	
industrial‐scaled	 production	 of	 uranium	 ore	 did	 not	 begin	 until	 1982	 (IAEA,	
2012).	 	 Uranium	 ore	was	mined	 primarily	 in	 Pocos	 de	 Caldas	 in	Minas	 Gerais	
until	that	mine	closed	in	1997	and	starting	in	1999	at	the	Caetité	mine	in	Bahia	
state(World	Nuclear	Association,	2014).	 	Caetité	 is	currently	the	only	operating	
source	of	uranium	in	Brazil,	although	Santa	Quitéria,	a	new	mine	in	Ceará	state,	is	
being	 prepared	 for	 operation	 (World	 Nuclear	 Association,	 2014).	 	 Uranium	
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mined	 in	 Brazil	 is	 currently	 shipped	 out	 of	 the	 country	 for	 conversion	 and	
enrichment,	 then	 brought	 back	 to	 be	 fabricated	 into	 fuel	 and	 used	 in	 the	
country’s	nuclear	reactors	(Kassenova,	2014).			
	
Operating	Research	Reactor	
Brazil’s	 first	 research	 reactor,	 the	 IEA‐R1,	 was	 built	 in	 São	 Paulo	 with	
American	 assistance	 through	 the	 Atoms	 for	 Peace	 program	 and	 first	 achieved	
criticality	in	1957(Saxena,	2007).		The	IEA‐R1	was	followed	by	the	IPR‐R1,	a	Mk.	
1	TRIGA‐type	reactor	built	at	Minas	Gerais	 in	1960	(Saxena,	2007).	 	By	1962,	a	
landmark	 was	 reached:	 the	 Argonauta,	 an	 indigenously‐built	 (93%)	 research	
reactor	 was	 completed	 (IAEA,	 2013).	 	 Despite	 this	 advancement,	 the	 turmoil	
caused	 by	 the	 political	 crisis	 of	 1961‐64,	 which	 ended	 in	 the	military	 coup	 of	
1964,	 limited	 the	 execution	 of	 nuclear	 projects—the	 Argonauta	 did	 not	 reach	
first	 criticality	 until	 1965	 (Saxena,	 2007).	 	 Currently,	 Brazil	 operates	 four	
research	reactors,	 located	 in	the	cities	of	Sao	Paulo,	Belo	Horizonte,	and	Rio	de	
Janeiro.	 	 These	 facilities	 are	 used	 to	 train	 staff	 and	 power	 plant	 operators,	
produce	radioisotopes	for	medical,	agricultural,	and	industrial	applications,	and	
conduct	scientific	experiments	(Open	Source	Center,	2009).	
	
Conversion	Facility	
Uranium	 conversion	 is	 defined	 as	 the	 process	 by	which	 uranium	 ore	 is	
chemically	 converted	 into	 UF6	 gas	 in	 preparation	 for	 introduction	 to	 the	
enrichment	 plant	 (Lamarsh	&	 Baratta,	 1997).	 	 UF6	 gas	 is	 highly	 corrosive	 and	
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toxic,	making	it	chemically	very	difficult	to	work	with	in	industrial	processes.		In	
the	 official	 declared	 program,	 Brazilian	 scientists	 gained	 expertise	 in	 working	
with	UF6	through	the	partnership	on	researching	the	Becker	nozzle	enrichment	
technology,	while	 the	military	 covertly	 acquired	 two	hundred	kilograms	of	 the	
material	from	China	in	order	to	test	their	systems	at	IPEN	(Barletta,	1997,	p.	13).		
By	 the	 early	 1980s,	 Brazilian	 scientists	 at	 IPEN	 had	 successfully	mastered	 the	
conversion	process	and	had	developed	a	pilot	conversion	facility	at	the	Aramar	
Experimental	Facility	in	Sao	Paulo	(Patti,	2014).		Today,	although	there	are	plans	
for	 an	 industrial	 size	 conversion	 facility	 at	 Resende,	 all	 of	 Brazil’s	 commercial	
uranium	conversion	is	contracted	to	Areva	in	France	(World	Nuclear	Association,	
2014).	
	
Reprocessing	Capability	
Reprocessing	 capability	 is	defined	 in	 the	model	 as	 the	ability	 to	 recover	
fissile	material	from	spent	nuclear	fuel	(Duderstadt	&	Hamilton,	1976).		Uranium	
and	 plutonium	 found	 in	 spent	 fuel	 rods	 is	 extracted	 chemically	 and	 can	 be	
recycled	 for	use	 in	new	 fuel.	 	The	main	proliferation	risk	of	an	 industrial‐sized	
facility	is	the	risk	of	diversion—some	fissile	material	may	be	separated	from	the	
flows	of	material	through	the	plant	and	used	in	an	undeclared	weapons	program,	
undetectable	 by	 international	 safeguards.	 	 “Hot	 cells,”	 shielded	 work	
environments	where	researchers	can	perform	small‐scale	operations	with	spent	
fuel	 using	 remote	manipulators	 or	 lead‐loaded	 gloves,	 are	 also	 of	 proliferation	
concern	 since	 they	 may	 be	 used	 to	 break	 apart	 the	 spent	 fuel	 and	 separate	
enough	plutonium	for	use	in	a	weapon.		Although	Brazil	eagerly	sought	industrial	
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reprocessing	technology	from	West	Germany	in	the	1970s,	the	country	still	lacks	
a	 reprocessing	 capability	 or	 even	 the	hot	 cells	 needed	 to	work	with	 spent	 fuel	
(Perrotta,	2008;	World	Nuclear	Association,	2014).		
	
Enrichment	Capability	
	 Essential	 to	 the	 production	 of	 nuclear	 fuel,	 enrichment	 capability	 is	
defined	as	any	facility	which	 increases	the	 isotopic	percentage	of	uranium‐235,	
allowing	 the	 fuel	 to	 be	 used	 in	 a	 sustainable	 chain	 reaction	 (Duderstadt	 &	
Hamilton,	1976).		The	production	of	nuclear	fuel	for	a	power	reactor	requires	an	
enrichment	 of	 3‐5%	 U‐235,	 but	 enrichment	 levels	 above	 20%	 U‐235	 are	
considered	to	be	highly	enriched	uranium	(HEU)	by	the	IAEA	and	considered	to	
be	a	proliferation	risk	(IAEA,	2001).		Brazil	first	sought	to	acquire	centrifuges	for	
enrichment	 from	West	 Germany	 in	 the	 1950s,	 but	 was	 blocked	 by	 the	 United	
States.		The	1975	Brazil‐West	Germany	nuclear	accord	contained	the	transfer	of	
experimental	 Becker	 nozzle	 enrichment	 technology,	 which	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 a	
failure	 (Solingen,	 1990).	 	 The	 military’s	 parallel	 program,	 however,	 achieved	
success	with	developing	high‐speed	ultracentrifuge	 technology	which	has	been	
funneled	 into	 the	 civilian	 efforts	 currently	 under	 safeguards	 (Barletta,	 1997).		
Using	 this	 technology	 developed	 by	 the	 navy,	 an	 industrial‐sized	 facility	 at	
Resende	 has	 begun	 operation	 in	 2009.	 	 The	 Resende	 facility	 was	 targeted	 to	
produce	60%	of	 the	country’s	commercial	 fuel	needs	by	2012,	with	 the	goal	of	
complete	enrichment	autonomy	and	export	on	the	international	market	by	2018	
(World	Nuclear	Association,	2014).			
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1975	Brazil‐West	Germany	Nuclear	Accord		
	 In	 this	 section,	 the	Brazil‐West	Germany	nuclear	 accord	of	1975	will	 be	
discussed.		First	the	background	of	the	deal	will	be	explored	in	the	context	of	the	
worldwide	energy	crisis	of	 the	1970s,	 then	 the	 impact	of	 the	experience	of	 the	
deal	on	policymakers	will	be	explained.	
	By	 the	 1970s,	 Brazil	 had	 risen	 to	 the	 dubious	 distinction	 of	 being	 the	
developing	 world’s	 leading	 importer	 of	 oil—80%	 of	 Brazil’s	 oil	 came	 from	
foreign	sources	in	1973	(Skidmore,	1988,	p.	178).		This	situation,	combined	with	
the	world	recession	of	1973‐74,	forced	Brazil	to	fall	further	and	further	into	debt	
on	 the	 international	 market	 as	 it	 attempted	 to	 fuel	 growth	 at	 home	 with	
increasingly	 expensive	 imports.	 	 By	 1976	 Brazil	 had	 eclipsed	 all	 others	 as	 the	
largest	debtor	nation;	Brazil	was	the	largest	single	country	indebted	to	the	World	
Bank	(Roett,	1976).		The	sudden	rise	in	oil	prices	from	the	OPEC	embargo	proved	
to	be	a	 significant	 contributor	 to	Brazil’s	balance‐of‐payments	woes	during	 the	
1970s.		Brazil	desperately	needed	alternative	sources	of	energy.			
The	reliance	on	both	foreign	investment	and	energy	sources	increasingly	
became	 perceived	 by	 policymakers	 as	 an	 issue	 of	 Brazil’s	 autonomous	
international	identity	and	foreign	policy	direction	(Soares	de	Lima	&	Hirst,	2006,	
pp.	23–24).		Lima	and	Hirst	observe	how	the	Brazilian	foreign	policy	outlook	has	
been	 “very	 heavily	 shaped	 by	 the	 prevailing	 economic	 model”	 (2006,	 p.	 22),	
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confirming	 that	 for	 Brazilian	 policymakers,	 the	 economic	 realities	 of	 their	
country’s	position	in	the	1970s	directly	led	to	an	intensification	of	their	pursuit	
of	 nuclear	 technology.	 	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 oil	 embargo	 and	 subsequent	
worldwide	 economic	 downturn	 emphasized	 Brazil’s	 overreliance	 on	 foreign	
sources	of	energy	and	capital.		The	effects	of	this	‘institutional	memory’	(Soares	
de	Lima	&	Hirst,	2006)	has	can	be	seen	in	the	progression	of	nuclear	cooperation	
and	technology	transfer	agreements	pursued	by	Brazil	during	this	period.	
The	1975	accord	consisted	of	 a	 transfer	of	 the	entire	nuclear	 fuel	 cycle:	
uranium	 surveying	 and	 mining,	 uranium	 enrichment	 using	 the	 experimental	
Becker	 jet	 nozzle	 technology,	 an	 industrial	 size	 fuel	 fabrication	 facility,	 a	 pilot	
facility	for	spent	fuel	reprocessing,	and	nuclear	reactors	(Skidmore,	1988).	 	The	
deal	was	negotiated	by	Itamaraty	without	seeking	input	of	the	Brazilian	scientific	
community	 and	 submitted	 Brazilian	 state	 enterprise	 Nuclebras	 to	 the	 close	
control	of	KWU	(Barletta,	1997,	p.	5).		The	alienation	of	the	scientific	community	
was	 complete	 when	 the	 experimental	 nozzle‐based	 enrichment	 technology	
turned	out	to	be	a	failure,	and	the	entire	project	was	wracked	with	cost	overruns	
consolidating	their	support	behind	the	secret	military	parallel	project.			
In	fact,	according	to	Dr.	Marco	A.	Marzo,	former	director	of	the	safeguards	
division	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 Nuclear	 Energy	 Commission,	 there	 was	 an	 extensive	
debate	between	political	authorities	and	the	scientific	community	regarding	the	
natural/LEU	 pathway	 decision	 for	 the	 civilian	 industry	 in	 Brazil	 (ISIS,	 1996).		
Skidmore	 (1988)	 fleshes	 out	 this	 debate	 as	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 involvement	 of	
Itamaraty,	the	Brazilian	foreign	ministry,	in	the	nuclear	negotiations.		In	the	end	
Itamaraty’s	political	officials	won	out	and	first	the	Westinghouse	turnkey	plant,	
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then	the	1975	West	Germany	deal	were	pursued	as	components	of	a	LEU‐based	
civilian	 power	 strategy.	 	 This	 outcome	 had	 important	 implications	 for	 the	
Brazilian	government’s	reaction	to	the	sea‐change	in	American	nuclear	policy	at	
the	end	of	the	1970s—the	LEU	power	generation	strategy	was	heavily	reliant	on	
the	fuel	guarantees	provided	by	the	United	States	and	the	virtual	monopoly	that	
the	US	enjoyed	in	the	LEU	enrichment	sector.			
Barletta	concludes	that	the	Nuclebras‐KWU	deal	was	based	on	a	“narrow	
bureaucratic	and	policy	coalition”	and	galvanized	civilian	and	military	elements	
to	join	in	opposing	the	official	effort	in	favor	of	a	nuclear	program	which	built	up	
an	autonomous	domestic	capability	(Barletta,	1997,	p.	5).		This	alliance	led	to	the	
emergence	of	the	so‐called	parallel	program	which	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	
section.				
The	 impact	 of	 the	 1975	 accord	 on	 policymakers	 was	 substantial.	 	 Dr.	
Marzo	 relates	 how	 the	 difficulties	 experienced	 by	 the	 Brazilian	 program	 as	 a	
result	 of	 American	 opposition	 “contributed	 decisively	 to	 the	 motivation	 to	
implement	 a	 domestic	 nuclear	 program”	 (ISIS,	 1996).	 	 Marzo	 singles	 out	
inconsistencies	in	fuel	supply	for	Angra‐I	due	to	the	US	Nuclear	Nonproliferation	
Act	(1978)	and	the	technical	failures	of	the	cooperation	agreement	with	KWU	as	
key	 factors	 in	 the	 decision‐making	 calculus	 for	 starting	 the	 military’s	 parallel	
program	(ISIS,	1996).		Frustrated	that	the	goal	of	technological	autonomy	would	
not	 be	 achieved	 by	 the	 Nuclebras‐KWU	 accord,	 a	 group	 of	 military	 leaders	
proposed	an	alternative	free	of	the	constraints	of	international	sanctions,	gaining	
the	approval	of	both	government	officials	and	civilian	scientists	(Barletta,	1997).		
This	parallel	program	will	be	discussed	in	detail	in	the	next	section.			
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The	Military’s	Parallel	Program:	
	 The	difficulties	with	the	West	German	deal,	especially	the	faulty	jet‐nozzle	
enrichment	 technology	 led	 Brazilian	 policymakers	 to	 turn	 elsewhere	 in	 their	
quest	for	domestic	mastery	of	the	nuclear	fuel	cycle.		The	Programa	Autonomo	de	
Techologia	Nuclear	(PATN),	or	Autonomous	Program	of	Nuclear	Technology,	also	
known	as	simply	the	parallel	program,	was	a	secret	nuclear	development	project	
started	 by	 Brazil’s	 military	 dictatorship	 during	 the	 late	 1970s.	 	 PATN	 was	
supported	 by	 elements	 of	 the	 civilian	 scientific	 research	 community	 unhappy	
about	being	excluded	by	Itamaraty	in	the	1975	West	German	deal.		That	accord	
had	 been	 negotiated	 by	 a	 small	 group	 of	 bureaucrats	 from	 Itamaraty	 and	 the	
president’s	 own	 office,	 so	 the	 actions	 of	 the	 military‐civilian	 coalition	 in	
developing	 the	 parallel	 program	 signal	 dissatisfaction	with	 the	way	 the	 Geisel	
government	 had	 been	 handling	 the	 nuclear	 issue	 (Barletta,	 1997).	 	When	 Joal	
Figueiredo	(1979‐1985)	assumed	the	presidency,	he	gave	official	sanction	to	the	
fledgling	 effort	 on	 the	 advice	 of	 his	 military	 advisers.	 	 In	 1990,	 Figueiredo	
testified	 before	 the	 Parliamentary	 Commission	 of	 Inquiry	 and	 assumed	 full	
responsibility	for	starting	the	PATN	(Barletta,	1997).	
	 All	 three	 branches	 of	 Brazil’s	 military	 pursued	 the	 acquisition	 of	 fissile	
material	 using	 different	 techniques.	 	 The	 Navy	 worked	 on	 developing	
ultracentrifuges	 for	uranium	enrichment,	while	 the	Air	Force	pursued	the	 laser	
method	 of	 enriching	 uranium.	 	 The	 Army	 worked	 on	 a	 graphite‐moderated	
reactor	for	the	production	of	plutonium	(Doyle,	2008a).		Of	the	three,	the	Navy’s	
program	was	 by	 far	 the	 most	 successful—the	 Navy	 was	 interested	 in	 nuclear	
technology	as	propulsion	for	submarines.				
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	 Known	as	“Operation	Cyclone,”	the	Navy’s	effort	began	in	1979	under	the	
leadership	of	Othon	Luiz	Pinheiro	da	Silva.	 	Pinheiro	da	Silva	had	been	inspired	
during	 his	 time	 at	 MIT	 as	 a	 student	 by	 an	 encounter	 with	 a	 professor	 who	
mocked	the	jet	nozzle	enrichment	technology	and	Brazil’s	purchase	of	it	in	1975	
(Guizzo,	 2006).	 	 Pinheiro	 da	 Silva’s	 team	 used	 the	 Institute	 of	 Technological	
Research	(IPEN)	in	São	Paulo	because	it	was	the	only	major	research	center	not	
associated	with	Nuclebras.	 	 All	 the	Nuclebras	 facilities	were	 subjected	 to	 IAEA	
safeguards	under	the	KWU‐Nuclebras	deal,	whereas	the	IPEN	was	not	subjected	
to	any	IAEA	inspections.			
Pinheiro	da	Silva’s	team	saw	swift	progress	with	the	difficult	technology:	
in	1981	the	first	centrifuge	was	constructed	(Barletta,	1997,	p.	6),	one	year	later	
the	 first	 enrichment	 experiments	 were	 conducted	 (Guizzo,	 2006),	 and	 a	 mini	
cascade	 of	 nine	 centrifuge	 units	 had	 been	 built	 by	 1984	 (Barletta,	 1997,	 p.	 6).		
Mastery	of	 the	enrichment	process	probably	occurred	sometime	 in	1986	but	 it	
wasn’t	 announced	 until	 1987,	 in	 order	 to	 finish	 the	 import	 of	 sensitive	
machinery,	 including	 a	 specialty	 lathe	 needed	 to	 create	 fine	 parts	 for	 the	
ultracentrifuges	 before	 an	 international	 backlash	 occurred	 (Barletta,	 1997,	 p.	
13).			
In	 contrast	with	 the	Navy’s	efforts,	 the	Air	Force	and	Army	struggled	 to	
focus	limited	resources	on	a	winning	technology.		The	Air	Force	researched	laser	
enrichment	 of	 uranium,	 nuclear	 power	 systems	 for	 satellites,	 fast	 breeder	
reactors,	and	was	tasked	with	researching	the	production	of	a	nuclear	explosive	
(Barletta,	1997,	p.	10).		The	Army	built	a	graphite	research	reactor	at	its	Institute	
of	Special	Projects	(IPE)	in	Guaratiba	(Barletta,	1997,	p.	10).		Both	the	Air	Force	
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and	 Army	 had	 limited	 collaboration	with	 civilian	 scientists,	 whereas	 the	 Navy	
aggressively	 recruited	 civilian	 contributors	 to	 its	 program.	 	 As	 the	 Navy	
experienced	 successes	 with	 its	 centrifuge	 program,	 more	 and	 more	 resources	
were	allocated	to	its	program	and	its	projects	were	expanded	in	comparison	with	
the	other	two	services’	efforts	(Flemes,	2006,	p.	14).			
After	 the	 return	 to	 civilian	 rule	 in	 1985,	 President	 Jose	 Sarney	 (1985‐
1989)	 was	 notified	 of	 the	 secret	 program	 and	 approved	 its	 continuation	
(Barletta,	 1997,	 p.	 10).	 	 It	 was	 Sarney	 who	 in	 1987	 announced	 the	 parallel	
program’s	 successful	 enrichment	 of	 uranium.	 	 This	 accomplishment	 was	
announced	the	day	before	Brazilian	Independence	Day	on	prime‐time	television	
in	 a	 move	 which	 emphasized	 the	 significant	 step	 towards	 national	 nuclear	
autonomy	(Barletta,	1997,	p.	26).		Sarney	proclaimed	that	the	accomplishment	of	
enrichment	was	“a	fact	of	great	transcendence	in	the	scientific	history	of	Brazil”	
and	a	“symbol	of	the	capacity	of	the	Brazilian	scientist,	of	his	determination,	his	
competence,	 a	 symbol	of	Brazil’s	unbeatable	vocation	 for	modernity”	 (Barletta,	
1997,	 p.	 26).	 	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 President	 Sarney	 underscored	 the	 peaceful	
nature	of	Brazil’s	efforts,	misleadingly	portraying	 it	 as	 the	product	of	a	 civilian	
research	 program	 (Barletta,	 1997).	 	 A	 year	 after	 President	 Sarney’s	
announcement,	 construction	 on	 a	 full‐scale	 pilot	 enrichment	 facility	 using	 the	
ultracentrifuge	technology	began	at	Iperó	(Morrison,	2006).			
The	secret	parallel	programs	were	dismantled	 in	1989‐90	and	the	gains	
achieved	were	folded	into	the	declared	civilian	program.		 	Sarney’s	successor	in	
office,	President	Fernando	Collor	(1990‐impeached	in	1992)	sought	to	rein	in	the	
power	 of	 the	 military	 in	 politics	 and	 assert	 civilian	 rule.	 	 Public	 opinion	 was	
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firmly	against	 the	armed	 forces	as	revelations	of	corruption	and	brutality	 from	
the	 military	 regime	 era	 continued	 to	 surface.	 	 As	 a	 public	 symbol	 of	 civilian	
control	over	the	military,	Collor	oversaw	the	pouring	of	concrete	to	fill	a	series	of	
boreholes	drilled	by	the	Air	Force	at	a	base	Cachimbo	in	northern	Brazil.		These	
shafts	were	allegedly	 intended	for	a	 future	nuclear	explosive	test.	 	 In	 front	of	a	
live	television	audience,	Collor	personally	shoveled	wet	concrete	into	the	shafts,	
showing	 he	 was	 serious	 about	 putting	 the	 military’s	 legacy	 firmly	 in	 the	 past	
(Flemes,	 2006).	 	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 Collor	 was	 also	 continuing	 a	 process	 of	
rapprochement	 begun	by	his	predecessors	with	Argentina.	 	 In	 the	next	 section,	
the	Argentine‐Brazilian	rivalry	will	be	described.			
	
Rivalry	with	Argentina	
Another	 key	 material	 input	 to	 the	 nuclear	 decisionmaking	 process	 in	
Brazil	 was	 the	 worrying	 developments	 across	 the	 border	 in	 Argentina.	 	 The	
Argentine‐Brazilian	 rivalry	 has	 been	 characterized	 as	 the	 “oldest	 of	 South	
American	conflicts”	and	has	its	roots	in	the	rivalry	between	Spain	and	Portugal	in	
their	conquest	of	the	continent	(Child,	1985,	p.	98).	 	Throughout	the	nineteenth	
century,	 the	 rivals	 confronted	 each	 other	 over	 influence	 in	 Uruguay	 and	
Paraguay.	 	 In	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 the	 two	 nations	 differed	 considerably	 on	
their	 approach	 to	World	War	 II:	Argentina,	while	 remaining	neutral,	was	vocal	
about	its	Axis	sympathies,	while	Brazil	entered	the	war	on	the	side	of	the	Allies	
as	has	been	discussed	earlier.	 	 In	 the	post‐war	era,	 the	promise	Argentina	had	
shown	as	an	economic	miracle	faded,	while	Brazil’s	fortunes	seemed	only	to	rise	
in	comparison	(Child,	1985).		With	the	balance	shifting	more	and	more	towards	
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Brazil,	 some	Argentine	military	 policymakers	were	 feeling	 the	 pressure	 by	 the	
1980s,	although	they	remained	 in	the	minority	of	voices	 in	 that	state’s	military	
government	(Barletta,	1997).					
This	rivalry	took	on	a	new	flavor	when	German	conglomerate	Siemens	AG	
signed	an	agreement	with	the	Argentine	government	and	started	construction	on	
a	natural	uranium‐fueled	power	plant	Atucha	I	in	1968.		Argentina	had	made	the	
decision3	 to	pursue	a	nuclear	 fuel	cycle	based	on	natural	uranium.	 	Argentina’s	
domestic	sources	of	uranium	were	plentiful,	making	a	natural	uranium	fuel	cycle	
an	attractive	option	(Doyle,	2008a,	p.	311).	
	The	natural	uranium	fuel	cycle	also	had	the	benefit	of	limiting	Argentina’s	
dependence	 on	 external	 sources	 of	 enriched	 uranium,	 but	 necessitated	 the	
purchase	 of	 heavy	 water	 from	 the	 international	 market.	 	 Heavy	 water	 is	 an	
essential	 component	 of	 a	 nuclear	 reactor	 fueled	 with	 natural	 uranium	 as	 it	
lowers	the	energy	of	neutrons	properly	to	cause	fission	in	natural	U‐238	atoms	
(Duderstadt	&	Hamilton,	1976).		Without	heavy	water	for	use	as	a	moderator,	a	
reactor	fueled	with	natural	uranium	will	not	reach	criticality,	the	self‐sustaining	
state	 capable	 of	 producing	 power.	 	 Because	 spent	 fuel	 from	 natural	 uranium‐
fueled	 reactors	 contains	 plutonium	 in	 high	 quantities,	 natural	 uranium‐fueled	
reactors	 (and	 subsequently	 heavy	water)	 are	 perceived	 as	 a	 proliferation	 risk	
and	technologies	associated	with	them	are	controlled	(Doyle,	2008b).			
Argentina’s	 Atucha	 I	 reactor	 was	 finished	 in	 1974,	 making	 it	 the	 first	
operational	nuclear	power	plant	in	Latin	America.	 	By	the	late	1980s,	according	
																																																													
3	Argentine	scientists	played	a	crucial	role	in	this	decision	for	natural	uranium,	as	described	in	
detail	by	(Solingen,	1993)	and	(Hymans,	2006).		
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to	some	estimates,	Atucha	I	had	produced	enough	plutonium	to	potentially	build	
a	nuclear	weapon,	and	Argentina	had	embarked	on	a	secret	project	to	develop	a	
clandestine	uranium	enrichment	facility	(Hymans,	2006,	p.	158).		These	efforts	in	
Argentina	 picked	 up	 pace	 in	 response	 to	 the	 announcement	 of	 the	 massive	
Brazil‐West	 Germany	nuclear	 contract	 in	 1975.	 	 The	 unsafeguarded	Pilcaniyeu	
enrichment	plant	was	opened	in	1983	and	began	enriching	uranium	to	20%	U235	
in	 1988	 (Doyle,	 2008a,	 p.	 312).	 	 More	 worrisome	 still	 was	 the	 Ezeiza	
reprocessing	 facility,	 as	 it	 was	 to	 be	 subject	 to	 international	 safeguards	 only	
when	processing	safeguarded	fuel	(Doyle,	2008a,	p.	312).		Construction	at	Ezeiza	
began	 in	 1978	 and	 was	 to	 have	 begun	 operations	 in	 the	 early	 1980s,	 but	
technical	difficulties	prevented	the	plant	from	progressing	beyond	a	laboratory‐
sized	 facility	 (Doyle,	 2008a).	 	Neither	Brazil	 nor	Argentina	was	 constrained	by	
the	Nuclear	Non‐proliferation	Treaty	or	by	the	Treaty	of	Tlatelolco,	a	fact	which	
certainly	contributed	to	rising	tensions	which	some	interpret	as	the	beginning	of	
a	burgeoning	security	dilemma	in	the	Southern	Cone	(Velázquez,	2004).			
For	 Brazilian	 military	 policymakers,	 the	 Argentine	 acquisition	 of	 the	
heavy	 water	 reactor	 and	 clandestine	 work	 on	 uranium	 enrichment	 were	
worrisome	for	several	reasons.		Brazilian	decision	makers	were	concerned	about	
nuclear	 developments	 across	 the	 border	 because	 the	 Argentine	 program	 was	
more	 technically	 advanced,	 clandestine	 in	 nature,	 and	 contained	 within	 the	
Argentine	military’s	 strategic	 calculus	 (Barletta,	1997,	p.	15).	 	According	 to	 the	
Brazilian	 analysts	 and	 policymakers	 interviewed	 by	 Barletta,	 their	
understanding	 of	 Argentina’s	 strategy	 was	 one	 of	 matching	 the	 imbalances	 of	
power	 between	 their	 nation	 and	 Brazil	 through	 the	 acquisition	 of	 nuclear	
87	
	
technology	(Barletta,	1997,	p.	15).		Still,	consensus	shows	that	there	was	no	clear	
military	threat	perceived	by	Brazilian	leaders	from	Argentina	during	the	period	
of	 analysis	 (Barletta,	 1997;	 Child,	 1985;	 Doyle,	 2008a).	 	 Instead,	 Barletta’s	
sources	point	 to	 the	 importance	of	 the	concept	of	 “technological	deterrence”	 in	
the	minds	of	Brazilian	policymakers	(Barletta,	1997,	p.	16).		Brazilian	leaders	felt	
the	 pressure	 to	 seek	 enrichment	 as	 away	 to	 deter	 a	 future	 Argentine	 nuclear	
device	 by	 presenting	 the	 ability	 to	 match	 it,	 thereby	 negating	 the	 Argentine	
calculus	of	making	up	the	capability	gap	between	the	two	countries.			
Yet	 through	 careful	 analysis,	 Hymans	 (2006)	 shows	 that	 Argentine	
opposition	 to	 the	 nonproliferation	 regime	 had	 less	 to	 do	 with	 its	 nuclear	
ambitions	and	more	to	do	with	its	standoffish	attitude	to	having	its	sovereignty	
constrained	 by	 international	 treaty	 obligations.	 	 In	 1980,	 faced	 with	 US	
accusations	 of	 a	 developing	 arms	 race,	 Brazil	 and	 Argentina	 used	 diplomatic	
momentum	 from	 their	 recently	 signed	 accord	 over	 the	 Itaipu	 Dam	 to	 sign	 an	
agreement	 of	 formal	 dialogue	 between	 the	 two	 nations’	 nuclear	 development	
agencies	(Hymans,	2006,	p.	161).		Neither	side	was	eager	to	open	their	facilities	
up	 for	 international	 inspection,	 so	 a	 system	 of	 verbal	 security	 assurances	 and	
technical	 dialogue	 developed,	 which	 satisfied	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 military	
governments	in	Brasília	and	Buenos	Aires.	
The	 first	 concrete	 step	 in	 this	 process	was	 taken	 by	 Joao	 Figueiredo	 in	
May	1980,	when	he	became	the	first	Brazilian	president	to	visit	Buenos	Aires	in	
40	 years	 (Doyle,	 2008a).	 	 During	 his	 visit,	 a	 formal	 cooperation	 agreement	
between	 the	 atomic	 energy	 commissions	 of	 Brazil	 and	 Argentina	 was	 signed.		
The	 warming	 of	 relations	 was	 accelerated	 by	 the	 demise	 of	 the	 military	
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governments	 in	 Brasilia	 and	 Buenos	 Aires	 in	 the	 mid‐1980s.	 	 In	 1985,	 the	
Declaration	 of	 Iguazu	 was	 signed	 by	 the	 democratically‐elected	 presidents	 of	
both	countries,	establishing	a	Joint	Committee	on	Nuclear	Policy	as	a	platform	for	
continued	mutual	exchange	relating	to	the	nuclear	issue	(Doyle,	2008a,	p.	317).	
In	 1986,	 Argentine	 officials	 were	 allowed	 to	 visit	 the	 Brazilian	 Navy’s	
research	 facility	 at	 IPEN,	 and	 in	 1987,	 President	 Sarney	 sent	 his	 Argentine	
counterpart	 President	 Alfonsin	 a	 letter	 giving	 him	 advance	 notice	 that	 Brazil	
would	soon	be	announcing	its	successful	enrichment	of	uranium	(Doyle,	2008a,	
p.	317).		The	process	of	opening	continued	with	a	second	Argentine	visit	to	IPEN	
and	a	reciprocal	Brazilian	visit	to	the	Ezeiza	reprocessing	facility	in	1988	(Doyle,	
2008a).	 	 This	 led	 to	 the	 two	 country’s	 leaders	 signing	 the	 Joint	 Declaration	 of	
Common	 Nuclear	 Policy	 at	 Foz	 de	 Iguazu	 in	 November	 1990,	 pledging	 to	 use	
nuclear	 technology	 only	 for	 peaceful	 ends,	 including	 the	 rejection	 of	 peaceful	
nuclear	explosives,	and	comply	fully	with	the	Treaty	of	Tlatelolco	(Doyle,	2008a).		
The	 Joint	 Declaration	 was	 formalized	 in	 July	 1991	 with	 the	 signing	 of	 the	
Guadalajara	 Accord,	 which	 established	 the	 Joint	 System	 of	 Accounting	 and	
Control	 of	 Nuclear	 Materials	 (SCCC)	 to	 ensure	 that	 no	 fissile	 materials	 were	
diverted	 to	 covert	 military	 programs	 (Doyle,	 2008a,	 p.	 318).	 	 The	 Brazilian‐
Argentine	Agency	for	Accounting	and	Control	of	Nuclear	Materials	(ABACC)	was	
formed	to	apply	the	SCCC	in	both	countries	(Leventhal	&	Tanzer,	1992).		Finally	
in	 1991,	 a	 framework	 for	 full‐scope	 international	 safeguards	 was	 established	
with	 the	 Quadripartite	 Agreement	 between	 Brazil,	 Argentina,	 ABACC,	 and	 the	
IAEA,	 which	 outlined	 the	 responsibilities	 of	 each	 party	 with	 regards	 to	
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safeguards,	 inspection,	 and	 accounting	 and	 control	 of	 nuclear	 material	
(Leventhal	&	Tanzer,	1992).	
	
Conclusion	
	 In	 conclusion,	 the	 material	 inputs	 of	 Brazilian	 nuclear	 policy	 can	 be	
summarized	 as	 a	 combination	 of	 policymakers’	 perceptions	 of	 their	 nation’s	
relevant	 technical	 capabilities	 and	 their	 nation’s	 security	 environment.	 In	 the	
Brazilian	 case,	 these	 are	 the	 specifics	 of	 the	nuclear	 procurement	 strategy,	 the	
economic	 dilemma	 created	 by	 the	 1973	 oil	 embargo	 and	 subsequent	 nuclear	
accord	with	West	Germany,	and	the	rivalry	with	Argentina.	 	Underlying	Brazil’s	
nuclear	 procurement	 strategy	 was	 a	 consistent	 desire	 for	 technological	
autonomy,	a	desire	which	was	strengthened	in	response	to	American	opposition	
to	 the	 1975	 Brazil‐West	 Germany	 nuclear	 accord	 and	 loss	 of	 the	 fuel	 supply	
guarantee	 in	1978.	 	The	military’s	parallel	program	benefited	 from	 this	 shared	
desire	 for	 autonomy	 and	 opposition	 to	 the	 official	 declared	 program	 among	
military	 and	 civilian	 researchers,	 which	 led	 to	 the	 development	 of	 Brazil’s	
independent	enrichment	capability	in	the	1980s.			
	 At	the	same	time,	 	Brazilian	strategists	have	defined	its	national	security	
in	 socio‐economic	 terms	 for	 a	 long	 time	 because	 of	 its	 territorial	 satisfaction	
(Selcher,	 1985).	 	 	 Although	 Brazilian	 leaders	 were	 clearly	 concerned	 by	
Argentina’s	 nuclear	 program,	 tensions	 between	 Brazil	 and	 Argentina	were	 not	
significant	 enough	 to	 develop	 into	 a	 long‐lasting	 nuclear	 rivalry.	 	 Instead,	 the	
external	 threat	 to	 Brazilian	 nuclear	 objectives	was	 clearly	 perceived	 to	 be	 the	
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meddling	of	external	powers,	led	by	the	US.		This	perception	stemmed	from	the	
opposition	 to	 the	 1975	 nuclear	 deal	 with	 West	 Germany.	 	 In	 fact,	 a	 shared	
opposition	to	external	powers	and	the	desire	to	achieve	autonomy	helped	push	
Brazil	 and	 Argentina	 to	 cooperate	 in	 nuclear	 matters,	 leading	 to	 a	 series	 of	
declarations	and	agreements	between	the	two	countries	culminating	in	a	formal	
safeguards	agreement	and	the	application	of	full‐scope	international	safeguards	
in	 the	early	1990s.	 	The	next	 section	outlines	 the	 ideational	 sources	of	Brazil’s	
nuclear	policy.	
	
4.5.	 Ideational	sources	of	Brazilian	role	conceptions	
	 In	this	section	the	ideational	sources	of	Brazilian	role	conceptions	will	be	
explored.		The	ideational	inputs	in	the	model	consist	of	the	leader(s)’	perceptions	
of	 their	 state’s	 national	 identity,	 culture	 and	 history.	 	 Specifically,	 the	 model	
characterizes	how	key	decision	makers	view	the	identity	of	their	state	in	two	key	
areas:	 the	 trajectory	of	 their	state’s	history	and	content	of	 their	state’s	cultural	
heritage.	
In	order	to	determine	how	these	factors	feed	into	a	conception	of	role	in	
the	mind	of	Brazilian	policymakers,	a	combination	of	a	survey	of	the	literature	on	
Brazilian	 foreign	 policy	 and	 a	 discourse	 analysis	 of	 the	 speeches	 of	 Brazilian	
leaders	was	used.		The	excerpts	used	in	the	discourse	analysis	were	taken	from	
the	 annual	 addresses	 made	 to	 the	 United	 Nations	 General	 Assembly	 (UNGA)	
between1973‐1991.	 	 This	 annual	 speech	 hold	 special	 significance	 for	Brazilian	
foreign	 policy	 makers,	 as	 the	 right	 to	 be	 the	 first	 to	 address	 the	 UNGA	 was	
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specifically	given	to	Brazil	in	1947	and	has	been	faithfully	kept	as	tradition	ever	
since	(NPR,	2010).		The	time	period	is	also	significant,	spanning	four	decades	of	
Brazilian	governments,	both	military	and	democratically‐elected.			
The	ideational	sources	of	Brazilian	foreign	policy	roles	can	be	delineated	
into	 two	 categories:	 historical	 and	 lingo‐cultural.	 	 Brazilian	policymakers	draw	
on	 their	 nation’s	 unique	 multicultural	 identity	 and	 legacy	 of	 negotiation	 in	
foreign	policy	frequently	to	make	their	case	for	Brazil’s	roles	in	the	international	
arena.	 	 Brazilian	 multicultural	 identity	 can	 be	 dissected	 into	 four	 distinct	
components:	 Brazil’s	 specific	 links	 with	 African	 identities,	 its	 status	 as	 a	
Lusophone	 country	 (in	 contrast	with	 its	 Spanish	 speaking	neighbors),	 its	 Latin	
American	character,	and	immigrant	culture.		
Brazil’s	 long	 and	 painful	 historical	 connection	 with	 slavery	 is	 deeply	
connected	with	its	identity	as	a	colonized	country.		Until	the	abolition	of	the	slave	
trade,	millions	of	West	Africans	were	brought	to	work	in	Brazilian	sugarcane	and	
coffee	 plantations	 (Roett,	 1984).	 	 The	 slave	 trade	 in	 Brazil	 was	 gradually	
abolished	much	later	than	in	other	parts	of	the	world,	with	a	ban	on	the	import	of	
new	slaves	being	effectively	enforced	in	1850,	leading	to	a	final	emancipation	of	
all	 slaves	 in	1888	 (Levine,	1999,	pp.	66–68).	 	The	 status	of	Afro‐Brazilians	has	
been	a	contentious	issue	in	Brazilian	society,	with	Afro‐Brazilians	largely	absent	
from	 positions	 of	 power	 although	 consisting	 44	 percent	 of	 the	 population	 in	
1991	(Skidmore,	1999,	p.	208).		Still	Afro‐Brazilians	have	contributed	greatly	to	
the	cultural	vibrancy	of	Brazil,	and	Brazilian	policymakers	increasingly	draw	on	
their	nation’s	African	heritage	when	pursuing	their	policy	goals	in	relation	with	
African	states.			
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Another	 legacy	 from	 Brazil’s	 colonial	 past	 is	 its	 language,	 Portuguese.		
Since	there	are	a	 limited	number	of	Lusophone	nations,	Brazilian	policymakers	
view	their	status	as	the	largest	Portuguese‐speaking	country	as	a	matter	of	pride	
and	 influence	within	 a	 relatively	 small	 community.	 	 Brazil’s	 influence	with	 the	
other	Portuguese‐speaking	nations	is	not	insignificant.		Through	the	initiative	of	
Brazilian	President	José	Sarney,	the	heads	of	state	of	Angola,	Brazil,	Cape	Verde,	
Guinea‐Bissau,	Mozambique,	 Portugal	 and	 Sao	Tome	 and	Principe	 convened	 in	
the	Brazilian	city	of	São	Luís	do	Maranhão	in	November	1989	to	discuss	the	idea	
of	 creating	a	 community	 formed	around	 their	 common	 language	 (CPLP,	2010).		
Since	 then,	 partnership	 between	 Lusophone	 nations	 has	 grown,	 and	 the	
Community	 of	 Portuguese	 Language	 Countries	 (CPLC/CPLP)	 was	 founded	 in	
1996	 by	 those	 six	 countries	 (CPLP,	 2010).	 	 Upon	 gaining	 its	 independence	 in	
2002,	East	Timor	also	joined	the	community.		The	objectives	of	the	CPLC	include	
fostering	collaboration	and	friendship	between	the	member	states	in	the	areas	of	
education,	 health,	 science	 and	 technology,	 defense,	 agriculture,	 public	
administration,	communications,	justice,	public	safety,	culture,	sports	and	media	
(CPLP,	2010).	 	Brazil	uses	its	connection	with	Portuguese‐speaking	countries	to	
break	 into	 their	 relatively	 untapped	 consumer	 markets.	 	 For	 example,	 under	
Geisel,	 Brazil	 quickly	 recognized	Angola’s	Marxist	 government	 in	 1975,	 hoping	
that	state	oil	company	Petrobras	would	win	contracts	to	survey	Angolan	oil	fields	
(Solingen,	1990,	p.	133).		
	 Brazil’s	 Portuguese	 heritage	 sets	 it	 apart	 in	 a	 region	 filled	with	 former	
Spanish	 colonies.	 	 Yet	 Brazilian	 leaders	 have	 increasingly	 drawn	 on	 its	
geographic	 and	 cultural	 location	 in	 Latin	 America	 when	 addressing	 regional	
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politics.	 	 This	 emphasis	 really	 began	 in	 earnest	with	 president	 Figueiredo,	 the	
final	leader	of	the	military	government.		It	was	Figueiredo	who	took	initiative	to	
make	 official	 visits	 to	 Caracas,	 Asuncion	 and	 Buenos	 Aires	 and	 hosted	 the	
presidents	 of	 Peru,	 Mexico,	 and	 Argentina	 in	 the	 short	 span	 of	 12	 months	 in	
order	to	foster	closer	ties	with	Latin	American	nations	(United	Nations,	1980,	p.	
29).		This	emphasis	was	coupled	with	an	increasing	tendency	for	Brazil	to	“stick	
up	 for”	 its	 Latin	 American	 and	 Caribbean	 neighbors.	 	 Brazil’s	 stance	 on	 the	
Falklands/Mavlinas	War	and	the	pariah	status	of	Cuba,	for	example,	can	be	read	
according	to	this	narrative	(Burges,	2009).			
	 Finally,	 Brazil	 is	 also	 a	 nation	 of	 immigrants—the	 nation	 is	 frequently	
described	as	a	‘spectrum’	of	the	world’s	ethnicities	and	races.		In	fact,	more	than	
a	few	Brazilian	statesmen	and	women	trace	their	origins	directly	to	immigrants,	
such	 as	 Juscelino	 Kubitschek	 (Czech),	 Ranieri	 Mazzilli	 (Italian),	 Emílio	 Médici	
(Italian),	Ernesto	Geisel	(German),	and	Dilma	Rousseff	(Bulgarian).		Brazilians	of	
European	descent	have	long	held	important	positions	in	the	Brazilian	elite,	a	fact	
which	was	used	by	Rio	Branco	to	the	advantage	of	Brazil	in	the	negotiation	of	its	
borders.	By	selecting	diplomatic	aides	for	their	European	features	and	breeding,	
Branco	was	able	to	make	the	case	to	foreign	dignitaries	that	Brazil	was	distinct	in	
“civilized”	 character	 (Levine,	 1999,	 pp.	 86–87).	 	 Initially	 prompted	 by	
government	subsidies	to	incentivize	the	immigration	of	Europeans	as	cheap	field	
labor,	waves	 of	Germans,	 Italians,	 Portuguese,	 Poles,	 and	 Japanese	 came	 to	 try	
their	luck	working	on	plantations	or	as	colonos	(colonists)	(Levine,	1999,	pp.	74–
75).	 	 President	 Figueiredo,	 for	 example,	 expresses	 this	 perception	 of	 Brazil	 as	
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“having	 a	 clear	 Western	 identity”	 to	 place	 Brazil	 in	 the	 camp	 of	 the	 Western	
developed	nations	(United	Nations,	1982,	p.	29).			
Historically,	no	one	has	had	an	impact	in	Brazilian	foreign	relations	more	
than	 the	 Baron	 Rio	 Branco,	 a	 fact	 which	 has	 already	 been	 alluded	 to	 several	
times.	 	His	negotiation	of	Brazil’s	borders	 remains	enshrined	as	one	of	 the	key	
foundations	 of	 Brazil’s	 outlook	 on	 the	 world.	 	 Despite	 having	 10	 neighboring	
states	 with	 which	 to	 negotiate,	 Rio	 Branco	 was	 able	 to	 negotiate	 a	 successful	
outcome	in	every	case.		Brazilian	experts	attribute	this	to	his	skill	as	a	diplomat	
and	 the	 autonomy	 he	 was	 allowed	 in	 negotiations.	 	 These	 have	 important	
repercussions	for	the	institution	Rio	Branco	founded,	Itamaraty,	Brazil’s	Ministry	
of	 External	 Relations.	 	 Itamaraty	 is	 given	 a	 large	 degree	 of	 autonomy	 in	 its	
negotiations	and	emphasizes	continuation	of	dialogue	as	the	key	to	a	successful	
outcome.	 	 Lafer	 characterizes	 Rio	 Branco’s	 heritage	 at	 Itamaraty	 as	 a	 “style	 of	
constructive	moderation”	which	seeks	to	relieve	tension	and	reduce	diplomatic	
impasses	to	their	lowest	common	denominators	(Lafer,	2000,	p.	215).			
Rio	 Branco	 makes	 frequent	 appearances	 in	 Brazilian	 foreign	 policy	
discourse.	 	 References	 to	 the	 statesman’s	 border	 negotiation	 legacy	 are	
frequently	 made	 by	 Brazilian	 policymakers	 as	 evidence	 for	 their	 nation’s	
peacebuilding	 credentials.	 	 Brazilian	UN	Ambassador	Celso	Amorim	 states	 that	
apart	from	Brazil	“no	other	nation	has	had	uninterrupted	relations	of	peace	and	
cooperation	 for	 so	 long	 and	 with	 so	 many	 neighboring	 states”,	 making	 his	
nation’s	experience	in	peacebuilding	“noteworthy”	(United	Nations,	1993).	 	The	
next	year	he	again	references	Brazil’s	peacefully‐defined	borders	and	absence	of	
armed	conflict	with	its	neighbors	as	part	of	its	“identity,”	which	dictates	Brazil’s	
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readiness	to	join	in	multilateral	efforts	to	construct	a	new,	more	egalitarian	and	
cooperative	international	agenda	(United	Nations,	1994).	 	“Brazil	takes	pride	in	
its	 diplomatic	 tradition,”	 argues	 Minister	 of	 External	 Affairs	 Celso	 Lafer,	 a	
tradition	which	 has	 resulted	 in	 10	 neighbors	 and	 almost	 17,000	 kilometers	 of	
peacefully	negotiated	borders	(United	Nations,	1992).		It	is	the	belief	of	Brazilian	
foreign	 policy	 makers	 that	 this	 tradition	 is	 ready	 to	 tackle	 the	 unequal	
distribution	 of	 power	 between	 the	 haves	 and	 have‐nots	 in	 the	 international	
order.				
	
Ideational	motivations	in	nuclear	policy	
This	 historical	 and	 lingo‐cultural	 legacy	 has	 implications	 for	 nuclear	
policymaking	 in	 that	 Brazilian	 policymakers	 have	 long	 seen	 their	 nation	 as	
aspiring	 to	 achieve	 great	 power	 status	 (Burges,	 2013).	 	 Since	 the	 Vargas	 era,	
Brazilian	 leaders	 have	 equated	 developmental	 progress	 with	 their	 country’s	
desire	 for	 greatness,	 a	 status	 which	 requisites	 a	 certain	 level	 of	 technological	
proficiency.	 	 For	 example,	 President	 Geisel	 stated	 in	 1974	 that	 an	 “economic,	
social,	 racial,	 and	 political	 democracy,	 in	 accord	 with	 the	 Brazilian	 people’s	
character,”	was	essential	for	“the	creation	of	a	modern,	competitive,	and	dynamic	
economy”	(Hovey,	1974).		Guided	by	a	sense	of	destiny	and	a	view	of	their	own	
history	 and	 culture	 as	 exceptional,	 Brazilian	 leaders	 have	 pursued	 large	
development	projects	like	the	Trans‐Amazonian	Highway	(Landry,	1974,	p.	24),	
a	robust	military	equipment	export	industry	(Pinheiro,	2013),	and	of	course	the	
massive	nuclear	cooperation	deal	of	1975.			
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The	 military	 government’s	 propaganda	 from	 this	 period	 showed	
montages	 of	 progress—modern	 factories,	 massive	 hydroelectric	 projects,	
children	being	educated	 in	government	 schools—followed	by	 the	 slogan	of	 the	
regime:	 “This	 is	 a	 country	 that	 is	 going	 forward”	 (Kandell,	 1976).	 	The	nuclear	
program	was	no	exception—the	Brazilian	desire	for	autonomy	and	the	definition	
of	 national	 security	 in	 economic	 terms	 led	 to	 the	 acquisition	 of	 nuclear	
technology	 being	 perceived	 in	 those	 terms.	 	 Specifically,	 the	 concept	 of	
“technological	 deterrence”,	 or	 the	 belief	 that	 the	 acquisition	 of	 an	 autonomous	
domestic	 technical	 capability	 would	 be	 enough	 to	 provide	 security	 for	 Brazil	
against	 external	 foes	 was	 clearly	 present	 in	 the	 minds	 of	 Brazilian	 leaders	
(Barletta,	1997,	p.	16).			
This	 is	 illustrated	 in	 the	 statement	 on	 nuclear	 policy	 made	 by	 Pires	
Gonçalves,	 Jose	 Sarney’s	 Minister	 of	 the	 Army	 in	 the	 lead‐up	 to	 the	 1988	
constitutional	 reform.	 	 Gonçalves	 stated	 that	 Brazil’s	 nuclear	 program	 was	
necessary	 in	order	 to	become	 “a	 country	with	high	 technological	development,	
and	therefore,	strong	and	respected.		This	is	deterrence	by	greatness”	(Barletta,	
1997,	p.	16).		By	tapping	into	this	sense	of	destiny,	Brazilian	policymakers	sought	
to	justify	the	nuclear	program	to	rising	public	opposition,	even	as	there	remained	
considerable	ambiguity	as	to	the	goals	of	the	project(s).		During	the	transition	to	
democracy,	 asserting	 civilian	 oversight	 while	 emphasizing	 its	 contribution	 to	
Brazilian	autonomy	saved	the	nuclear	program	from	the	general	atmosphere	of	
anti‐military	sentiment	in	Brazil	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	(Barletta,	1997).			
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Conclusion	
	 In	conclusion,	 the	 ideational	sources	of	Brazilian	role	conceptions	 in	 the	
nuclear	 issue	area	can	be	summarized	as	a	combination	of	historical	and	lingo‐
cultural	 factors	 which	 contribute	 to	 Brazilian	 leaders’	 sense	 of	 their	 nation’s	
unique	 character	 in	 the	 world.	 	 These	 include	 Brazil’s	 multicultural	 and	
immigrant	heritage,	special	connection	with	Africa,	and	its	status	as	the	world’s	
largest	Portuguese‐speaking	nation.		Brazil’s	history	of	peaceful	coexistence	with	
neighbors	 and	 the	 legacy	 of	 Rio	 Branco	 specifically	 are	 often	 cited	 by	 its	
politicians	as	signs	of	Brazil’s	national	character	on	the	international	stage.			
	 All	these	factors	contribute	to	a	sense	of	national	destiny	and	emphasis	on	
technological	progress	in	the	case	of	Brazil.		Policymakers	equate	Brazil’s	ability	
to	 command	 respect	 in	 the	world	with	 its	 level	 of	 technological	 sophistication	
and	 ability	 to	 conduct	 its	 affairs	 autonomously	 from	 other	 countries.	 	 Brazil’s	
national	 motto,	 Ordem	 e	 Progresso	 (Order	 and	 Progress),	 is	 prominently	
displayed	 on	 the	 national	 flag	 and	 this	 sense	 of	 destiny	 and	 development	
certainly	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 attitude	 of	 policymakers	 towards	 the	 nuclear	
program.		The	next	section	of	this	chapter	proposes	the	national	role	conceptions	
of	 Brazil	 during	 the	 period	 of	 1975‐1991	 and	 explores	 their	 impact	 on	 the	
policies	pursued	by	the	Brazilian	government	during	that	period.			
	
4.6.	 National	Role	Conceptions	in	Brazilian	Foreign	Policy	
In	 this	 final	 section,	 I	 propose	 national	 role	 conceptions	 for	 Brazilian	
foreign	policy	relevant	to	the	area	of	nuclear	weaponry.	 	First,	the	national	role	
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conceptions	for	Brazil	as	assigned	by	Holsti	(1970)	and	Chafetz	et	al.	(1996)	will	
be	discussed	in	detail,	followed	by	my	own	modified	role	conceptions.		Then	the	
model	will	be	traced	throughout	the	Brazilian	case	and	the	hypothesized	policy	
outcomes	will	be	discussed.	
	
Role	Scholarship	on	Brazil	
In	his	1970	paper,	Holsti	finds	evidence	for	three	roles	for	Brazil:	Internal	
Developer,	 Regional‐Subsystem	 Collaborator,	 and	 Independent	 (Holsti,	 1970,	 p.	
275).	 	 Holsti	 defines	 the	 Internal	 Developer	 as	 playing	 less	 of	 a	 role	 in	 the	
international	and	more	demonstrating	that	the	main	concern	of	the	government	
should	be	directed	towards	addressing	its	own	domestic	development	issues.		He	
holds	up	Brazil	 as	 an	example,	 using	a	1967	 speech	by	President	Costa	 e	 Silva	
where	the	Brazilian	leader	stated	his	foreign	policy	orientation	as	being	focused	
on	 opening	 markets	 for	 Brazilian	 goods	 and	 encouraging	 investment	 and	
technology	 transfer	 (Holsti,	 1970,	 p.	 270).	 	 Holsti	 characterizes	 the	 Internal	
Developer	as	being	 focused	on	 its	 socio‐economic	needs	and	perceiving	 threats	
through	unwelcome	foreign	involvement	in	its	chosen	development	strategy.		In	
addition	 to	 Brazil,	 Holsti	 lists	 Finland,	 Indonesia,	 and	 Pakistan	 as	 displaying	
developer	tendencies	(Holsti,	1970,	p.	297).			
The	 Regional‐Subsystem	 Collaborator	 role	 conception	 denotes	 a	
widespread	commitment	to	fostering	cooperation	between	states	in	the	context	
of	a	wider	community	(Holsti,	1970,	p.	265).		He	cites	economic	needs,	a	sense	of	
“belonging”	to	its	region,	common	political‐ideological	traditions,	and	geographic	
99	
	
location	as	sources	of	 the	Regional‐Subsystem	Collaborator	role	conception,	and	
lists	 Belgium,	 Ethiopia,	 Guyana,	 Japan,	 Switzerland,	 and	 Sweden	 as	 examples	
(Holsti,	1970,	p.	298).			
The	 last	 and	 most	 broad	 role	 that	 Holsti	 assigns	 Brazil	 is	 that	 of	
Independent.	 	 Independent	 states	 emphasize	 the	 preeminence	 of	 their	 own	
interests	in	foreign	policy	making,	rather	than	doing	the	bidding	of	other	states.		
In	 pursuing	 this	 “policy	 self‐determination”,	 independent	 states	 generally	 are	
identifying	with	the	non‐aligned	movement	 in	some	way	(Holsti,	1970,	p.	268).		
He	lists	the	sources	of	this	role	as	anti‐bloc	or	anti‐colonial	sentiments,	economic	
needs,	and	threat	perception	and	holds	up	most	of	the	Non‐Aligned	Movement	as	
examples	(Holsti,	1970,	p.	297).	
As	 has	 been	 stated	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 the	 role‐based	 typology	
employed	 by	 Chafetz	 et	 al.	 (1996)	 takes	 a	 modified	 set	 of	 Holsti’s	 roles	 and	
categorizes	them	as	leading	towards,	away	from,	or	having	no	effect	on,	nuclear	
proliferation.	 	 They	 identified	 the	 Regional	 Leader,	 Global	 System	 Leader,	
Regional	 Protector,	 and	 Anti‐Imperialist	 role	 conceptions	 as	 tending	 towards	
nuclear	 status,	 with	 Independent	 having	 no	 correlation	 with	 proliferation	
(Chafetz	 et	 al.,	 1996,	 p.	 734).	 	 The	 main	 factor	 behind	 their	 identification	 of	
proliferation‐prone	roles	was	the	perception	of	some	states	of	nuclear	weapons	
as	 a	 symbol	 of	 global	 leadership	 as	 modeled	 by	 the	 “legal”	 nuclear	 weapons	
states	(Chafetz	et	al.,	1996,	p.	733).			
Chafetz	 et	 al.	 classify	 Brazil	 as	 a	 Regional	 Leader	 and	 Anti‐Imperialist	
(Chafetz	et	al.,	1996,	p.	733).	 	They	describe	the	function	of	the	Regional	Leader	
as	 “providing	 leadership	 in	 a	 delimited	 geographic	 or	 functional	 area”	 and	 list	
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India,	Iran,	and	Iraq	as	examples	of	states	displaying	that	conception	(Chafetz	et	
al.,	 1996,	 p.	 734).	 	 The	 Anti‐Imperialist	 is	 described	 as	 acting	 as	 an	 “agent	 of	
struggle	against	imperialist	threats”	and	Iran,	North	Korea,	Iraq,	India,	and	Libya	
are	 listed	 as	 examples	 (Chafetz	 et	 al.,	 1996,	 p.	 734).	 	 The	 national	 role	
conceptions	attributed	to	Brazil	by	Holsti	and	Chafetz	et	al.	are	listed	in	Table	5	
below:	
Table	5:	Summary	of	Brazilian	NRCs	from	(Holsti,	1970)	and	(Chafetz	et	al.,	1996)	
Role	Type	 Role	Description	 Source	
Regional	Leader	 Provide	leadership	in	delimited	geographic	or	functional	area	 (Chafetz	et	al.,	1996)	
Anti‐Imperialist	 Act	as	agent	of	struggle	against	imperialist	threats	 (Chafetz	et	al.,	1996)	
Internal	Developer	
focused	on	socio‐economic	needs;	
perceiving	threats	through	foreign	
involvement	
(Holsti,	1970)	
Regional‐Subsystem	
Collaborator	
committed	to	fostering	cooperation	
between	states	in		a	wider	community	 (Holsti,	1970)	
Independent	
“self‐determined	foreign	policy”;	
preeminence	of	own	interests	in	foreign	
policy	making	
(Holsti,	1970)	
	
I	argue	that	these	conceptions,	while	valuable,	are	not	specific	enough	to	
yield	 insight	 into	 why	 Brazil	 pursued	 the	 nuclear	 trajectory	 that	 it	 did.		
Specifically,	 the	role	concepts	cited	by	(Holsti,	1970)	and	(Chafetz,	et	al.,	1996)	
need	more	detail	in	the	area	of	defining	why	exactly	Brazil	pursued	a	seemingly	
standoffish	 nuclear	 stance	 while	 lacking	 urgency	 in	 its	 quest	 to	 acquire	 the	
technology	 necessary	 to	 acquire	 a	 nuclear	 explosive.	 	 In	 the	 next	 section,	 I	
propose	a	set	of	Brazilian	national	role	conceptions	for	nuclear	policy	during	the	
period	of	1975‐1991	that	seeks	to	address	these	concerns.			
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Brazilian	National	Role	Conceptions	
In	 this	 section	 I	 present	 three	Brazilian	NRCs	 for	 nuclear	 policymaking:	
voice	of	the	global	South,	regional	leader,	and	internal	developer.			
Voice	of	the	Global	South	
Echoing	 Holsti’s	 description	 of	 the	 role	 of	 a	 sub‐system	 collaborator,	
Brazilian	 policymakers	 seek	 to	 portray	 their	 country	 as	 the	 voice	of	 the	global	
South.		Burges	describes	this	rhetorical	phenomenon	as	Brazil	“[entrenching	its]	
position	of	global	importance	as	the	‘voice’	of	the	South”	(Burges,	2012,	p.	353).		
Speaking	to	an	international	audience,	the	discourse	Brazilian	policymakers	use	
attempts	to	link	the	development	challenges	that	Brazil	is	facing	with	the	wider	
condition	of	other	developing	states.			
Brazilian	 policymakers	 use	 their	 nation’s	 multicultural	 population,	 its	
African	and	Lusophone	roots,	and	identity	as	a	formerly	colonized	country	as	a	
body	of	ideational	rhetoric	which	supports	this	role	conception.		Taken	together,	
these	 statements	 communicate	 a	 powerful	 message	 of	 credibility	 for	 the	
northern	‘core’	nations—“if	you	want	to	improve	relations	with	the	Global	South,	
you	need	to	talk	to	Brazil.”	
This	 is	 seen	 in	 the	 relationship	 between	 North‐South	 and	 South‐South	
cooperation,	 frequent	 themes	 in	 Brazilian	 leaders’	 foreign	 policy	 discourse.		
Minister	of	External	Relations	Antonio	Francisco	Azeredo	da	Silveira	expressed	
in	1978	how	Brazil	was	 committed	 to	 fostering	North‐South	dialogue	aimed	at	
assisting	developing	countries:	
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Brazil	 will	 always	 continue	 to	 be	 pledged	 to	 the	 promotion	 and	
improvement	 of	 international	 co‐operation….It	 is	 in	 the	 light	 of	
these	 facts	 that	 we	 attribute	 special	 importance	 to	 the	
development	of	machinery	aimed	at	filling	the	gaps	in	North‐South	
co‐operation.	 With	 this	 aim	 in	 mind	 Brazil	 has	 put	 forward	 and	
supported	efforts	to	promote,	enlarge	and	intensify	horizontal	and	
equitable	 co‐operation	 among	 the	 countries	 which	 strive	 for	
development	(United	Nations,	1978,	p.	43).	
	 As	the	voice	of	the	global	South,	Brazil	proclaims	that	its	inclusion	in	high‐
level	multilateral	negotiations	is	a	way	of	including	“the	ambitions	and	interests	
of	the	over	150	countries	who	are	not	present	at	the	meetings”	(Patriota,	2011,	
as	cited	in	Burges,	2012,	pg.	353).		Drawing	on	its	multicultural	identity,	specific	
links	with	Africa,	 and	history	as	a	developing	nation	with	a	history	of	poverty,	
Brazil	seeks	to	sell	this	identity	to	both	other	developing	nations	and	to	the	core	
nations	from	which	it	seeks	acceptance.			
Brazil’s	 execution	 of	 this	 role	 frequently	 manifests	 itself	 in	 calls	 for	
changes	 to	 the	 forces	 shaping	 the	 evolution	 of	 globalization	 and	 development	
policy.	 	Minister	of	External	Relations	Roberto	Costa	de	Abreu	Sodre	describes	
Brazil’s	position	on	the	need	for	a	restructuring	of	the	global	economic	system:	
The	magnitude	of	the	challenges	facing	the	developing	nations	and	
the	 total	 lack	 of	 progress	 in	 restructuring	 the	 international	
economic	order	 are	 the	 two	 sides	of	 the	 coin	of	 the	 same	deeply	
disturbing	 panorama.	 	 I	 am	 from	 a	 developing	 country	 that	 will	
never	 surrender	 this	 right	 [to	 development]	 and	 is	 not	 only	
103	
	
convinced	of	the	justice	and	legitimacy	of	its	claims	but	also	of	the	
viability	of	its	objectives	in	the	economic	and	social	fields	(United	
Nations,	1987,	p.	10).			
In	 acting	 on	 their	 conception	 of	 Brazil	 as	 Voice	 of	 the	 Global	 South,	
Brazilian	policymakers	draw	on	the	discourses	of	Brazil’s	multicultural	identity,	
being	 both	Western	 and	non‐Western—African,	 European,	 and	Latin	American	
as	 they	 attempt	 to	 position	 their	 country	 as	 a	 bridge	 between	 East	 and	West,	
between	developing	and	developed	worlds.	 	Minister	of	External	Affairs	Ramiro	
Saraiva	Guerreiro	calls	on	 this	unique	 identity	as	he	calls	 for	a	greater	 role	 for	
Brazil	in	multilateral	initiatives	at	the	global	level:	
Brazil	is	both	a	Western	and	a	third‐world	country,	with	a	foreign	
policy	 that	 reflects	 internationally	 the	 invaluable	 wealth	 of	 our	
historical	experience.			As	inheritors	of	different	cultures,	we	have	
a	natural	and	deep‐rooted	respect	for	diversity—an	indispensable	
condition	for	harmony	(United	Nations,	1983,	p.	30).	
The	 Voice	 of	 the	 Global	 South	 role	 manifested	 itself	 in	 Brazilian	
policymakers’	emphasis	of	 their	country’s	respect	 for	the	 institutions	central	to	
global	 governance,	 while	 also	 at	 the	 same	 time	 creating	 additional	 fora	 for	
multilateral	 exchange	 outside	 of	 the	 usual	 channels.	 	 President	 Figueiredo	
communicates	 this	 balance	 while	 expressing	 Brazil’s	 position	 on	 development	
policy	in	this	speech	excerpt	from	1982:			
The	 developing	 countries,	which	 for	 so	 long	 have	 striven	 for	 the	
principle	of	permanent	sovereignty	over	 their	national	resources,	
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today	face	the	new	challenge	of	maintaining	sovereignty	over	their	
own	 economic	 space.	 	 This	 does	 not	 mean,	 however,	 that	 the	
developing	 countries	 should	 oppose	 or	 show	 lack	 of	 interest	 in	
greater	 interaction	 at	 the	 international	 level,	 with	 respect	 to	 the	
flows	 of	 capital	 and	 technology…It	 is	 undeniable	 that	 the	 vast	
majority	of	developing	countries,	beginning	with	those	who	have	a	
clear	 Western	 identity,	 such	 as	 Brazil…aim	 at	 improving	 and	
diversifying	 their	 links	 with	 the	 developed	 West,	 which	 is	 a	
valuable	 source	 of	 the	 factors	 of	 production	 necessary	 for	 their	
development	(United	Nations,	1982,	p.	29).	
At	the	same	time,	Brazilian	policymakers	recognize	that	their	state’s	role	
as	 interlocutor	 must	 be	 palatable	 to	 the	 developing	 world.	 	 Brazilian	 leaders	
frequently	express	 their	nation’s	 independence	and	autonomy	 in	 foreign	policy	
with	frequent	anti‐imperialist	overtones.	 	President	Sarney	rejects	the	prospect	
of	Brazilian	 leadership	 being	perceived	 as	 hegemonic	 or	 a	 vehicle	 of	 the	Great	
Powers	in	this	speech	from	1985:	
I	am	here	to	say	that	Brazil	no	longer	wishes	its	voice	to	be	timid.	
Brazil	wants	 to	 be	 heard	 ‐	without	 aspirations	 to	 hegemony,	 but	
with	 a	 clearly	 determined	 presence.	 	We	 shall	 not	 preach	 to	 the	
world	 what	 we	 do	 not	 say	 within	 our	 own	 borders.	 	 We	 are	 at	
peace	with	ourselves.	Consistency	has	become	our	 strength.	 	Our	
domestic	discourse	matches	our	international	stance.		We	wish,	as	
of	now,	to	give	new	life,	with	renewed	emphasis,	to	our	presence	in	
the	 debate	 of	 nations,	 by	 espousing	 an	 independent,	 dynamic	
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foreign	policy….[we]	shall	not	be	held	captive	by	great	Powers	nor	
enslaved	by	minor	conflicts	(United	Nations,	1985,	p.	6)	
Similarly,	 Brazilian	 leaders	 frequently	 affirm	 their	 nation’s	 commitment	
to	the	principle	of	non‐interference	among	states:		
Zealous	for	our	sovereignty	and	independence,	we	have	reaffirmed	
whenever	 necessary	 by	 word	 and	 deed	 our	 unshakeable	
adherence	 to	 the	 principles	 of	 non‐interference	 in	 the	 internal	
affairs	 of	 States,	 mutual	 respect	 and	 self‐determination	 (United	
Nations,	1978,	p.	42).			
A	final	feature	of	this	role	conception	is	that	in	bridging	the	gap	between	
North	 and	 South	 during	 the	 Cold	War,	 Brazilian	 policymakers	 frequently	 used	
anti‐bloc	language,	similar	to	that	of	the	members	of	the	Non	Aligned	Movement.		
In	these	quotations	from	speeches	made	by	Ministers	of	External	Affairs	Silveira	
(1978)	 and	 Guerreiro	 (1980),	 a	 willingness	 to	 break	 out	 of	 the	 bloc	 system’s	
gridlock	in	international	affairs	can	be	seen:	
We	have	 sought,	 as	 far	 as	 possible,	 to	 break	obsolete	 patterns	 of	
international	 relations	 and	 to	 replace	 them	with	 more	 equitable	
and	more	balanced	arrangements:	This	has	enabled	us	to	open	up	
new	 diplomatic	 horizons.	 And	 we	 have	 thus	 revealed	 the	 true	
international	 profile	 of	 Brazil,	 ever	 sensitive	 to	 changes	 in	 the	
world	reality	(United	Nations,	1978,	p.	42).	
We	are	ready	to	co‐operate	in	the	establishment	of	a	more	just	and	
effective	 international	 order.	 My	 country,	 within	 the	 limits	 of	 its	
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resources,	 has	 given	 repeated	 demonstrations	 to	 that	 effect.	 We	
are	 committed	 to	 fostering	 a	 climate	 of	 trust	 among	 nations;	we	
are	 always	 alert	 to	 the	 possibilities	 of	 co‐operation	 on	 an	
egalitarian	basis;	we	 repudiate	 the	 formation	of	 Power	blocs;	we	
seek	 to	 give	 a	 forward	 thrust	 to	 existing	 opportunities	 for	
development	(United	Nations,	1980,	p.	28).	
Regional	Leader	
The	next	Brazilian	 role	 conception	 from	the	period	of	analysis	 is	 that	of	
regional	leader.		Brazilian	policymakers	express	how	Brazil	consistently	seeks	to	
unify	Latin	America	behind	 its	 leadership.	 	This	 is	done	by	holding	both	Brazil	
and	its	region	up	as	an	example	of	peaceful	coexistence,	seeking	prestige	as	the	
leader	 of	 South	 America	 and	 international	 recognition	 of	 that	 role.	 	 Guerreiro	
proclaims	 Brazil	 and	 Latin	 America	 as	 examples	 in	 this	 excerpt	 from	 a	 1980	
speech:		
Brazil	 lives	in	peace	with	its	neighbors	in	Latin	America	and	with	
all	 nations	 which	 observe	 the	 principles	 of	 sound	 international	
behavior.	Relations	between	Brazil	and	friendly	countries	of	Latin	
America	are	clear	testimony	to	the	success	achieved	when	the	path	
of	 mutual	 respect	 and	 non‐interference	 is	 taken	 with	
determination	and	when	the	search	for	harmonious	and	profitable	
co‐operation	 prevails	 over	 controversies	 or	 topical	 divergencies	
(United	Nations,	1980,	p.	28).	
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After	President	Sarney’s	announcement	of	Brazil’s	successful	enrichment	
of	 uranium	 in	 1987,	 Roberto	 Costa	 de	 Abreu	 Sodre,	 his	 Minister	 for	 External	
Affairs	emphasized	how	the	nuclear	issue	was	becoming	a	force	for	closer	ties	in	
the	region:	
I	wish	to	reiterate	my	country's	commitment	to	use	nuclear	energy	
exclusively	for	peaceful	purposes	[as	well	as	to]	the	enhancement	
of	 increased	co‐operation	and	mutual	 trust	 in	Latin	America.	The	
initiatives	of	collaboration	which	are	being	implemented	between	
Brazil	and	Argentina,	in	particular,	will	assure	the	mastering	of	the	
nuclear	cycle	without	 the	development	of	atomic	weapons	 in	our	
continent.	This	common	purpose	was	highlighted	in	the	exchange	
of	 correspondence	 between	 presidents	 Jose	 Sarney	 and	 Raul	
Alfonsin	 when	 the	 announcement	 of	 Brazil's	 mastery	 of	 the	
technology	 for	 enriching	 uranium	 was	 made	 public	 (United	
Nations,	1987,	pp.	16–17).	
Expressions	of	Brazilian	regional	leadership	are	often	combined	with	calls	
for	 international	recognition	for	that	role	with	additional	responsibilities	in	the	
UN	structure.		Brazilian	leaders	frequently	call	for	reform	to	the	structure	of	the	
Security	Council	 and	 for	 a	permanent	 seat	 for	 a	Latin	American	 representative	
(presumably	 Brazil).	 	 In	 1989,	 as	 the	 old	 Cold	War	 order	 was	 dissolving	 and	
Brazil	 assumed	non‐permanent	membership	on	 the	Security	Council,	President	
Sarney	 called	 for	 Brazil	 to	 be	 included	 in	 the	 decision‐making	 body	 as	 a	
reflection	of	the	changes	underway	in	the	world	system:		
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The	time	has	come	for	a	re‐evaluation	designed	to	make	it	possible	
to	reflect	the	multi‐polarity	of	today’s	world	in	the	Security	Council	
so	that	it	may	better	fulfill	 its	responsibilities.	 	We	could	consider	
an	additional	category	of	permanent	members	that	would	not	have	
the	veto	privilege	(United	Nations,	1989).			
In	conceiving	of	itself	as	the	leader	of	South	and	Latin	America,	Brazil	has	sought	
recognition	of	 that	 role	both	 in	 the	 region	and	 internationally.	 	 Still,	Brazil	 has	
not	 seen	 a	 confirmation	 of	 this	 role	 conception	 from	 these	 audiences	 to	 the	
degree	that	its	leaders	have	desired.			
Internal	Developer	
Finally,	as	observed	by	Holsti	(1970),	Brazilian	leaders	frequently	express	
a	 conception	 of	 their	 state	 as	 an	 Internal	 Developer.	 	 This	 role	 conception	 is	
focused	 on	 the	 country’s	 socio‐economic	 development	 needs,	 and	 threats	 are	
perceived	 as	 unwanted	 foreign	 involvement	 in	 domestic	 economic	 affairs.		
During	the	period	of	analysis,	Brazil	was	wracked	by	severe	economic	inequality,	
combined	 with	 inflation	 and	 crippling	 foreign	 debt.	 	 Thus	 the	 theme	 of	
development	 makes	 frequent	 appearances	 in	 Brazilian	 leaders’	 foreign	 policy	
addresses.		For	example,	Minister	of	External	Affairs	Guerreiro	defines	Brazilian	
foreign	policy	 in	developmental	 terms	 in	1984:	 	 “My	 country	 reaffirms	 that	 its	
foreign	 policy	 adheres	 to	 the	 high	 aim	 of	 seeking	 solutions	 consistent	 with	
universal	causes	of	peace	and	development”	(United	Nations,	1984,	p.	30).		Three	
years	 later,	 his	 successor	de	Abreu	 Sodre	 stated	 emphatically,	 “development	 is	
not	an	option	for	us;	it	is	an	imperative”	(United	Nations,	1987,	p.	9).			
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This	 role	 is	 sometimes	 manifests	 as	 anti‐protectionism	 on	 the	 part	 of	
industrialized	 economies.	 	 Brazilian	 leaders	 were	 quick	 to	 point	 out	 the	
hypocrisy	 of	 core	 countries’	 calls	 for	 economic	 liberalism	 at	 home	 while	
protecting	 their	 own	 industry	 from	 foreign	 competition	 through	 barriers	 to	
trade.	 	 External	 Relations	 Minister	 Guerreiro	 calls	 for	 debt	 reform	 for	 the	
developing	world	in	this	speech	from	1983:	
International	 trade…has	 entered	 a	 period	 of	 stagnation	 and	
recession,	 asphyxiated	 by	 growing	 protectionist	 barriers…and	 by	
the	 burden	 of	 foreign	 debt‐which	 together	 restrict	 to	 an	
unbearable	extent	the	import	capacity	of	the	debtor	countries,	thus	
making	 it	 impossible	 for	 them	 to	 sustain	 the	 levels	 of	 economic	
activity	needed	 to	meet	 the	 requirements	of	 their	peoples	and	 to	
generate	the	very	resources	necessary	to	meet	their	commitments	
(United	Nations,	1983,	p.	32).			
Brazil’s	 leaders	 viewed	 the	 acquisition	 of	 technology	 with	 this	
developmentalist	mindset,	including	the	acquisition	of	nuclear	technology.		They	
frame	the	nuclear	 issue	within	the	context	of	 the	right	to	development	and	call	
for	a	lifting	of	restrictions	on	the	use	of	nuclear	technology	for	peaceful	purposes.		
External	Relations	Minister	 Silveira	 links	 the	nuclear	 issue	 to	 the	development	
imperative:	
Brazil	is	a	peaceful	county.	The	dominant	concern	of	the	Brazilian	
nation	 is	 its	 integrated,	 harmonious	 economic	 and	 social	
development....We	 believe	 that	 the	 true	 meaning	 of	 non‐
proliferation	 is	 to	 ban	 the	 diffusion	 of	 nuclear	 weapons,	 not	 the	
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dissemination	 of	 nuclear	 technology.	 Given	 adequate	 safeguards,	
access	 to	 the	 technology	 for	 the	 peaceful	 uses	 of	 nuclear	 energy	
should	 not	 be	 subjected	 to	 discriminatory	 restrictions	 (United	
Nations,	1977,	p.	56).	
The	 efforts	 undertaken	 by	 the	 developing	 countries	 to	 create	 a	
new	international	economic	order	will	produce	results	only	if	they	
are	 accompanied	by	 effective	 action	 to	 offset	 the	 distortions	 that	
exist	 in	 the	 policy	 of	 transfer	 of	 scientific	 and	 technological	
knowledge.	As	President	Sarney	 stated	on	4	September,	when	he	
announced	 Brazil's	 mastery	 of	 the	 technology	 for	 enriching	
uranium,	Brazil	cannot	forgo	broad	and	unrestricted	access	to	the	
entire	 range	 of	 available	 scientific	 knowledge	 and	 its	 practical	
applications	(United	Nations,	1987,	pp.	16–17).	
Overall,	 the	 internal	 developer	 role	 conception	 featured	 prominently	 in	
the	foreign	policy	discourse	of	Brazilian	policymakers	over	the	time	period.	 	As	
has	 been	 stated	 earlier,	 Brazilian	 policymakers	 tended	 to	 perceive	 threats	 to	
their	nation’s	security	through	a	developmentalist	mindset	(Burges,	2009;	Soares	
de	Lima	&	Hirst,	2006;	Solingen,	1990),	so	it	is	not	surprising	that	this	economic	
focus	would	be	reflected	in	the	speeches	of	Brazilian	leaders.		In	the	next	section,	
the	 model	 will	 be	 used	 to	 trace	 the	 formation	 of	 Brazilian	 nuclear	 policy,	
summarizing	 the	 inputs	 and	 role	 conceptions	 and	 discuss	 how	 these	 in	 turn	
affected	actual	Brazilian	foreign	policy	behavior.			
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A	role‐based	model	of	Brazilian	nuclear	policy	
	 This	section	sketches	out	the	“big	picture”	of	the	national	role	conception	
process	in	the	Brazilian	case	and	discusses	its	implications	for	the	actual	policy	
pursued	by	Brazil	during	the	period.		The	hypothesized	role‐based	mechanism	is	
discussed	and	the	hypothesis	for	Brazil	is	evaluated.			
	 The	 inputs	 section	 of	 the	 model	 considered	 two	 sources	 policymakers	
draw	from	when	forming	national	role	conceptions—these	were	categorized	as	
ideational	 and	 material.	 	 Material	 inputs	 were	 defined	 as	 decisionmakers’	
perceptions	 of	 their	 state’s	 nuclear	 technical	 capability	 and	 security	
environment,	 whereas	 ideational	 inputs	 were	 defined	 as	 decisionmakers’	
perceptions	of	their	state’s	national	identity	and	cultural	heritage.			
	 In	 the	 Brazilian	 case,	 the	 technical	 capability	 evolved	 slowly,	 with	 little	
progress	being	made	until	the	landmark	accord	with	West	Germany	in	1975.		To	
this	day,	Brazil	has	yet	to	acquire	any	significant	reprocessing	capability	and	its	
enrichment	 and	 conversion	 facilities	 have	 struggled	 with	 technical	 difficulties	
even	 on	 the	 pilot	 level	 (Kassenova,	 2014).	 	 Still,	 the	 military	 was	 able	 to	
successfully	acquire	ultracentrifuge	enrichment	technology	and	achieve	a	degree	
of	technological	autonomy.			
	 From	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 security	 environment,	 rival	 Argentina	 was	
having	 much	 more	 success	 technically	 during	 the	 period	 of	 analysis,	 with	 an	
unsafeguarded	 enrichment	 plant	 and	 a	 spent	 fuel	 reprocessing	 facility	 under	
construction.		Developments	across	the	border	with	Argentina’s	military	regime	
clearly	worried	Brazilian	policymakers	and	affected	their	thinking	on	the	nuclear	
issue	(Barletta,	1997).			
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	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 	 Brazilian	 strategists	 have	 primarily	 defined	 their	
country’s	national	security	in	socio‐economic	terms	for	a	long	time	because	of	its	
territorial	satisfaction	(Selcher,	1985).	 	 	Although	Brazilian	leaders	were	clearly	
concerned	 by	 Argentina’s	 nuclear	 program,	 tensions	 between	 Brazil	 and	
Argentina	 were	 not	 significant	 enough	 to	 develop	 into	 a	 long‐lasting	 nuclear	
rivalry.	 	 Instead,	 the	 external	 threat	 to	Brazilian	nuclear	objectives	was	 clearly	
perceived	to	be	the	meddling	of	external	powers,	led	by	the	US.		This	perception	
stemmed	from	the	opposition	to	the	1975	nuclear	deal	with	West	Germany	and	
the	general	frustration	over	the	dire	economic	straits	Brazil	found	itself	in	during	
the	period	(Skidmore,	1988).	
	 From	 the	 ideational	 perspective,	 inputs	 can	 be	 summarized	 as	 a	
combination	of	historical	and	lingo‐cultural	factors	which	contribute	to	Brazilian	
leaders’	 sense	 of	 their	 nation’s	 unique	 character	 in	 the	 world.	 	 These	 include	
Brazil’s	multicultural	and	immigrant	heritage,	special	connection	with	Africa,	and	
its	status	as	 the	world’s	 largest	Portuguese‐speaking	nation.	 	Brazil’s	history	of	
peaceful	coexistence	with	neighbors	and	the	legacy	of	Rio	Branco	specifically	are	
often	 cited	 by	 its	 politicians	 as	 signs	 of	 Brazil’s	 national	 character	 on	 the	
international	stage.			
	 All	these	factors	contribute	to	a	sense	of	national	destiny	and	emphasis	on	
technological	progress	in	the	case	of	Brazil.		Policymakers	equate	Brazil’s	ability	
to	 command	 respect	 in	 the	world	with	 its	 level	 of	 technological	 sophistication	
and	 ability	 to	 conduct	 its	 affairs	 autonomously	 from	 other	 countries.	 	 Thus	 I	
argue	that	in	the	mind	of	policymakers,	the	acquisition	of	nuclear	technology	and	
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the	 option	 to	 pursue	 a	 peaceful	 nuclear	 explosive	 was	 seen	 as	 an	 important	
aspect	of	reflecting	this	image	to	the	world.			
	 Brazilian	policymakers	draw	on	these	inputs	in	forming	their	conceptions	
about	what	role	their	nation	should	play	in	the	international	arena.		These	roles	
are	summarized	in	Table	6	below:		
Table	6:	Brazilian	NRCs	for	nuclear	policy	
Role	Type	 Role	Description	
Voice	of	the	Global	South	 Serve	as	go‐between	the	industrialized	core	and	developing	periphery	in	global	fora	
Regional	Leader	 Provide	leadership	in	delimited	geographic	or	functional	area	
Internal	Developer	 focused	on	socio‐economic	needs;	perceiving	threats	through	foreign	involvement	
	
	 These	 role	 conceptions	 have	 obvious	 implications	 for	 the	 course	 set	 by	
Brazilian	policymakers	when	 it	 comes	 to	nuclear	decisionmaking.	 	The	Voice	of	
the	Global	South	conception	contains	anti‐bloc	and	anti‐imperialist	overtones,	an	
observation	 also	 made	 by	 Chafetz	 et	 al.	 (1996)	 in	 their	 own	 classification	 of	
Brazil	 (pre‐1990)	 as	 an	 Anti‐Imperialist	 state.	 	 This	 often‐confrontational	
attitude	 towards	 great	 powers	 in	 the	 international	 system	 could	 be	 consistent	
with	a	desire	for	nuclear	weaponry.	
	 In	 expressing	 their	 conception	 of	 Brazil	 as	 a	 regional	 leader	 in	 South	
America,	Brazilian	policymakers	hold	their	region	up	as	an	example	of	peace	and	
coexistence	 in	 the	 world	 and	 attribute	 this	 to	 Brazilian	 leadership.	 	 As	 the	
rapprochement	with	Argentina	progressed,	the	nuclear	issue	became	connected	
with	 this	 discourse	 of	 responsibility	 and	 regional	 integration.	 	 Brazil	 sought	
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regional	and	international	recognition	for	its	role	as	the	leader	of	South	America,	
but	 has	 yet	 to	 receive	 it,	 despite	 fostering	 many	 regional	 initiatives	 aimed	 at	
deepening	 ties	 throughout	 the	 continent.	 	 During	 the	 period	 of	 analysis,	 the	
nuclear	 issue	 switched	 from	being	 linked	 to	 the	 desire	 to	 dominate	 the	 region	
through	 superior	 capabilities	 to	 a	 force	 for	 closer	 ties	 between	 Brazil	 and	 its	
main	 regional	 rival.	 	 With	 the	 transition	 to	 democracy	 in	 the	 1980s,	 the	
continuation	of	a	nuclear	program	which	 intimidated	 the	region	was	no	 longer	
consistent	with	 Brazilian	 policymakers’	 perceptions	 of	what	 Brazilian	 regional	
leadership	would	look	like.			
	 Finally,	following	the	trend	of	Brazilian	foreign	policy	being	dominated	by	
economic	 and	 developmental	 policy,	 the	 role	 conception	 of	 internal	 developer	
played	 an	 important	 part	 in	 the	 policy	 discourse	 surrounding	 the	 nuclear	
program	 during	 the	 analysis	 period.	 	 Brazilian	 policymakers	 emphasized	 their	
nation’s	 autonomy	 and	 right	 to	 development,	 placing	 their	 nuclear	 ambitions	
within	 that	 context.	 	 Threats	 to	 the	 nuclear	 program	 were	 seen	 as	 threats	 to	
Brazil’s	 security,	 due	 to	 the	 connection	 of	 the	 development	 issue	 and	 national	
security	 in	 the	minds	of	Brazil’s	military	 leaders.	 	Opposition	 to	 the	 1975	deal	
with	West	Germany	pushed	military	leaders	to	start	the	secret	parallel	program	
and	 research	 the	 development	 of	 a	 nuclear	 explosive.	 	 With	 the	 transition	 to	
democratic	 rule,	 this	 discourse	 was	 adopted	 to	 justify	 the	 military’s	 parallel	
program,	 as	 Sarney	 portrayed	 the	 navy’s	 enrichment	 of	 uranium	 as	 an	
achievement	for	domestic	development.		
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Evaluation	of	the	Model	
	 Overall,	 the	model	 illuminates	several	key	 features	of	 the	Brazilian	case.		
For	Brazilian	policymakers	over	the	period	of	analysis,	the	imperative	and	right	
to	 development	 was	 closely	 linked	 to	 foreign	 policy	 goals	 and	 the	 concept	 of	
national	security.		More	specifically,	the	acquisition	of	technology	and	pursuit	of	
development	 goals	 was	 closely	 tied	 to	 national	 pride	 and	 a	 sense	 of	 Brazilian	
ascendency	 on	 the	 international	 stage.	 	 This	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 way	 leaders	
framed	the	nuclear	program	in	terms	of	achieving	national	autonomy.		From	the	
perspective	of	the	security	environment	as	defined	by	Breuning	(2011),	Brazilian	
policymakers	understood	 that	 their	 state	had	much	 to	 lose	by	 embarking	on	 a	
serious	push	to	acquire	nuclear	capability.		This	stood	in	contrast	to	the	modest	
and	 ambiguous	 gains	 in	 prestige	 nuclear	weaponry	would	 bring.	 	 Additionally,	
the	threat	from	Argentina	was	not	considered	clear	enough	to	necessitate	such	a	
bold	move.			
In	 this	 thesis,	 I	 hypothesized	 that	 Brazil’s	 lack	 of	 a	 consistently	 hostile	
regional	rival	in	Argentina	and	a	competitive,	not	oppositional,	attitude	towards	
the	international	system	informs	Brazil’s	understanding	of	its	role	in	the	region,	
and	 therefore	 Brazil	 would	 seek	 nuclear	 explosives	 as	 a	 status	 symbol	 but	
eventually	give	up.		This	hypothesis	is	displayed	visually	in	Figure	7	below:	
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Figure	7:	Relationship	between	competitive	regional	role	conception	and	nuclear	
weapons	acquisition	attempts	
	
	 In	 their	 conceptions	 of	 their	 country’s	 role	 in	 the	 world,	 Brazilian	
policymakers	 approach	 both	 their	 region	 and	 the	 international	 system	with	 a	
competitive,	 rather	 than	 oppositional	 attitude.	 	 This	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	
willingness	to	participate	in	international	fora	and	IOs	as	the	Voice	of	the	Global	
South,	 and	 diffuse	 bilateral	 tension	 and	 seek	 regional	 integration	 rather	 than	
hegemony	as	a	Regional	Leader.			
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 consistent	 with	 their	 conception	 of	 Brazil	 as	 an	
Internal	Developer,	Brazilian	policymakers	put	a	 strong	emphasis	on	acquiring	
nuclear	 technology	 and	 the	 full	 fuel	 cycle	with	 national	 autonomy	 as	 the	 goal.		
When	 the	 1975	 deal	 was	 perceived	 as	 incompatible	 with	 the	 goal	 of	 an	
independent	 nuclear	 policy,	 the	 military’s	 parallel	 program	 was	 started	 to	
achieve	autonomy	by	covert	means	while	 leaving	the	option	open	for	a	nuclear	
explosive	(Barletta,	1997).		Still,	the	pressures	towards	the	acquisition	of	such	an	
explosive	were	not	strong	enough	 for	Brazil’s	policymakers	 to	 tolerate	a	policy	
position	inconsistent	with	their	national	role	conceptions.	 	 In	the	end,	although	
elements	 of	 the	 military	 certainly	 desired	 to	 pursue	 a	 nuclear	 explosive	 (as	
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evidenced	 in	 particular	 by	 the	 test	 shafts	 drilled	 by	 the	 Air	 Force),	 this	 policy	
outcome	was	deemed	 inconsistent	with	Brazilian	policymaker’s	 conceptions	 of	
their	nation	as	a	regional	unifier	and	South	American	standard‐bearer.		This	led	
to	the	rapprochement	process	with	Argentina	and	eventually	to	Brazil’s	accession	
to	the	NPT	as	a	non‐nuclear	weapons	state.			
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CHAPTER	5	
	
INDIA:	“WE	HAVE	A	BIG	BOMB	NOW”	
	
	
5.1.	 Introduction	
	 In	 this	 chapter,	 the	 case	 of	 India’s	 nuclear	 weapons	 acquisition	 will	 be	
explored	in	detail.	 	First	the	general	post‐independence	foreign	policy	positions	
of	India	will	be	reviewed	to	set	the	context	for	the	role	input	analysis.		Next,	the	
material	and	ideational	inputs	of	the	BJP’s	conception	of	India’s	national	role	will	
be	discussed	in	turn.		Finally,	the	policy	outcomes	and	their	linkages	to	this	role	
formation	process	will	be	explained.	
Case	Study	Structure:	
As	has	already	been	discussed	at	length	in	the	previous	section,	the	case	
study	 structure	 is	 founded	 on	 the	 Breuning	 model	 of	 national	 role	 formation	
(Breuning,	 2011).	 	 This	model	 has	 been	 adapted	 to	 the	 policy	 area	 of	 nuclear	
proliferation,	and	reproduced	again	below	in	Figure	8:	
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Figure	8:	Role‐based	 framework	 for	nuclear	decisionmaking	process	showing	 ideational	
and	material	inputs,	based	on	(Breuning,	2011)	
After	a	general	 review	of	 Indian	history	and	 foreign	policy,	 the	material	
and	ideational	 inputs	of	Indian	national	role	conceptions	are	explored	in	detail.		
Then	 the	 national	 role	 conceptions	 of	 Indian	 foreign	 policy	 are	 detailed	 with	
reference	to	these	material	and	ideational	inputs.		Finally,	the	role	enactment	of	
Indian	policymakers	 is	evaluated	according	 to	 the	hypotheses	presented	 in	 the	
previous	chapter.			
Timeframe	of	Analysis	
Before	 embarking	 on	 the	 case	 study,	 the	 timeframe	 of	 analysis	must	 be	
established.	 	The	aim	of	 this	case	analysis	 is	 to	capture	key	moments	 in	 Indian	
nuclear	 decision	 making,	 and	 as	 such,	 the	 existing	 scholarship	 has	 been	
consulted	to	determine	an	appropriate	analysis	timeframe.			
120	
	
In	his	book	on	 the	 Indian	nuclear	program,	Karsten	Frey	 focuses	on	 the	
period	from	1986‐2005,	starting	his	analysis	with	the	lead‐up	to	the	Brasstacks	
crisis	 of	 1986‐87	 and	 continuing	 until	 the	 landmark	 US‐India	 nuclear	 deal	 of	
2005	(2006).	 	Nizamani	centers	his	analysis	on	 the	discourse	of	 Indian	 leaders	
leading	up	to	the	Smiling	Buddha	test	in	1974,	then	fast‐forwards	to	the	debate	
in	the	same	community	surrounding	the	1998	tests	(2000).		George	Perkovich’s	
comprehensive	 overview	 of	 the	 Indian	 nuclear	 program	 begins	 in	 1948	 and	
spans	 all	 the	 way	 until	 1998.	 	 He	 breaks	 the	 trajectory	 of	 Indian	 nuclear	
ambitions	 into	 four	 rough	 segments:	 1948‐1963,	 1963‐1974,	 1974‐1987,	 and	
1987‐1998.		SarDesai	and	Thomas’	edited	volume,	on	the	other	hand,	centers	its	
analysis	exclusively	on	the	1998	detonation	(2002).			
This	 analysis	 focuses	 its	 attention	 on	 two	 decisions—or	 series	 of	
decisions—which	 led	 first	 to	 India	detonating	a	 “peaceful	nuclear	explosive”	 in	
1974,	then	secondly	to	the	test	shots	at	Pokhran	in	1998.		Perkovich	(1999),	Frey	
(2006),	 and	 others	 point	 to	 1964	 as	 a	 key	 year	where	 Indian	 leaders	 began	 a	
series	of	 shifts	 in	outlook	which	resulted	 in	 the	 “Smiling	Buddha”	 test	of	1974.		
The	decade	of	1964‐1974,	therefore,	is	the	first	focus	for	the	period	of	analysis	of	
this	 study.	 	 The	 second	 period	 of	 analysis	 spans	 the	 decade	 between	 the	
beginning	of	the	Brasstacks	crisis	(1986)	and	the	Pokhran	tests	in	1998.		Before	
focusing	 on	 these	 periods,	 however,	 the	 following	 section	 establishes	 the	
historical	and	foreign	policy	context	for	the	analysis	to	follow.			
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5.2.	 General	Foreign	Policy	Outlook	
	 Indian	basic	foreign	policy	has	been	flavored	with	a	sense	of	destiny	even	
before	independence,	yet	India’s	efforts	to	cement	its	role	in	the	world	have	been	
chronically	hampered	by	slow	growth,	conflict	in	the	region,	paralyzing	levels	of	
poverty,	 political	 uncertainty,	 among	 other	 factors.	 	 In	 general,	 Indian	 foreign	
policy	 can	be	 characterized	by	 a	 seeking	of	 autonomy,	 independence,	 and	 self‐
reliance	in	world	affairs	(Cohen,	2001;	Hardgrave	&	Kochanek,	2008;	Luce,	2007;	
SarDesai,	 2008).	 	 India	 owes	 this	 stance	 to	 the	 overwhelming	 guidance	 of	
Jawaharlal	Nehru,	Gandhi’s	follower	and	contemporary	and	simultaneously	first	
prime	minister	and	foreign	minister	of	India	after	independence.	
A	Brief	History	of	Modern	India	
The	 Indian	 Subcontinent	 is	 home	 to	 one	 of	 the	 oldest	 civilizations	 on	
earth.	 	Present‐day	cultural	elements	of	 the	peoples	of	 the	Subcontinent	can	be	
traced	back	for	thousands	of	years.		India	is	the	world’s	second	largest	country	in	
terms	 of	 population,	with	 1.2	 billion	 inhabitants,	making	 it	 the	world’s	 largest	
democracy	(CIA,	2014a).		India’s	economy	is	the	world’s	fourth	largest	economy	
by	GDP	ranking,	and	has	been	tagged	as	a	member	of	the	BRICS	group	of	rising	
powers	(Tett,	2010).	
A	British	colony	from	the	 late	1700s	until	1947,	 Indian	history	has	been	
affected	greatly	by	its	colonial	experience.	 	Considered	the	“crown	jewel”	of	the	
British	Empire,	the	colony	of	India	provided	the	British	with	a	steady	stream	of	
income	 for	 over	 200	 years.	 	 British	 rule	 left	 an	 indelible	 mark	 on	 Indian	
institutions	 and	 modernity,	 as	 well	 as	 deep	 scars	 in	 the	 collective	 Indian	
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consciousness.		In	the	20th	Century,	opposition	to	British	rule	gained	momentum	
under	the	 leadership	of	Mahatma	Gandhi,	 famous	for	his	non‐violent	resistance	
movement	 against	 the	 British	 colonialist	 forces.	 	 Gandhi’s	 Indian	 National	
Congress	 organized	 demonstrations	 and	 mobilized	 popular	 support	 for	
independence	 through	 boycotts	 of	 British	 goods	 and	 non‐violent	 protests	
(SarDesai,	2008).			
The	 elation	 of	 independence	 was	 marred	 by	 brutal	 violence	 between	
Hindus	 and	Muslims	 during	 the	 partition	 of	 India	 into	 the	 sovereign	 states	 of	
India	 and	 Pakistan	 in	 1947.	 	 Led	 by	 Gandhi’s	 close	 follower	 and	 Congress	
political	strategist	Jawaharlal	Nehru,	India	charted	a	course	of	non‐alignment	in	
world	 affairs	 while	 seeking	 development	 at	 home	 for	 its	 poverty‐stricken	
population.	 	 Today	 India	 is	 a	 study	 in	 contrasts;	 the	 country	 is	 home	 to	 the	
world’s	 largest	 impoverished	 population,	 yet	 the	 proud	 possessor	 of	 nuclear	
weapons	and	an	advanced	space	program.		Its	scientists	conduct	research	on	the	
cutting	 edge	 of	 physics,	 chemistry,	 biotechnology,	 and	 material	 science,	
comprising	the	third‐largest	scientific	community	in	the	world	(SarDesai,	2008).		
Based	on	the	sheer	size	of	its	population	and	economy,	India	cannot	be	ignored	
on	 the	 world	 stage.	 	 Still,	 historically	 India	 has	 experienced	 difficulty	 in	
translating	its	size	into	leverage	in	its	foreign	policy.		The	next	section	introduces	
Indian	 foreign	 policy	 and	 identifies	 trends	 in	 India’s	 external	 relations	 since	
independence.				
Indian	Foreign	Policy	
In	 general,	 India	 seeks	 independence	 in	 the	 international	 arena.	 	While	
this	 statement	 alone	 does	 not	 distinguish	 India	 from	most	 states	 in	 the	world,	
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during	 the	 Cold	War	 this	 desire	 for	 autonomy	 defined	 India’s	 approach	 to	 its	
relations	with	other	nations.		By	affirming	its	adherence	to	non‐alignment,	India	
walked	the	fine	line	between	the	two	Cold	War	superpowers.		On	the	one	hand,	
India’s	mutual	 friendship	with	the	USSR	provided	needed	development	aid	and	
military	hardware,	while	at	the	same	time	it	sought	to	maintain	cordial	relations	
with	 the	 US	 and	 its	 allies.	 	 In	 fact,	 the	 history	 of	 Indian	 foreign	 policy	 is	 so	
intimately	linked	with	that	of	the	non‐aligned	movement	(NAM)	that	one	cannot	
be	understood	without	the	other.		In	the	following	sections,	India’s	relations	with	
the	 NAM,	 region,	 Pakistan,	 USSR,	 Russia,	 United	 States,	 and	 China	 will	 be	
discussed	in	greater	detail.			
India	and	the	Non‐Aligned	Movement	(NAM)	
The	NAM	was	 the	brainchild	 of	 the	 leaders	 of	 India	 (Jawaharlal	Nehru),	
Indonesia	 (Sukarno),	 Egypt	 (Gamal	 Abdel	 Nasser),	 Ghana	 (Kwame	 Nkrumah),	
and	Yugoslavia	(Josip	Broz	Tito),	who	convened	in	Belgrade	in	1961	to	call	for	a	
middle	 ground	 between	 the	 two	 Cold	 War	 superpowers	 and	 their	 allies	
(Abraham,	2008).		In	the	polarized	world	environment	of	that	time,	these	leaders	
saw	 their	 countries’	 futures	 tied	 to	 their	 ability	 to	 remain	 independent	 rather	
than	affiliated	with	either	of	 the	alliance	blocs	 forming	around	the	US	or	USSR.		
The	states	of	the	NAM,	largely	considered	developing	nations,	agreed	to	support	
each	other’s	 right	 to	 sovereignty,	 and	non‐interventionism,	 and	 fight	 racialism,	
colonization,	 and	 other	 forms	 of	 hegemony	 and	 great	 power	 politics	
(Government	of	Zaire,	2001).	 	 Interest	 in	such	an	association	 first	 formed	over	
concerns	in	developing	countries	that	they	might	become	caught	in	the	cross‐fire	
of	a	war	between	the	Cold	War	superpowers.		NAM	discourse	frequently	features	
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condemnation	 of	 Western	 imperialism	 and	 colonialism,	 along	 with	 dialogue	
about	 solving	 common	 development	 problems	 facing	 participant	 states	
(Government	 of	 Zaire,	 2001).	 	 With	 the	 dissolution	 of	 the	 USSR	 and	 the	
subsequent	shifts	in	the	international	arena,	the	non‐aligned	movement,	already	
a	loose	association,	lost	most	of	the	common	threads	which	had	held	its	diverse	
members	 together	 (Holloway	 &	 Tomlinson,	 1995).	 	 Still,	 India	 continues	 to	
maintain	a	“global	balance”	in	its	relations	with	the	major	powers	(Hardgrave	&	
Kochanek,	 2008,	 p.	 475).	 	 This	 has	 been	 described	 by	 some	 as	 an	 Indian	
‘aloofness’	 in	 world	 affairs,	 even	 as	 Indian	 economic	 liberalization	 and	
participation	 in	 the	 world	 economy	 has	massively	 increased	 in	 the	 past	 three	
decades.			
Indian	foreign	policy,	especially	in	the	Nehruvian	era,	has	therefore	been	
characterized	as	idealistic	by	many	scholars.		Yet	Indian	leadership	in	the	NAM	is	
both	idealistic	and	realistic—idealistic	because	of	its	consistency	with	the	values	
set	by	Nehru;	 realistic	because	association	with	 the	NAM	was	a	pragmatic	way	
for	 India	 to	maintain	 its	 autonomy	 in	 the	 caustic	Cold	War	 environment.	 	As	 a	
founder	 and	 leader	 of	 the	 NAM,	 India	 sought	 leadership	 among	 the	 newly‐
independent	states	of	Asia	and	Africa,	making	a	consistent	policy	of	supporting	
national	 liberation	 movements	 against	 the	 imperialist	 powers	 at	 the	 UN.		
Amongst	 these	 former	 colonies,	 India	 paid	 special	 attention	 to	 courting	
friendship	 with	 Islamic	 nations	 to	 prevent	 Pakistan	 from	 building	 consensus	
among	fellow	Muslim	states	for	the	resolution	of	the	Kashmir	dispute	in	its	favor.			
Until	1962,	Indian	foreign	policy	had	been	based	on	exercising	rhetorical	
influence	without	the	use	of	military	power,	but	the	border	war	defeat	to	China	
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exposed	 Indian	 military	 weakness.	 	 Though	 the	 NAM	 provided	 flexibility	 and	
normative	 values	 to	 Indian	 foreign	 policy	 at	 a	 global	 level,	 these	 ties	 did	 not	
trickle	down	to	the	regional	level.		India’s	quick	and	humbling	defeat	in	the	1962	
Sino‐Indian	war	evoked	very	little	condemnation	or	expressions	of	support	from	
its	non‐aligned	friends.	 	In	the	aftermath	of	this	conflict,	India	began	to	view	its	
place	 in	 the	 region	differently	and	embarked	on	a	 large	effort	 to	modernize	 its	
armed	 forces	 (Ganguly,	 2010).	 	 Additionally,	 the	 lack	 of	 coercive	 power	
hampered	India’s	ability	to	back	up	rhetoric	with	actual	policy	to	hold	the	non‐
aligned	movement	together	in	the	face	of	increasing	division	among	its	members.		
Overall,	 the	 NAM	 did	 not	 provide	 the	 seat	 for	 India	 to	 execute	 the	 global	
leadership	 its	 policymakers	 desired.	 	 Regional	 leadership,	 not	 anti‐bloc	
leadership,	gradually	became	emphasized	instead.			
Regional	Security	Outlook	
India	 is	 often	 characterized	as	having	a	 regional	outlook	on	 its	 security,	
viewing	the	Indian	Subcontinent	as	its	primary	area	of	security	concern	(Cohen,	
2001;	 Hardgrave	 &	 Kochanek,	 2008).	 	 Indian	 activity	 in	 the	 region	 is	 often	
interpreted	 by	 its	 neighbors	 as	 hegemonic	 and	 self‐serving,	 while	 India	 itself	
seeks	 international	 recognition	 of	 its	 status	 as	 the	 main	 power	 in	 the	 region,	
which	it	views	as	its	sphere	of	influence	(Hardgrave	&	Kochanek,	2008,	p.	476).		
This	extends	beyond	 the	 region,	as	 India	desires	confirmation	of	 its	 role	 in	 the	
world	proportional	to	its	population	and	status	as	the	world’s	largest	democracy.		
On	 the	 basis	 of	 its	 population	 and	 “continental	 country”	 status,	 India	 seeks	
admission	to	the	UNSC	as	a	permanent	member	(SarDesai,	2008).			
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Indian	leaders	express	how	they	consider	their	state	as	China’s	equal	on	
the	world	stage,	and	resent	US	equal	treatment	for	Pakistan	in	negotiations	over	
Kashmir	(Cohen,	2001).		Yet	significant	obstacles	to	this	goal	remain.			First,	the	
end	 of	 the	 Cold	 War	 and	 the	 subsequent	 identity	 crisis	 of	 the	 non‐aligned	
movement	 have	 meant	 a	 loss	 of	 status	 and	 prestige	 for	 India,	 as	 well	 as	 the	
diminishment	of	an	important	platform	for	the	projection	of	Indian	foreign	policy	
values.	 	 This	 decrease	 in	 rhetorical	 influence,	 coupled	 with	 India’s	 lack	 of	
involvement	 in	 the	 world	 economy	 relative	 to	 its	 size,	 has	 meant	 that	 India’s	
ascendant	destiny	resides	firmly	in	the	future	for	the	time	being.			
	 In	 contrast	 with	 its	 integral	 role	 in	 the	 multilateral	 non‐aligned	
movement,	at	a	regional	level	India	prefers	bilateral	relations	with	its	neighbors	
to	 regional	 cooperative	 organizations.	 	With	 India	 so	much	 larger	 than	 all	 the	
other	countries	in	the	region,	both	India	and	its	neighbors	tend	to	view	regional	
cooperation	with	skepticism.	 	 India’s	neighbors	see	New	Delhi’s	efforts	to	build	
consensus	 as	 manipulative	 and	 hegemonic,	 whereas	 India	 itself	 is	 hesitant	 to	
provide	a	forum	for	regional	collaboration	in	a	way	which	might	result	in	smaller	
countries	 banding	 together	 to	 oppose	 its	 preferences.	 	 The	 main	 regional	
organization,	the	South	Asian	Association	for	Regional	Cooperation	(SAARC),	was	
founded	 in	1983	 to	 foster	 limited	cooperation	 in	 the	areas	of	agriculture,	 rural	
development,	planning,	health,	education,	transport,	telecommunications,	sports,	
and	culture	(Hardgrave	&	Kochanek,	2008,	p.	500).		All	decisions	made	by	SAARC	
must	 be	 unanimous	 and	 therefore	 the	 organization’s	 effectiveness	 has	 largely	
been	 held	 hostage	 by	 the	 India‐Pakistan	 conflict	 (Cohen,	 2001).	 	 Indian	
policymakers	 frequently	 perceive	 that	 regionalism	 is	 a	 vehicle	 for	 collective	
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opposition	 to	 Indian	 objectives,	 so	 India	 tends	 to	 prefer	 to	 conduct	 bilateral	
relations	 with	 states	 in	 its	 region.	 	 Outside	 the	 region,	 historically	 India’s	
relations	with	China,	the	USSR/Russia,	and	the	US	have	been	the	most	significant.		
Before	moving	to	these,	however,	the	tensions	between	India	and	Pakistan	must	
be	discussed.			
Indian‐Pakistani	Relations	
The	conflict‐filled	relationship	between	India	and	Pakistan	has	its	roots	in	
the	poor	colonial	management	of	the	British,	the	deep‐rooted	tensions	between	
Hindus	 and	 Muslims	 in	 the	 Subcontinent,	 and	 the	 struggle	 over	 Kashmir	 (a	
region	with	importance	to	both	national	identities)	(Cohen,	2001).			
The	 rivalry	 between	 India	 and	 Pakistan	 lies	 in	 the	 pre‐independence	
dynamics	which	led	to	the	two	states	emergence	from	the	British	colonial	period	
as	separate	entities.		While	joined	in	their	opposition	of	British	colonial	rule,	the	
Indian	 National	 Congress	 and	 Muslim	 League	 Party	 differed	 over	 their	
conceptions	 of	 the	 role	 of	 religion	 in	 post‐independence	 identity.	 	 While	 the	
Congress	was	majority	Hindu	in	membership,	there	were	significant	numbers	of	
Muslim	members	as	well	and	the	Congress	advocated	for	a	single	unified,	secular,	
and	independent	Indian	state	(Metcalf	&	Metcalf,	2006).		In	contrast,	the	Muslim	
League,	fearful	that	Muslims	would	be	outnumbered	and	oppressed	by	Hindus	in	
such	an	arrangement,	called	 for	a	separate	homeland	for	 Indian	Muslims	(Paul,	
2005,	 p.	 7).	 	 Hasty	 to	 leave	 India,	 the	 British	 accepted	 the	 inevitability	 of	 a	
separate	 Muslim	 state	 and	 amidst	 large‐scale	 religious	 violence,	 the	 two	
independent	 states	 were	 declared	 in	 August	 1947,	 accompanied	 by	 mass	
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migrations	of	 over	10	million	people	 fleeing	 from	one	 state	 to	 the	other	 (Paul,	
2005,	p.	7).			
India	and	Pakistan	have	fought	a	total	of	four	declared	wars:	in	1947‐48	
and	 1965	 over	 Kashmir,	 in	 1971	 over	 East	 Pakistan/Bangladesh,	 and	 in	 1999	
over	the	Kargil	region	in	Kashmir,	in	addition	to	countless	skirmishes	and	near‐
conflicts	(SarDesai,	2008).		The	disputed	regions	of	Kashmir	and	Jammu	remain	
the	 main	 focal	 point	 of	 the	 tensions.	 	 Kashmir’s	 population	 is	 around	 75%	
Muslim,	and	its	status	has	been	disputed	ever	since	the	Partition	of	India	in	1947	
(SarDesai,	 2008).	 	 During	 the	 Partition,	 Pakistan	 supported	 an	 invasion	 of	
Kashmir	 by	 Pakistani	militants,	 hoping	 to	 seal	 Kashmir’s	 inclusion	 in	 the	 new	
state.	 	The	local	Maharaja,	a	Hindu,	called	on	India	for	protection	and	agreed	to	
accession	to	India,	provided	an	internationally‐monitored	referendum	was	held	
once	peace	was	restored	(Hardgrave	&	Kochanek,	2008).	 	An	uneasy	peace	was	
finally	restored	in	1949	through	a	UN‐brokered	ceasefire,	with	one‐third	of	the	
region	 in	 Pakistani	 hands	 (Azad	 Kashmir)	 and	 the	 remainder	 a	 part	 of	 India.		
Nehru	 came	 to	 view	 Kashmir	 as	 an	 essential	 part	 of	 India’s	 budding	 secular	
project	 (he	 himself	 was	 a	 Kashmiri	 Brahmin)	 (Frey,	 2006).	 	 After	 the	 1949	
ceasefire,	 Pakistan	 sought	 a	 military	 partnership	 with	 the	 United	 States	 and	
began	acquiring	hardware	and	training.	
In	the	1960s,	emboldened	by	a	decade	of	receiving	US	military	equipment	
and	training,	Pakistan	adopted	a	policy	of	“leaning	on	India”	in	Kashmir.		In	1965,	
India	 responded	 to	 Pakistani	 guerrilla	 incursions	 with	 an	 overwhelming	
armoured	 push	 towards	 Lahore.	 	 After	 a	 series	 of	 decisive	 Indian	 successes,	 a	
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rather	 inconclusive	settlement	was	reached	 in	1966	 in	Tashkent,	negotiated	by	
the	USSR	and	supported	by	the	United	States	(Metcalf	&	Metcalf,	2006).			
The	next	conflict	between	the	two	states	occurred	not	over	Kashmir,	but	
over	 East	 Pakistan	 (present‐day	 Bangladesh).	 	 The	 two	 regions	 of	 Pakistan	
formed	as	a	result	of	 the	Partition	were	always	hugely	separated	by	geography	
and	 culture,	 and	 the	 unequal	 power	 dynamic	 left	 many	 in	 East	 Bengal	 deeply	
unhappy	with	their	place	in	the	Pakistani	state.		After	an	election	in	East	Pakistan	
was	not	accepted	by	the	West	Pakistani	government,	the	Pakistani	army	began	a	
repressive	 attempt	 to	 crush	 East	 Pakistani	 opposition.	 	 Thousands	 of	 civilians	
were	 killed	 in	 the	 resulting	 civil	war,	 and	 about	 10	million	 refugees	 streamed	
across	 the	 border	 into	 India,	 causing	 a	 humanitarian	 crisis	 in	 its	 eastern	
provinces	(Hardgrave	&	Kochanek,	2008).		Seeing	East	Bengali	independence	as	
inevitable	 but	 not	wishing	 to	 be	 left	with	 a	 permanent	 refugee	 problem,	 India	
entered	the	conflict	after	a	series	of	preemptive	Pakistani	airstrikes	on	Indian	Air	
Force	bases.		In	just	ten	days,	Indian	troops	blazed	their	way	to	Dhaka	and	forced	
Pakistan’s	surrender.		Pakistan	lost	roughly	half	of	its	entire	armed	forces	in	the	
utter	defeat	(SarDesai,	2008).			
After	 the	 1971	 war,	 tensions	 never	 really	 resolved,	 remaining	 high	
throughout	 the	 1980s	 and	 90s.	 	 The	 two	 nations’	 “tit‐for‐tat”	 nuclear	 tests	 in	
1998	 showed	 policymakers	 on	 both	 sides	 just	 how	 risky	 conflict	 had	 become,	
forcing	 high‐level	 talks	 between	 Indian	 Prime	Minister	 Vajpayee	 and	Pakistani	
Prime	Minister	Nawaz	Sherif	in	1999	(Paul,	2005).		Still,	just	a	few	months	later,	
the	two	nations	found	themselves	once	again	embroiled	 in	open	conflict	over	a	
glacier	 in	 Kashmir’s	 Kargil	 district.	 	 US	 President	 Bill	 Clinton	 was	 able	 to	
130	
	
convince	 Pakistan	 to	 move	 its	 forces	 back	 to	 the	 1949	 line	 of	 control	 (Paul,	
2005).	 	In	December	2001,	relations	reached	a	new	low	when	Pakistani‐trained	
terrorists	 attacked	 the	 Indian	 Parliament	 building,	 killing	 14	 people	 (SarDesai,	
2008).	 Intense	 international	 pressure	 once	 again	 diffused	 the	 immediate	
situation,	 but	 tangible	 progress	 to	 a	 permanent	 settlement	 has	 been	 virtually	
non‐existent.		Cohen	concludes	that	any	resolution	of	the	conflict	requires	taking	
significant	risks	with	very	 limited	payoff	 for	either	 side,	and	 therefore	 inaction	
has	become	the	“default	option”	in	Kashmir	(Cohen,	2001,	p.	222).	
Sino‐Indian	Relations	
Where	 India’s	 relationship	 with	 the	 USSR	 remained	 relatively	 constant	
throughout	 the	 Cold	War,	 its	 relations	with	 China	 have	 seen	 a	 vast	 fluctuation	
over	 the	 years.	 	 Nehru	 viewed	 China	 as	 a	 natural	 Asian	 partner	 to	 right	 the	
injustices	and	imbalances	caused	by	colonialism	and	foreign	intervention	in	the	
region.	 	 He	 envisioned	 a	 partnership	 between	 the	 two	 countries	which	would	
establish	a	new	post‐colonial	order	in	Asia	(Cohen,	2001,	p.	25).	
Sino‐Indian	relations	started	warmly,	 formalized	by	 the	Panchsheel	 (five	
virtues)	treaty	signed	in	1954	(SarDesai,	2008).	 	The	treaty	established	the	two	
nations’	commitment	to	mutual	respect	of	each	other’s	sovereignty,	borders,	and	
non‐interference	 in	 each	 other’s	 domestic	 affairs.	 	 India	 repeatedly	 called	 for	
mainland	 China’s	 representation	 in	 the	 UN	 General	 Assembly	 and	 Security	
Council	 over	 the	 Republic	 of	 China	 (Taiwan).	 	 Still,	 tensions	 over	 their	 shared	
border	and	the	status	of	Tibet	gradually	grew	throughout	the	following	decade;	
these	tensions	would	develop	into	a	diplomatic	crisis	and	finally,	armed	conflict	
in	1962.		In	the	aftermath	of	the	conflict,	the	India‐USSR	special	relationship	was	
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strengthened,	 and	China	 reached	out	 to	Pakistan	 for	 additional	 leverage.	 	Both	
shifts	 in	 alignment	 had	 profound	 implications	 for	 future	 events	 in	 the	 region,	
events	which	shaped	the	decisionmaking	environment	surrounding	the	nuclear	
issue	in	India.		The	roots	of	the	tensions	lie	in	the	disagreements	between	India	
and	 China	 over	 their	 shared	 border,	 disagreements	 which	 began	 after	 both	
countries	gained	domestic	autonomy	in	the	late	1940s.			
After	 achieving	 victory	 against	 both	 the	 Japanese	 invaders	 and	 Chiang	
Kai‐shek’s	 Nationalists	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1940s,	 the	 People’s	 Liberation	 Army	
turned	 its	 focus	 to	 the	 undeveloped	 Western	 frontier	 and	 to	 Tibet.	 	 Chinese	
forces	 advanced	 west	 quickly,	 consolidating	 its	 hold	 over	 Tibet	 and	 building	
roads	and	supply	roots	as	they	went.		The	region	of	Tibet,	which	had	enjoyed	de	
facto	 autonomous	 status	 for	 decades	 while	 Beijing	 was	 occupied	 elsewhere,	
suddenly	found	itself	firmly	under	Chinese	control.		The	resulting	tensions	within	
Tibet	led	to	a	large‐scale	armed	uprising	beginning	in	1956.		This	developed	into	
an	 all	 out	 rebellion	 against	 Chinese	 rule	 in	 1959.	 	 As	 part	 of	 its	 efforts	 to	
consolidate	its	claim	on	the	disputed	border	region	of	Aksai	Chin	and	facilitate	its	
military	operations	in	Tibet,	in	1957	the	Chinese	government	built	a	road	across	
territory	which	India	claimed	as	its	own	according	to	the	borders	drawn	by	the	
British	 colonial	 administration	 (the	 McMahon	 Line).	 	 With	 tensions	 already	
running	high	and	Indian	public	opinion	staunchly	against	China	as	a	result	of	the	
conflict	 in	Tibet,	Nehru	ordered	Indian	troops	to	advance	to	the	McMahon	Line	
and	establish	“facts	on	the	ground”	by	evicting	any	Chinese	elements	that	were	
located	in	the	disputed	region	(Garver,	2010,	p.	91).	
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In	doing	so,	Nehru	gravely	underestimated	the	significant	Chinese	forces	
arrayed	 against	 him	 on	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	 McMahon	 Line,	 as	 well	 as	 the	
logistics	necessary	to	support	 forward	infantry	positions	at	such	high	altitudes.		
This	left	Indian	forces	stretched	thin,	and	in	October	1962,	Chinese	forces	moved	
against	 the	 Indian	 positions	 with	 decisive	 and	 overwhelming	 force	 (SarDesai,	
2008).		Indian	troops,	not	trained	for	high‐altitude	combat	and	generally	poorly‐
equipped	 compared	 with	 their	 battle‐hardened	 Chinese	 opponents,	 were	
completely	 routed.	 	 Satisfied,	 China	 then	 unilaterally	 declared	 a	 cease‐fire	 and	
withdrew	its	forces	to	the	border	that	it	claimed	with	India.			
The	1962	war	had	great	consequences	for	both	India’s	strategic	doctrine	
and	its	relations	with	China.		After	the	war,	Indian	leaders	looked	at	China	with	
suspicion	where	Nehru	had	seen	the	potential	of	partnership.	 	The	implications	
for	India’s	military	strategy	were	even	more	significant.		Garver	characterizes	the	
effect	 of	 the	 1962	war	 in	 the	minds	 of	 policymakers	 as	 a	 sort	 of	 “never	 again	
syndrome”—India’s	 armed	 forces	 should	 never	 again	 be	 caught	 unawares	 and	
unequipped	like	they	were	in	the	conflict	with	China	(2010,	p.	93).	
Indira	 Gandhi	 connected	 the	 normalization	 of	 ties	 with	 China	 to	 the	
solution	 of	 the	 border	 conflict,	 a	 policy	which	was	 followed	 by	 her	 successors	
and	led	to	an	armed	standoff	and	near‐conflict	in	1987	between	the	two	nations,	
again	 over	 the	 disputed	 area	 of	 Arunachal	 Pradesh.	 	 Although	 the	 two	nations	
had	 exchanged	 ambassadors	 again	 in	 the	 1970s,	 bilateral	 ties	 were	 extremely	
limited	 and	 the	 1987	 crisis	 catalyzed	 the	 need	 for	 further	 ties	 in	 the	mind	 of	
Indian	 policymakers	 (SarDesai,	 2008).	 	 Indira	 Gandhi’s	 son,	 PM	 Rajiv	 Gandhi,	
visited	Beijing	on	a	 state	 visit	 in	1988,	 and	 in	1991,	Chinese	Prime	Minister	Li	
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Peng	 visited	 New	 Delhi	 (Andersen,	 2001).	 	 	 This	 was	 followed	 by	 a	 gradual	
opening	of	ties;	in	1993,	Indian	Prime	Minister	Narasimha	Rao	visited	Beijing	for	
talks	about	reducing	tensions	over	the	“Line	of	Actual	Control”,	the	cease‐fire	line	
declared	by	the	Chinese	at	the	end	of	the	1962	conflict.	 	Both	nations	agreed	to	
pull	their	troops	back	from	this	line	and	reduce	the	number	of	troops	deployed	
along	the	border	in	general	(Hardgrave	&	Kochanek,	2008,	pp.	504–5).	
Still,	 China	 and	 India	 are	 deeply	 suspicious	 of	 each	 other.	 	 Both	nations	
are	 competing	 over	 the	 same	 geography	 and	 markets.	 	 Continued	 Chinese	
support	 for	 Pakistan	 and	 the	 still‐unresolved	 status	 of	 the	 border	 dispute	
prevents	 the	 reality	 of	 the	 Sino‐Indian	 relationship	 from	meeting	 the	 rhetoric	
with	which	it	began	under	PM	Nehru’s	tutelage.		For	many	in	the	Indian	strategic	
community,	the	rise	of	China	represents	a	significant	threat	to	India,	a	threat	that	
should	be	met	by	additional	assertiveness	on	India’s	part.			
In	 the	aftermath	of	 the	1998	Pokhran	 II	nuclear	 tests,	PM	Vajpayee	and	
other	 BJP	 leaders	 used	 the	 threat	 of	 China	 as	 justification	 for	 the	 tests	 (Frey,	
2006).	 	Yet	it	is	apparent	from	the	efforts	made	by	both	sides	that	this	threat	is	
still	very	much	based	in	assessments	of	the	future	rather	than	a	current	reality.		
While	the	perception	of	a	Chinese	threat	has	clearly	shaped	Indian	policymakers’	
mindsets	 concerning	 the	acquisition	of	nuclear	weapons,	dynamics	 in	 relations	
with	China	are	inadequate	to	explain	why	India	chose	to	test	again	in	1998,	at	a	
time	when	it	was	making	overtures	about	repairing	bilateral	ties.			
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Indian‐Russian	Relations	
As	 mentioned	 earlier,	 India’s	 “special	 relationship”	 with	 the	 USSR	 was	
significant	during	 the	Cold	War—India	 received	Soviet	development	assistance	
and	purchased	arms,	while	the	USSR	viewed	partnership	with	India	as	a	valuable	
political	asset.		While	staunchly	committed	to	non‐alignment,	Nehru	admired	the	
quick	 development	 of	 the	 USSR	 and	 was	 wary	 of	 American	 capitalism.	 	 The	
Indian‐USSR	partnership	was	cordial	but	limited	to	a	barter	system	for	weapons	
and	 other	 aid.	 	 This	 partnership	 was	 formalized	 in	 the	 Indo‐Soviet	 Treaty	 of	
Peace	Friendship	and	Cooperation	of	1971	(SarDesai,	2008,	p.	442).	 	At	 its	 fall,	
the	 USSR	 had	 supplied	 India	 with	 70%	 of	 its	 military	 hardware,	 and	 with	 its	
collapse	 in	 1991‐92,	 the	 barter	 system	 for	 weapons	 also	 disintegrated	 while	
Russia	 was	 preoccupied	 with	 the	 transition	 from	 the	 Soviet	 government	
(SarDesai,	 2008,	 p.	 442).	 	 Indian‐Russian	 relations	 in	 the	 post‐Cold	 War	 era	
continue	to	be	dominated	by	arms	contracts	(SarDesai,	2008,	p.	442).			
Indian	Relations	with	the	United	States	
In	contrast,	India’s	relations	with	the	United	States	have	been	less	central	
to	its	foreign	policy	portfolio	in	the	20th	Century.		The	US	was	looking	for	allies	in	
the	 region	 to	 contain	 the	 communist	 threat	 during	 the	 Cold	War,	 and	 courted	
both	India	and	Pakistan.		To	many	Indians,	the	United	States	had	taken	the	place	
of	the	British	as	the	materialistic	leader	of	the	developed	world	(Cohen,	2001,	p.	
272).		Without	close	natural	ties	to	the	US,	India	chose	to	keep	its	distance	while	
Pakistan	 joined	 CENTO	 and	 received	 American	 military	 assistance.	 	 American	
military	 support	 is	 credited	 with	 giving	 Pakistan	 the	 material	 means	 and	
confidence	to	challenge	its	far	larger	rival	(Cohen,	2001,	p.	275).		Hardgrave	and	
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Kochanek	 characterize	 the	 US‐India	 relationship	 as	 one	 of	 “intense	 strain,	
punctuated	 by	 periods	 of	 friendship	 and	 cooperation	 (Hardgrave	&	 Kochanek,	
2008,	p.	510).	 	American	support	of	Pakistan	is	a	major	sore	spot;	India	resents	
that	the	US	policy	towards	Kashmir	effectively	views	India	and	Pakistan	as	being	
on	equal	footing.			The	1998	nuclear	detonations	and	subsequent	Indo‐Pakistani	
tensions	brought	condemnation	and	sanctions	from	the	US	and	the	international	
community,	 but	 also	 forced	 the	US	 to	pay	more	 attention	 to	 the	 region	 and	be	
more	active	 in	diplomacy—President	Clinton	was	the	 first	US	president	 to	visit	
India	in	over	22	years	when	he	spent	five	days	touring	the	country	on	one	of	his	
most	important	state	visits	(Cohen,	2001,	p.	268).						
One	memory	which	is	burned	into	the	minds	of	the	Indian	foreign	policy	
establishment	is	President	Nixon’s	deployment	of	the	nuclear	aircraft	carrier	USS	
Enterprise	 to	 the	Bay	of	Bengal	 during	 the	 India‐Pakistan	war	of	1971.	 	Angry	
and	 humiliated	 that	 the	 US	 would	 resort	 to	 a	 form	 of	 “gunship	 diplomacy”	 to	
blackmail	 India	 rather	 than	 engage	 with	 the	 situation	 through	 diplomatic	
channels	 (Frey,	 2006,	 p.	 87).	 	 For	 the	 Indian	 foreign	 policy	 community,	 the	
United	 States	 consistently	 undervalues	 India	 in	 its	 relations	 with	 the	
Subcontinent	 and	 has	 punished	 India	 disproportionately	 for	 violating	
nonproliferation	norms	(Frey,	2006).	
Structure	of	Indian	Nuclear	Policy	Making	Organs		
In	order	to	better	understand	the	foreign	policy	decisions	made	by	India’s	
leaders,	 the	 institutions	 responsible	 for	 producing	 policy	 should	 be	 examined.		
The	Indian	foreign	policy	apparatus	has	been	described	as	highly	centralized	and	
elitist,	while	 its	decisions	often	characterized	as	reactive,	rather	than	proactive.		
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The	 Indian	Foreign	Service	consists	of	a	small	 (~600)	staff	of	elite	bureaucrats	
operating	under	 the	offices	of	 the	Ministry	of	External	Affairs	 (MEA)	 located	at	
162	 missions	 and	 posts	 around	 the	 world	 (MEA,	 2014).	 	 The	 MEA	 generally	
executes	the	decisions	made	by	the	Prime	Minister,	Foreign	Minister,	and	small	
inner	 circle	 of	 trusted	 advisors.	 	 This	 often	 resembles	 an	 informal	 process,	
according	to	the	style	of	the	ruling	PM.		For	example,	as	PM	from	1946	until	his	
death	 in	 1964,	 Nehru	 also	 served	 simultaneously	 as	 his	 own	 foreign	minister.		
Known	 as	 the	 “one‐man	 think	 tank,”	 Nehru	 was	 notorious	 for	 his	
micromanagement	of	every	level	of	the	foreign	policy	bureaucracy	(Hardgrave	&	
Kochanek,	2008,	p.	477).		In	a	more	recent	example,	PM	Vajpayee	consulted	with	
only	 a	handful	 of	 close	 confidants	 in	 the	decision‐making	process	which	 led	 to	
the	nuclear	tests	of	May	1998	(Perkovich,	1999).			
This	advising	structure	often	leads	to	a	policy	which	appears	reactive	and	
reactive	and	ad	hoc—mechanisms	are	weak	or	non‐existent,	leaving	institutional	
decisions	up	 to	 those	at	 the	highest	 levels	of	government.	 	Even	 the	disastrous	
border	 war	 with	 China	 in	 1962	 failed	 to	 prompt	 significant	 soul‐searching	 on	
how	 the	 establishment	 conducted	 and	 executed	 foreign	 policy	 decisions.		
Attempts	to	create	a	National	Security	Council	in	the	late	1980s	and	early	1990s	
were	 circumvented	 by	 the	 MEA	 bureaucracy	 as	 a	 threat	 to	 their	 institutional	
domain.	 	The	rise	to	power	of	the	BJP	provided	new	impetus	for	change	in	this	
area,	 with	 a	 new	 National	 Security	 Council	 being	 formed	 in	 November	 1998;	
however	 the	 assessment	 (as	 of	 2008)	 is	 that	 not	 much	 has	 changed	 from	 the	
previous	status	quo	(Hardgrave	&	Kochanek,	2008,	p.	480).	
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In	 order	 to	 understand	 how	decisions	 regarding	 nuclear	weapons	were	
made	in	India,	 the	 institutional	 framework	for	nuclear	policymaking	also	needs	
to	be	summarized.		Although	the	Constitution	stipulates	that	the	President	is	the	
“Supreme	Commander”	of	the	armed	forces,	as	Head	of	State	he/she	has	little	say	
over	nuclear	policy,	which	lies	 in	the	domain	of	the	prime	minister.	 	The	prime	
minister	 holds	 the	 cabinet	 post	 for	 minister	 of	 science	 and	 technology,	 which	
includes	the	Department	of	Atomic	Energy	(DAE).		This	state	organ	in	turn	works	
together	with	the	technical	Atomic	Energy	Commission	(AEC)	to	execute	nuclear	
policy.	 	 The	MEA	 historically	 has	 played	 a	 small	 role	 in	 the	 development	 and	
execution	of	nuclear‐related	policies;	instead,	the	prime	minister,	as	head	of	the	
DAE,	makes	decisions	in	close	conference	with	the	chief	scientist	who	heads	the	
AEC.	 	The	Defence	Research	and	Development	Organization	(DRDO),	under	 the	
oversight	 of	 the	 defence	 minister,	 works	 together	 with	 the	 AEC	 on	 the	
weaponization	side	of	the	development	agenda.		The	effect	of	these	institutional	
characteristics	 is	 for	 the	 most	 important	 decisions	 regarding	 India’s	 nuclear	
program	 to	 be	 made	 in	 an	 off‐the‐record	 fashion	 by	 the	 prime	 minister	 after	
consultation	with	the	head	of	the	AEC	(Perkovich,	1999,	pp.	9–10).		This	point	is	
important	 to	 note	 in	moving	 forward,	 as	 information	 on	 key	 turning	 points	 in	
India’s	nuclear	timeline	is	missing	because	of	this	off‐the‐record	decisionmaking	
framework.			
Nuclear	Timeline	
India’s	 nuclear	 timeline	 begins	 before	 the	 country’s	 independence,	with	
the	rise	of	Dr.	Homi	Bhabha,	widely	considered	the	father	of	the	Indian	nuclear	
program	 (Sublette,	 2003).	 	 Through	his	 education	 at	 Cambridge,	 he	 gained	 the	
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opportunity	to	meet	some	of	the	leading	experimental	physicists	of	the	era,	men	
like	Niels	Bohr,	 James	Franck,	and	Enrico	Fermi,	who	would	soon	be	intimately	
involved	 in	the	Allies’	nuclear	bomb	programs.	 	 In	1944,	Dr.	Bhabha	petitioned	
the	Sir	Dorab	Tata	Trust	to	fund	an	institution	dedicated	to	fundamental	physics	
research,	 and	 in	 1945,	 the	 Tata	 Institute	 of	 Fundamental	 Research	 opened	 in	
Bangalore	 (today’s	Bengaluru)	 (Tata	 Institute	of	Fundamental	Research,	2013).		
With	 the	United	States’	dropping	of	 atomic	bombs	on	 Japan,	 the	 importance	of	
the	 new	 nuclear	 technology	 became	 obvious	 to	 the	 world’s	 leaders.	 	 In	 1946,	
Interim	Government	Cabinet	 leader	(later	PM)	Jawaharlal	Nehru	wrote	a	series	
of	 notes	 to	 state	 officials	 to	 prevent	 the	 export	 of	materials	 useful	 for	 nuclear	
research.	 	 That	 same	 year,	 he	 appointed	 Dr.	 Bhabha	 as	 the	 official	 scientific	
adviser	to	the	Indian	government.			
	 At	the	same	time,	the	US‐proposed	Baruch	Plan	was	being	debated	at	the	
United	 Nations.	 	 Central	 to	 the	 plan	 was	 the	 stipulation	 that	 all	 fissile	 ores	
(primarily	uranium	and	thorium)	would	be	held	under	international	ownership	
to	prevent	the	proliferation	of	nuclear	weaponry.		Possessing	significant	deposits	
of	 thorium	 in	 the	 monazite	 sands	 in	 the	 south	 of	 the	 country	 and	 having	
experienced	British	 colonialism,	 India	was	wary	 of	 any	 restriction	 placed	 on	 a	
potential	future	economic	and	strategic	asset.		Nehru	began	taking	steps	towards	
developing	 this	 asset	 through	 forming	 an	 Atomic	 Energy	 Research	 Committee	
with	Dr.	Bhabha	as	chair.	This	effectively	solidified	Bhabha’s	position	as	Nehru’s	
close	advisor	on	atomic‐related	issues	(Venkataraman,	1994,	p.	145).			
	 The	 next	 major	 step	 occurred	 in	 1948,	 less	 than	 a	 year	 after	 India’s	
independence.	 	 On	 15	 April	 1948,	 the	 Atomic	 Energy	 Act	 was	 passed	 in	 the	
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Indian	Constituent	Assembly	(Abraham,	1998).		This	bill,	established	the	Atomic	
Energy	Commission	(AEC)	and	placed	the	AEC	under	the	authority	of	the	prime	
minister	 (Abraham,	 1998,	 p.	 61).	 	 The	 Atomic	 Energy	 Act,	 while	 ostensively	
modeled	 on	 the	 British	 Atomic	 Energy	 Act,	 shrouded	 all	 atomic	 research	 and	
development	in	secrecy.		During	debate	over	the	bill,	MP	S.V.	Krishnamurthy	Rao	
pointed	 out	 that	 “secrecy	 in	 the	 UK	 is	 restricted	 only	 for	 defensive	 purposes.”		
Nehru	responded	tellingly	by	stating,	“I	do	not	know	how	you	are	to	distinguish	
between	the	[defense	and	atomic	energy	purposes]”	(Abraham,	1998,	p.	61).			
	 In	his	new	position	as	head	of	the	AEC,	Bhabha	began	to	use	his	contacts	
abroad	to	seek	information	on	nuclear	ores,	reactors,	enrichment,	and	other	fuel	
cycle	technologies.		This	occurred	as	PM	Nehru	embarked	on	a	four‐year	plan	to	
develop	 India’s	 nuclear	 program	 in	 1952	 (Bhatia,	 1979,	 p.	 88).	 	 In	 November	
1954,	 the	 Conference	 on	 the	 Development	 of	 Atomic	 Energy	 for	 Peaceful	
Purposes	was	held	in	New	Delhi.		At	the	conference,	Dr.	H.	Bhabha	presented	his	
plan	to	develop	India’s	nuclear	power	sector	in	three	stages,	largely	independent	
of	 international	 assistance.	 According	 to	 this	 plan,	 India	 would	 first	 build	
Canadian‐supplied	natural	uranium‐fueled	reactors	which	produce	plutonium	as	
well	 as	 electric	 power.	 This	 plutonium	 would	 be	 recycled	 and	 mixed	 with	
thorium	 to	 fuel	 the	 second‐stage	 reactors.	 	 In	 the	 final	 stage,	 the	 uranium	
produced	from	the	thorium	would	be	used	to	fuel	breeder	reactors	(NTI,	2010).			
	 In	 1955	 Canada	 and	 India	 agreed	 to	 construct	 a	 Canadian‐designed	
natural	 uranium‐fueled	 40	 MW	 research	 reactor,	 the	 Canada‐India	 Reactor.		
When	 the	United	States	agreed	 to	 supply	 the	 reactor	with	 the	necessary	heavy	
water	 moderator,	 its	 name	 was	 changed	 to	 CIRUS	 to	 reflect	 American	
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participation	 in	 the	 project	 (NTI,	 2010).	 	 The	 same	 year,	 construction	 on	 the	
Apsara	pool‐type	reactor	began	in	Trombay.	 	The	reactor	design	and	initial	fuel	
supplies	were	 provided	 by	 the	 UK.	 	When	 this	 reactor	went	 critical	 in	 August	
1956,	it	was	the	first	operational	research	reactor	in	Asia	(NTI,	2010).			
	 Technical	progress	on	the	three‐stage	plan	outlined	by	Bhabha	continued	
well	 into	 the	 1960s.	 	 In	 1958,	 PM	 Nehru	 authorized	 Project	 Phoneix,	 which	
entailed	the	construction	of	a	spent	fuel	reprocessing	plant	to	extract	plutonium	
from	the	fuel	rods	of	the	CIRUS	research	reactor.	 	The	plant	was	to	have	a	total	
throughput	 of	 20	 tons	 of	 fuel	 per	 year,	 or	 the	 calculated	 spent	 fuel	 to	 be	
produced	by	the	CIRUS	reactor	(Sublette,	2001).	 	Between	1958	and	1959,	77.6	
million	rupees—or	27	percent	of	the	Indian	government’s	total	technology	R&D	
budget—was	allocated	for	the	AEC’s	operations	alone	(Abraham,	1992,	p.	242).		
In	 1959,	 over	 1000	 researchers	were	 employed	 at	 the	 atomic	 energy	 research	
complex	 at	 Trombay	 (Jain,	 1974,	 p.	 91).	 	 From	 both	 the	 number	 of	 scientists	
being	employed	at	Trombay	and	the	amount	of	money	being	spent	on	the	AEC,	it	
is	 clear	 that	 by	 this	 point	 Bhabha	 had	 Nehru’s	 ear	 when	 it	 came	 to	 nuclear	
decision‐making.	 	 Still,	 it	would	 be	wrong	 to	 conclude	 that	 Dr.	 H.	 Bhabha	was	
steering	the	ship	of	nuclear	affairs.		In	1957,	just	as	the	international	atomic	race	
was	heating	up,	Nehru	completely	rejected	Bhabha’s	proposal	 to	start	research	
on	the	specifics	of	nuclear	explosives	(Hymans,	2006,	p.	176).			
	 In	 1961,	 construction	 of	 the	 Phoenix	 reprocessing	 plant	 at	 Trombay	
began.		The	plant	was	designed	to	separate	usable	plutonium	and	uranium	from	
spent	 fuel	 elements	 irradiated	 in	 nuclear	 reactors	 using	 the	 PUREX	 method,	
which	had	then	been	recently	declassified	and	made	available	by	the	US	through	
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the	 Atoms	 for	 Peace	 program.	 In	 the	 PUREX	 process,	 the	 fuel	 is	 first	 removed	
from	its	protective	cladding	using	a	combination	of	cutters	and	chemical	agents,	
and	then	the	plutonium	and	uranium	are	separated	from	the	rest	of	 the	 fission	
products	using	a	series	of	chemical	processes	(Doyle,	2008b).	 	This	enables	the	
recovery	 of	 specific	 isotopes	 of	 plutonium	 and	 uranium,	 useful	 for	 fabricating	
new	fuel,	but	also	for	acquiring	the	proper	isotopic	ratios	necessary	for	creating	
the	core	of	a	nuclear	weapon.			
By	1962,	the	main	process	building	of	the	reprocessing	plant	was	almost	
finished,	along	with	much	of	 the	support	 infrastructure	 (Department	of	Atomic	
Energy,	 1964,	 pp.	 3–4,	 8).	 	 That	 same	 year,	 the	 Department	 of	 Atomic	 Energy	
(DAE)	opens	a	tender	for	a	nuclear	power	plant	to	be	built	at	Tarapur,	selecting	
General	Electric’s	proposal	for	two	turnkey	boiling	water	reactors	(BWR)	with	a	
total	 power	 rating	 of	 380	 MWe	 (Department	 of	 Atomic	 Energy,	 1964,	 p.	 11).		
Shortly	 thereafter,	 the	DAE	decided	 to	pursue	a	 second	power	station	near	 the	
Rana	Prata	Sagar	dam	in	the	state	of	Rajasthan.	 	This	reactor	would	be	built	by	
Indian	 technicians	 using	 plans	 and	 specifications	 obtained	 from	 the	 Canadians	
(Department	of	Atomic	Energy,	1964,	p.	12).			
	 During	 the	 1960s,	 India	 pursued	 a	 relatively	 aggressive	 program	 of	
acquiring	nuclear	technology,	yet	these	activities	cannot	be	attributed	to	a	clear	
desire	for	a	nuclear	explosive.		In	1965,	probably	influenced	by	the	1964	Chinese	
nuclear	 test,	Bhabha	pressured	Nehru’s	 successor	Lal	Bahadur	Shastri	 to	allow	
the	undertaking	of	a	study	of	the	theoretical	and	technical	feasibility	of	a	peaceful	
nuclear	 explosive	 (PNE),	 a	 request	 which	 Shastri	 reluctantly	 granted.	 	 Yet	 PM	
Shastri	 forbade	the	AEC	 from	contacting	and	collaborating	with	the	Ministry	of	
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Defense	laboratories	which	would	be	responsible	for	the	research	and	design	of	
such	a	device	(Hymans,	2006,	p.	179).			
	In	 1966	Dr.	 Bhabha	was	 killed	 in	 a	 plane	 crash	 on	Mount	Blanc	 on	 the	
way	 to	 join	a	meeting	of	 the	Scientific	Advisory	Committee	of	 the	 IAEA.	 	Prime	
Minister	Indira	Gandhi	renamed	the	AEET	as	the	Bhabha	Atomic	Research	Centre	
in	his	honor	in1967.		After	Bhabha’s	death,	PM	Indira	Gandhi	appointed	Vikram	
Sarabhai	 as	 his	 replacement,	 and	 as	 one	 of	 his	 first	 acts	 as	 director,	 Sarabhai	
ordered	the	confiscation	of	documents	and	the	cessation	of	activities	related	to	
the	 PNE	 project	 (Perkovich,	 1999,	 p.	 122).	 	 As	 an	 adherent	 of	 the	 pacifist	 Jain	
faith,	 Sarabhai	 was	 known	 for	 his	 opposition	 of	 the	 development	 of	 a	 nuclear	
weapon	 and	worked	 to	 prevent	 the	work	 from	 progressing	 (Hymans,	 2006,	 p.	
179).	
At	 the	same	time,	 India	vociferously	defended	 its	right	 to	access	nuclear	
technology	in	the	international	arena,	most	notably	in	the	negotiations	leading	to	
the	 development	 of	 the	 Non	 Proliferation	 Treaty	 in	 1968.	 	 Indian	 concerns	
regarding	 assurances	 of	 disarmament	 were	 not	 incorporated,	 and	 parliament	
vehemently	vetoed	Indian	signature	of	 the	 treaty	quickly	 thereafter	on	12	 June	
1968	 	(Perkovich,	1999,	p.	125).	 	 Indian	efforts	 to	achieve	 independence	 in	the	
area	of	nuclear	technology	continued	through	the	opening	of	a	new	uranium	mill	
at	 Jaduguda,	 in	Bihar	state,	 that	 same	year	 (Perkovich,	1999,	p.	125).	 	 In	1970,	
PM	India	Gandhi	dedicated	the	Tarapur	Atomic	Power	Station	to	the	nation.	The	
380	MWe	BWR	facility	at	Tarapur	was	India’s	first	commercial	power	plant,	the	
result	of	the	agreement	with	GE	for	a	pair	of	turnkey	reactors	(NTI,	2010).		
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In	1971,	the	escalation	of	the	civil	war	between	East	and	West	Pakistan	in	
the	eastern	territory	of	modern‐day	Bangladesh	 led	to	a	series	of	events	which	
changed	the	calculus	of	the	policymakers	who	until	then	had	been	opposed	to	the	
active	pursuit	of	a	PNE.		By	December	1971,	India	had	intervened	in	the	conflict	
and	 routed	 the	 Pakistani	 Army.	 	 The	 Nixon	 administration,	 watching	
developments	in	East	Pakistan	with	alarm,	dispatched	the	USS	Enterprise	carrier	
battle	group	to	the	Bay	of	Bengal	in	a	“tilt”	to	support	Pakistan	(Hymans,	2006,	p.	
180).	 	 In	 reaction	 to	 the	 humiliating	 defeat,	 Pakistani	 President	 Zulfiqar	 Ali	
Bhutto	summoned	key	figures	in	the	national	science	community	to	a	meeting	in	
the	 city	 of	 Multan	 in	 1972.	 	 There	 he	 issued	 the	 call	 to	 jumpstart	 a	 Pakistani	
effort	to	acquire	a	nuclear	weapon.		Informed	of	this	meeting	and	troubled	by	the	
American	 interference	 in	 the	conflict	and	perceived	support	of	Pakistan,	 Indira	
Gandhi	gave	the	go‐ahead	for	an	Indian	push	for	a	PNE	(Perkovich,	1999).		Work	
on	 all	 the	 systems	 necessary	 for	 a	 successful	 detonation	 intensified	 with	 her	
approval,	 and	 two	 years	 later	 on	 18	 May	 1974,	 India	 conducted	 “Smiling	
Buddha”,	the	test	of	the	PNE,	in	the	Pokhran	desert	(Abraham,	1998).	
International	reaction	was	swift—a	mere	 four	days	after	the	detonation,	
Canada	 announced	 a	 freeze	 of	 all	 nuclear	 assistance	 to	 India	 for	 the	 CANDU	
reactors	 in	Rajasthan	and	the	Kota	heavy	water	production	 facility	which	were	
under	construction	at	the	time.	 	The	plutonium	used	in	the	device	detonated	at	
Pokhran	was	produced	in	the	Canadian‐supplied	CIRUS	facility	(NTI,	2010).		The	
US	and	UK	also	 issue	strong	condemnations	of	 the	 test	and	 the	continuation	of	
nuclear	cooperation	with	these	countries	was	thrown	into	doubt.	
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	 Due	 to	 the	 sanctions	 and	 doubts	 caused	 by	 the	 1974	 test,	 the	 Indian	
nuclear	program	witnessed	a	slow‐down	in	the	following	decade.	 	The	reactors	
at	 Tarapur,	 for	 example,	 were	 forced	 to	 operate	 at	 limited	 power	 levels	 to	
conserve	 fuel	 in	 light	 of	 US	 refusal	 to	 honor	 the	 long‐term	 contracts	 for	 fuel	
supply	 signed	 before	 the	 test	 (NTI,	 2010).	 	 This	 experience	 encouraged	 the	
pursuit	 of	 the	 natural	 uranium	 and	 thorium	 fuel	 cycles,	 as	 well	 as	 indigenous	
production	of	the	necessary	heavy	water	moderator.			
In	 1977,	 the	 AEC	 began	 work	 on	 the	 Dhruva	 research	 reactor	 at	 the	
Trombay	 complex.	 	 Completed	 in	 1985,	 the	 Dhruva	 Research	 Reactor	 is	 an	
indigenously‐designed	 and	 built	 version	 of	 the	 CIRUS	 reactor,	 designed	 to	
produce	 plutonium	 from	 natural	 uranium	 using	 a	 heavy	 water	 modifier	 and	
coolant	 (NTI,	 2013d).	 	The	 reactor’s	unique	design	allows	 for	 the	 extraction	of	
specific	 isotopes	 of	 plutonium	 after	 specific	 irradiation	 times.	 	 This	 enables	
operators	 to	 achieve	 specific	 isotopic	 ratios,	 an	 important	 point	 in	 producing	
weapons‐grade	plutonium	(Doyle,	2008b).					
	 Despite	all	the	attention	that	the	1974	PNE	detonation	garnered	from	the	
international	community,	 India	could	not	 immediately	be	categorized	as	a	state	
that	was	ready	to	deploy	nuclear	weapons.		In	fact,	Itty	Abraham	estimates	that	it	
was	not	until	around	1986	that	India	could	be	classified	as	a	“nuclear	weapons‐
capable	state”	(2009).			
Even	 after	 the	 heightened	 tensions	 of	 the	 Brasstacks	 crisis,	 Indian	
policymakers	continued	their	calls	for	disarmament	into	the	1990s.		In	fact	it	was	
Prime	Minister	Rajiv	Gandhi	(son	of	Indira	Gandhi)	who	introduced	the	proposal	
of	an	“Action	Plan	for	a	Nuclear‐Weapons‐Free	and	Non‐Violent	World	Order”	to	
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the	UN	General	assembly	in	1988.		Stage	one	of	this	action	plan	was	a	50%	cut	in	
the	 arsenals	 of	 the	 USSR	 and	 US,	 a	 moratorium	 on	 the	 production	 of	 new	
weapons	 and	 weapons‐grade	 fissile	 material,	 and	 a	 ban	 on	 testing	 of	 nuclear	
weapons	 (United	 Nations,	 1988,	 p.	 16).	 	 This	 ban	 reopened	 international	
dialogue	on	a	future	Comprehensive	Test	Ban	Treaty	(CTBT),	and	in	1993	India	
and	the	US	cosponsored	the	UN	resolution	calling	for	the	CTBT	(Hymans,	2006,	p.	
193).	
	 Yet	with	 the	 fall	 of	 the	 Iron	 Curtain,	 negotiations	 on	 the	 CTBT	not	 only	
progressed	more	 quickly	 than	 Indian	 leaders	 assumed,	 but	 also	 advanced	 in	 a	
direction	that	Indian	policymakers	perceived	would	retain	the	pre‐treaty	status	
quo.	 	 Indian	 elites	 desired	 a	 greater	 emphasis	 placed	 on	 the	 disarmament	
responsibility	 of	 the	 nuclear	 powers	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 concessions	 of	
sovereignty	 made	 by	 non	 nuclear	 weapons	 states.	 	 Additionally,	 a	 lobbying	
campaign	by	 the	BJP	and	 its	partners	 in	 the	Lok	Sabha	successfully	 labeled	 the	
negotiations	of	both	the	CTBT	and	the	renewal	of	the	NPT	(set	to	expire	in	1995)	
as	 a	 continuation	 of	 “nuclear	 apartheid,”	 a	 stance	which	was	 confirmed	 in	 the	
minds	of	Indian	policymakers	and	the	public	through	heavy‐handed	US	demands	
for	a	complete	Indian	about‐face	in	its	nuclear	policy.					
Given	the	uncertain	 future	of	 India’s	relationship	with	the	NPT,	 in	1995,	
Prime	Minister	Narasimha	Rao’s	government	was	caught	contemplating	a	series	
of	 nuclear	 tests	 by	 American	 intelligence,	 and	was	 dissuaded	 from	 conducting	
tests	by	the	resulting	US	diplomatic	pressure.		Hymans	(2006)	interprets	this	not	
as	a	sign	of	the	“inevitability”	of	Indian	nuclear	tests,	but	rather	a	continuation	of	
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the	 status‐quo	 policy	 of	 nuclear	 ambiguity.	 	 Yet	 the	 1996	 Lok	 Sabha	 elections	
were	to	change	the	mix	and	bring	the	BJP	to	the	decisionmaking	forefront.			
When	the	election	results	were	tallied,	the	BJP	had	emerged	on	top,	with	
186	seats,	yet	needed	to	obtain	a	majority	of	at	least	273	seats	in	order	to	form	a	
coalition	 government.	 	 After	 being	 sworn	 in	 as	 prime	 minister,	 Atal	 Behari	
Vajpayee	was	given	15	days	to	gather	a	majority.		Almost	immediately,	Vajpayee	
visited	R.	Chidambaram,	head	of	 the	AEC,	and	A.	P.	 J.	Abdul	Kalam,	head	of	 the	
DRDO	(Hymans,	2006,	p.	196),	giving	 them	the	go‐ahead	 to	begin	preparations	
for	 a	 nuclear	 test	 at	 Pokhran.	 	 Perkovich	 notes	 that	 although	 American	
intelligence	detected	 the	 test	 preparations,	 they	 failed	 to	detect	 just	 how	 close	
India	 really	 was	 to	 a	 nuclear	 detonation—one	 nuclear	 device	 was	 actually	
lowered	into	position	in	a	test	shaft	(1999,	p.	374).	 	Vajpayee	wisely	decided	to	
wait	for	the	vote	of	confidence	before	calling	the	shot.		Eleven	days	later,	the	BJP	
lost	 the	 vote	 of	 confidence	 and	 a	 new	 governing	 coalition	 led	 by	 H.	 D.	 Deve	
Gowda	formed	in	its	place	(Perkovich,	1999).			
	 The	BJP	received	another	chance	in	1998,	and	this	time	was	successful	in	
forming	a	ruling	coalition	under	Vajpayee’s	 leadership	on	19	March	1998.	 	The	
very	next	day,	Vajpayee	visited	Chidambaram	and	Kalam	and	instructed	them	to	
prepare	 for	 a	 test.	 	 On	 6	 April,	 Pakistan	 tested	 a	 Ghauri	 missile,	 capable	 of	
delivering	a	nuclear	payload	to	India’s	major	metropolitan	areas	(Hymans,	2006,	
p.	 196).	 	 Two	 days	 later,	 Vajpayee	 instructed	 Chidambaram	 and	 Kalam	 to	 go	
ahead	with	the	test	(Hymans,	2006,	pp.	196–7).		After	30	days	of	preparations,	on	
11	May	 India	 conducted	 three	 simultaneous	underground	 tests	 at	 the	Pokhran	
site—one	fission	device,	one	thermonuclear	device,	and	a	low‐yield	experimental	
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device	 (Hymans,	2006).	 	Two	days	 later,	 two	more	 tests	were	 conducted,	both	
sub‐kiloton	experimental	devices.		India	had	officially	entered	the	“nuclear	club.”			
Conclusion	
Overall,	 Indian	 foreign	 policy	 has	 been	 characterized	 by	 multilateral	
involvement	at	the	international	level,	while	at	the	regional	level	experiencing	a	
significant	 uptick	 in	 hostility	 during	 the	 1960s.	 	 Guided	 by	 Nehru’s	 normative	
discourse,	India	has	traditionally	been	very	vocal	on	the	international	scene.		At	
the	 regional	 level,	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 1962	 border	 war	 had	 important	
implications	both	for	Indian	strategic	doctrine	and	bilateral	relations	with	China,	
Pakistan,	and	the	USSR	which	have	shaped	the	trajectory	of	India’s	foreign	policy	
ever	since.			
	
5.3.	 Indian	Nuclear	Policy:	Material	Inputs	
	 In	this	section	the	material	 inputs	of	 India’s	nuclear	role	conception	will	
be	 investigated	in	depth.	 	First	the	acquisition	of	key	fuel	cycle	 facilities	will	be	
discussed,	 followed	by	an	analysis	of	India’s	security	environment.	 	Specifically,	
the	shaping	events	of	 the	1960s	and	the	Brasstacks	Crisis	of	 the	 late	1980s	are	
covered	in	detail.			
Technical	Capabilities	
This	 section	 details	 the	 acquisition	 of	 key	 fuel	 cycle	 facilities	 by	 India,	
which	are	summarized	in	Table	7	below:	
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Table	7:	Key	Indian	Fuel	Cycle	Facilities	
Technical	Capability	 Facility	Details	 Year	
Source	of	Fissile	Material	 Jaduguda	Uranium	Mine,	Bihar	State 1968	
	
Operating	Research	
Reactor		
Apsara	(pool	type,	1MW)
BARC,	Trombay		 1956	
CIRUS	(natural	uranium,	40	MW)
BARC,	Trombay 1960	
Conversion	Facility		 Uranium	conversion	and	fuel	fabrication	facility,	BARC	Trombay 1970s	
Heavy	Water		
Production	Facility	
Nangal:	small	scale 1962	
Enrichment	Capability		 Pilot	ultracentrifuge	plantBARC,	Trombay 1985	
Reprocessing	Capability	 Phoenix	Facility	(PUREX	method)BARC,	Trombay 															1964	
Domestic	Source	of	Fissile	Material:		
	 Interest	 in	 uranium	 mining	 in	 India	 was	 high	 immediately	 after	
independence—in	 1948	 the	 Atomic	 Energy	 Commission	 established	 the	 Rare	
Metal	Survey	Unit	to	survey	the	country	for	uranium	reserves	(Gupta	&	Sarangi,	
2005).	 	 Uranium	 ore	 was	 first	 discovered	 in	 India	 in	 1951	 at	 Jaduguda	 in	
Jharkhand	State,	and	India’s	 first	commercial	uranium	mine	was	commissioned	
there	 in	 1968	 (Gupta,	 2009).	 	 Still,	 India	 has	 very	 small	 domestic	 reserves	 of	
uranium	 and	 has	 struggled	 to	 produce	 enough	 fuel	 for	 its	 domestic	 power	
program	over	the	years.			
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Operating	Research	Reactor	
	 Apsara,	 located	 at	 the	Bhabha	Atomic	Research	Centre,	was	 India’s	 first	
research	reactor	and	first	went	critical	 in	August	1956	(NTI,	2013a).	 	Designed	
by	Indian	scientists	with	assistance	from	the	UK,	Apsara	was	initially	fuelled	with	
HEU	 supplied	 by	 the	UK	 as	well	 (NTI,	 2013a).	 	 Apsara	was	 the	 first	 operating	
reactor	 in	 the	whole	 continent	 of	 Asia,	marking	 just	 how	 advanced	 the	 Indian	
program	was	 from	an	early	stage	 (NTI,	2010).	 	 India’s	 second	research	reactor	
was	 the	 aforementioned	 CIRUS	 reactor,	which	went	 critical	 in	 July	 1960	 (NTI,	
2013c).		The	large	40	MWt	reactor	burns	natural	uranium	fuel	and	therefore	uses	
a	heavy	water	moderator	and	can	be	refueled	online	(without	shutdown).	 	This	
reactor	was	not	safeguarded	by	the	IAEA	and	capable	of	producing	9‐10	kg/	year	
of	plutonium	suitable	 for	weapons.	 	The	CIRUS	reactor	provided	the	plutonium	
used	in	the	“Smiling	Buddha”	test	of	1974	(NTI,	2013c).	
	
Conversion	Facility	
Uranium	 conversion	 is	 defined	 as	 the	 process	 by	which	 uranium	 ore	 is	
chemically	 converted	 into	 UF6	 gas	 in	 preparation	 for	 introduction	 to	 the	
enrichment	 plant	 (Lamarsh	 &	 Baratta,	 1997).	 	 Indian	 scientists	 mastered	 this	
technique	 sometime	 in	 the	 1970s	 (NTI,	 2010),	 and	 it	 is	 now	 employed	 in	 the	
Rattehali	Enrichment	Facility	built	in	the	late	1980s	(NTI,	2012b).				
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Reprocessing	Capability	
Reprocessing	 capability	 is	defined	 in	 the	model	 as	 the	ability	 to	 recover	
fissile	 material	 from	 spent	 nuclear	 fuel	 (Duderstadt	 &	 Hamilton,	 1976).		
Construction	on	India’s	first	reprocessing	facility	started	in	1961	and	the	facility	
at	BARC	in	Trombay	was	processing	spent	fuel	from	the	CIRUS	reactor	as	early	as	
1964	(NTI,	2012a).		This	facility	most	likely	extracted	the	plutonium	used	in	the	
1974	tests,	with	estimates	claiming	around	400	kg	being	extracted	by	1997	(NTI,	
2012a).			
	
Heavy	Water	Production	
	 Because	 Indian	 scientists	 chose	 to	 pursue	 a	 natural	 uranium‐based	 fuel	
cycle,	India	also	has	pursued	heavy	water	production	technology.		Heavy	water	is	
needed	 to	moderate	 reactors	 using	 natural	 uranium	 as	 fuel.	 	 Natural	 uranium	
contains	mostly	U238,	a	fertile	isotope	of	uranium	which	becomes	Pu239	with	the	
absorption	of	a	neutron	(Duderstadt	&	Hamilton,	1976).	 	For	this	reason,	heavy	
water	 production	 technology	 is	 safeguarded	 and	 controlled	 by	 the	
nonproliferation	regime,	as	a	 reactor	operated	using	heavy	water	can	easily	be	
used	to	produce	plutonium	for	bombs	(Doyle,	2008b).	 	India’s	first	heavy	water	
production	facility	was	built	at	Nangal	in	1962	and	was	bought	from	the	German	
company	Linde	(NTI,	2013e).		Using	outdated	1940s	technology,	the	Nangal	plant	
produced	 enough	 water	 to	 keep	 the	 CIRUS	 reactor	 running	 as	 well	 as	
augmenting	 the	 supplies	 for	 the	 other	 plutonium	 production	 reactors	 (NTI,	
2013e).		Today,	India	is	the	world’s	second	largest	producer	of	heavy	water,	with	
151	
	
eight	 known	 industrial	 sized	 facilities	 currently	 operating	 in	 the	 country	 (NTI,	
2014b).				
	
Enrichment	Capability	
	 Essential	to	the	production	of	enriched	uranium	nuclear	fuel,	enrichment	
capability	 is	 defined	 as	 any	 facility	which	 increases	 the	 isotopic	 percentage	 of	
uranium‐235,	 allowing	 the	 fuel	 to	 be	 used	 in	 a	 sustainable	 chain	 reaction	
(Duderstadt	&	Hamilton,	1976).		India’s	first	uranium	enrichment	plant	was	built	
BARC	in	Trombay	as	a	pilot	cascade	of	gas	centrifuges	(NTI,	2013f).	 	Opened	in	
1985,	 this	 facility	 has	 been	 enlarged	 as	 India’s	 ultracentrifuge	 program	 has	
become	more	advanced	(NTI,	2013f).			
	
5.4.	 Security	Environment	
In	 this	 section,	 policymakers’	 perceptions	 of	 the	 Indian	 security	
environment	 are	 discussed.	 	 Specifically,	 three	 crucial	 points	 from	 the	 overall	
nuclear	timeline	are	examined:	first,	the	crucial	decade	of	the	1960s,	dominated	
with	the	war	with	China,	second,	 the	Brasstacks	crisis	with	Pakistan	of	 the	 late	
1980s.			
	
Developments	in	the	1960s	
	 India	 experienced	 a	 dramatic	 turn	 for	 the	 worse	 in	 its	 security	
environment	 in	 the	 1960s.	 	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 afore‐mentioned	 1962	 Indo‐
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Chinese	war,	China	detonated	 its	 first	nuclear	 test	 in	1964	and	 India	 fought	 its	
second	war	with	Pakistan	in	1965.		Finally,	the	signing	of	the	NPT	in	1968	by	the	
major	 powers	 and	 subsequent	 Indian	 rejection	 of	 the	 treaty	 left	 India	 on	 the	
outside	of	the	growing	nonproliferation	regime.				
	 For	 most	 of	 the	 1950s,	 relations	 between	 India	 and	 China	 were	 quite	
warm.		Nehru’s	vision	for	Indian	non‐alignment	drew	the	two	states	together,	a	
friendship	which	 continued	 until	 the	 Chinese	 invasion	 of	 Tibet	 in	 1959.	 	 India	
welcomed	 the	 Dalai	 Lama	 and	 thousands	 other	 asylum‐seekers	 fleeing	 the	
fighting,	adding	a	significant	strain	to	the	relationship	between	the	two	countries	
(Metcalf	&	Metcalf,	 2006,	 p.	 247).	 	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 China	 began	 establishing	
‘facts	 on	 the	 ground’	 by	 stationing	 troops	 along	 the	 two	 country’s	 disputed	
border.	 	When	Nehru	dispatched	 Indian	Army	divisions	 to	put	pressure	on	 the	
Chinese	positions,	 they	were	repelled	swiftly	and	the	Chinese	forces	descended	
all	 the	 way	 to	 the	 Assam	 Plains	 before	 unilaterally	 calling	 a	 cease‐fire	 and	
withdrawing	back	to	the	Aksai	Chin	plateau	(Metcalf	&	Metcalf,	2006,	p.	248).			
The	Indo‐Chinese	War	of	1962,	while	short,	had	a	disproportionate	effect	
on	the	mindset	of	Indian	policymakers.	 	Before	the	war,	PM	Nehru	had	insisted	
that	India	would	not	make	itself	slave	to	colonialist	weapons	dealers	or	enter	the	
bloc	 system	on	 the	side	of	one	of	 the	 two	superpowers.	 	The	 Indian	Army	was	
equipped	 with	 virtually	 the	 same	 hardware	 that	 it	 had	 inherited	 at	
Independence,	 and	 this	 weakness	 was	 exposed	 in	 the	 war	 with	 the	 Chinese.		
Having	put	so	much	faith	in	an	Indo‐Chinese	partnership,	PM	Nehru	was	shocked	
at	 how	 quickly	 the	 Chinese	 reverted	 to	 power	 politics	 even	 after	 the	 friendly	
overtures	of	the	previous	decade	(SarDesai,	2008).			
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In	 1964,	 Indian	 fears	 were	 compounded	 by	 the	 news	 that	 China	 had	
entered	the	nuclear	club	with	its	first	nuclear	test.	 	Hymans	lists	two	important	
policy	 implications	 of	 the	 test:	 a	 quest	 for	 a	 nuclear	 guarantee	 from	 the	 great	
powers,	 and	 an	 authorization	 of	 an	 AEC	 study	 on	 constructing	 a	 nuclear	
explosive	 (2006,	 p.	 178).	 	 The	 proposed	 guarantee	 was	 a	 product	 of	 non‐
alignment:	it	was	to	be	a	UN	declaration	made	by	the	US,	USSR,	and	UK	to	protect	
all	non‐nuclear	states	from	a	nuclear	attack	(Hymans,	2006).		In	the	end,	India’s	
leaders’	commitment	to	 their	non‐aligned	status	won	out	over	 their	perception	
of	 the	 threat	 from	 the	new	Chinese	 bomb,	 and	 they	did	 not	move	 to	 leave	 the	
state	of	“nuclear	ambiguity”	during	this	period.			
Next	 in	 the	 tumultuous	 decade	 was	 war	 between	 India	 and	 Pakistan	
again,	this	time	in	1965.		Overt	hostilities	began	with	Pakistan	deploying	special	
forces	into	the	Indian‐controlled	Kashmir	valley	in	the	hopes	of	sparking	a	local	
insurgency.	 	 Responding	 to	 this	 incursion,	 Indian	 forces	 drove	 the	 Pakistanis	
back	 and	 added	 to	 their	 holdings	 of	 Kashmiri	 territory.	 	 The	 Pakistani	 Army	
launched	a	counter‐offensive	from	the	south	in	an	attempt	to	cut	Indian	forces	in	
Kashmir	 off	 from	 their	 thin	 supply	 lines	 connecting	 them	with	 the	 rest	 of	 the	
country	(Perkovich,	1999,	pp.	108–109).		The	Indian	Army	counter‐attacked	with	
an	armored	push	towards	Lahore,	which	ended	up	establishing	a	front	about	15	
miles	 into	 Pakistani	 territory	 (Perkovich,	 1999,	 p.	 109).	 	 After	 a	 UN‐brokered	
ceasefire,	 the	 conflict	 ended	 after	 a	month	 and	 a	 half	 of	 intense	 fighting.	 	 The	
peace	treaty	officially	ending	hostilities	was	negotiated	by	the	Soviets	and	signed	
in	 Tashkent,	without	 addressing	 the	 status	 of	 Jammu	 and	Kashmir	 (Perkovich,	
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1999,	p.	110).	 	The	1965	war	was	seen	as	a	victory	 in	 India,	 especially	 coming	
after	the	embarrassing	defeat	to	China	in	1962.		
One	of	 the	main	 changes	 to	 Indian	 security	doctrine	after	 the	1965	war	
was	a	shift	 in	 its	overall	defense	posture.	 	Before	1965,	 Indian	strategists	were	
focused	on	possessing	“matching	capabilities”	with	respect	to	Pakistan,	but	after	
the	experience	of	1965,	this	shifted	to	a	policy	focused	on	maintaining	“sufficient	
deterrence”	 in	 its	deployed	 forces	 (Paul,	2005,	p.	13).	 	This	has	meant	 that	 the	
continuing	 conflict	 over	 Kashmir	 has	 been	 increasingly	 characterized	 by	
asymmetric	warfare,	with	 Pakistan	 employing	 insurgents	 and	 occupying	 easily	
defensible	 positions	 against	 a	 numerically	 superior	 Indian	 force.	 	 Still,	 from	 a	
technical	perspective,	 India	had	not	yet	amassed	enough	plutonium	to	create	a	
test	device—while	 the	debate	continued	in	parliament,	 the	scientists	continued	
at	their	pre‐war	pace	(Perkovich,	1999,	p.	112).			
The	 1960s	 was	 a	 tumultuous	 decade	 with	 many	 changes	 in	 India’s	
security	environment.		Entering	the	decade,	India	was	a	vocal	leader	of	the	non‐
aligned	 movement,	 portraying	 itself	 as	 a	 model	 for	 other	 newly‐decolonized	
states.		Nehru	had	worked	hard	in	the	1950s	to	introduce	China	to	the	world	and	
had	envisioned	China	and	India	partnering	together	to	foster	cooperation	in	Asia.		
The	1962	Chinese‐Indian	war	shocked	Nehru	and	proved	to	be	the	end	of	these	
aspirations	for	Indian	foreign	policy.		Not	only	were	relations	with	China	frozen	
for	 decades,	 but	 Indian	 credibility	 in	 Asia	 and	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 the	 non	 aligned	
moment	was	 severely	 damaged—no	 one	 likes	 to	 follow	 a	 loser,	 especially	 one	
which	was	defeated	in	such	total	fashion	as	India	was.			
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The	war	also	had	significant	effects	on	Indian	strategic	doctrine—Indian	
policymakers	 embarked	 on	 modernization	 efforts	 for	 the	 military	 and	
approached	the	region	with	a	“never	again”	mindset	which	has	continued	to	this	
day.	 	As	a	result	of	 these	preparations,	 the	1965	war	with	Pakistan	went	much	
better	by	comparison.	 	That	conflict	showed	how	a	numerically‐superior	Indian	
force	 could	 be	 challenged	 by	 the	 Pakistani	 army	 utilizing	 American	weaponry	
and	training.		American	provision	of	military	aid	to	Pakistan	before	the	war	was	
interpreted	as	a	denial	of	Indian	regional	leadership.		Overall,	the	experiences	of	
the	 1960s	 led	 the	 Indian	 establishment	 to	 engage	 in	 a	 re‐envisioning	 of	 its	
security	environment	
Brasstacks	Crisis,	1986‐1987	
In	1986,	the	year‐long	Brasstacks	crisis	with	Pakistan	was	instrumental	in	
convincing	 Indian	 policymakers	 to	 take	 the	 steps	 necessary	 to	 make	
weaponization	of	the	existing	technology	an	easy	task	should	the	need	arise.		The	
security	dilemma	which	arose	from	the	Indian	Army’s	massive	exercises	near	the	
Pakistani	 border	 (codenamed	 Operation	 Brasstacks)	 ushered	 in	 a	 new	 era	 of	
tensions	 between	 the	 two	 countries	 and	 had	 important	 implications	 for	 the	
nuclear	programs	of	both	states.	 	At	 the	end	of	1986,	 India	decided	 to	conduct	
massive	 military	 exercises	 in	 the	 Rajasthan	 Desert	 near	 the	 Pakistani	 border,	
resulting	in	a	tense	standoff	with	hundreds	of	thousands	of	troops	on	high	alert.		
It	took	several	months	of	intense	diplomatic	efforts	to	diffuse	the	crisis.			
The	 Brasstacks	 crisis	 emerged	 through	 a	 series	 of	 communication	
breakdowns,	both	between	Indian	and	Pakistani	officials,	and	between	domestic	
agencies	on	 the	 Indian	side	as	well.	 	Pakistani	officials	were	not	kept	 informed	
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enough	of	the	Indian	military’s	exercises	to	be	executed	dangerously	close	to	the	
border.	 	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 Pakistani	 military	 was	 performing	 its	 own	
previously‐scheduled	exercises	in	Sindh	province	on	the	other	side	of	the	border	
(Frey,	 2006,	 p.	 97).	 	 Previous	 military	 exercises	 had	 raised	 tensions,	 but	
Operation	 Brasstacks	 was	 different	 because	 of	 the	 sheer	 size	 of	 the	 Indian	
deployment.	 	 Brasstacks	 was	 the	 largest	 military	 exercise	 in	 South	 Asia	 post‐
independence,	 and	 rivaled	 multi‐national	 NATO	 exercises	 in	 terms	 of	 scale	
(Bajpai,	 Chari,	 Cheema,	 Cohen,	 &	 Ganguly,	 1995,	 p.	 3).	 	 Most	 worrisome	 to	
Pakistan	was	 the	 Indian	military’s	 dumping	 of	 large	 quantity	 ammunition	 and	
fuel	in	advanced	positions	and	the	involvement	of	the	Indian	Air	Force,	with	the	
activation	 of	 forward	 airbases	 and	 air	 defense	 systems	 near	 the	 border.		
According	 to	 Pakistani	 estimates,	 the	 exercise	 involved	 over	 a	 quarter	 of	 a	
million	troops	and	1300	tanks,	and	cost	over	a	quarter	of	a	billion	dollars	(Bajpai	
et	al.,	1995,	p.	30).			
The	 crisis	 began	on	18	 January	1987,	with	 the	 Indian	 announcement	 of	
“dangerous”	Pakistani	 troop	maneuvers	 in	 response	 to	 the	 Indian	mobilization	
on	 the	border	 (Bajpai	et	al.,	1995,	p.	33).	 	Thus	 the	publics	on	both	sides	were	
notified	of	just	how	close	to	war	their	two	countries	actually	were.		It	took	until	
23	 January	 for	a	hotline	 to	be	established	between	the	 two	military	commands	
(Bajpai	et	al.,	1995,	p.	34).	 	After	a	series	of	conciliatory	gestures	on	both	sides,	
both	 sides	 agreed	 to	 diplomatic	 talks	 to	 diffuse	 the	 tensions	 on	 25	 January	
(Bajpai	 et	 al.,	 1995,	 p.	 35).	 	 One	 such	 gesture	was	 the	 introduction	 of	 “cricket	
diplomacy”	to	the	Subcontinent—President	Zia	was	invited	by	the	Indian	Cricket	
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Board	 of	 Control	 to	 watch	 the	 India‐Pakistan	 cricket	 match	 in	 Jaipur,	 a	 move	
which	is	cited	with	reducing	the	tensions	further	(Bajpai	et	al.,	1995).	
	 Information	 on	 how	 the	 Brasstacks	 crisis	 affected	 this	 stage	 of	 India’s	
nuclear	program’s	development	is	sketchy	at	best.		Hymans	concludes	that	Rajiv	
Gandhi	 gave	 secret	 approval	 for	 “weaponization”	 sometime	between	1988	and	
1989	 (2006,	 p.	 190),	 yet	 exactly	 how	 this	 decision	 differed	 from	 the	 low‐level	
preparations	 already	 underway	 in	 the	 scientific	 community	 is	 unclear.	 	 Still,	
Brasstacks	 introduced	 a	 more	 serious	 nuclear	 tone	 to	 the	 tensions	 in	 the	
Subcontinent.	 	 In	 an	 interview	 conducted	 with	 an	 Indian	 journalist	 on	 28	
January,	 in	 the	midst	 of	 the	 crisis,	 Pakistani	 nuclear	 chief	 A.	 Q.	 Khan	 issued	 a	
statement	widely	interpreted	as	a	threat.		Khan	stated	that	Pakistan	had	achieved	
weapons‐grade	uranium	enrichment	and	was	capable	of	testing	an	atomic	bomb	
in	laboratory	simulations:	“Nobody	can	undo	Pakistan	or	take	us	for	granted.		We	
are	here	to	stay	and	let	it	be	clear	that	we	shall	use	the	bomb	if	our	existence	is	
threatened”	(Bajpai	et	al.,	1995,	p.	39).		By	the	time	the	interview	was	published,	
the	crisis	had	passed,	but	the	spectre	of	the	nuclear	threat	remained	(Perkovich,	
1999,	p.	281).			
	 Indian	 policymakers	 interpreted	 the	 rapid	 and	 strategically	 complex	
deployment	of	the	Pakistani	Army	in	response	to	the	Indian	maneuvers	as	a	sign	
of	how	weak	their	country	remained,	a	perception	encouraged	by	the	debacle	in	
Sri	 Lanka	 the	 same	 year	 (Frey,	 2006).	 	 Perkovich	 states	 how	 Indian	 PM	 Rajiv	
Gandhi	recognized	that	the	key	threat	to	Indian	security	still	was	conventional	in	
nature	 and	 necessitated	 a	 build‐up	 in	 conventional	 capabilities,	 not	 nuclear	
(1999,	 p.	 282).	 	 Additionally,	 Rajiv	 Gandhi’s	 government’s	 official	 policy	
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remained	that	the	Khan	announcement	did	not	mark	a	change	in	Pakistani	policy	
and	 that	 India	 had	 no	 aims	 to	 exercise	 its	 nuclear	 option	 (Perkovich,	 1999,	 p.	
282).	 	 Overall,	 the	 Brasstacks	 crisis	 showed	 the	 Indian	 security	 establishment	
how	 close	 their	 nation	 was	 to	 another	 confrontation	 with	 Pakistan,	 and	
instigated	 important	 reforms	 in	 decision‐making	 processes	 and	 institutions	
(Frey,	2006).		While	policymakers	perpetuated	the	policy	of	nuclear	ambiguity	in	
the	1960s	and	1970s,	the	debate	over	Brasstacks	and	its	relation	to	the	nuclear	
issue	 meant	 that	 the	 debate	 shifted	 from	 one	 of	 the	 philosophical	 and	 moral	
implications	 of	 weapons	 to	 a	 debate	 over	 the	 security	 threat	 and	weaponized	
nuclear	capability	as	a	part	of	it	(Frey,	2006).		This	debate	intensified	throughout	
the	1990s	until	the	tests	of	1998.			
	
5.4.	 Ideational	sources	of	Indian	role	conceptions	
This	section	contains	the	analysis	of	ideational	sources	of	Indian	nuclear	
policy.	 	 As	 has	 already	 stated,	 this	 study	 defines	 ideational	 sources	 of	 role	
conceptions	as	the	leaders’	perception	of	national	identity,	history,	and	domestic	
audience	 (Breuning,	2011).	 	These	 factors	will	be	 identified	 through	a	 two‐fold	
approach	 combining	 a	 survey	 of	 the	 foreign	 policy	 literature	 on	 India	 with	 a	
discourse	 analysis	 of	 key	 speeches	 of	 Indian	 leaders.	 	 I	 identify	 two	 distinct	
bodies	 of	 thought	 in	 India	 with	 relationship	 to	 the	 nuclear	 issue;	 one	 which	
scholars	have	labeled	as	Nehruvian	and	one	which	can	be	characterized	as	Hindu	
Nationalist.	 	 This	 dichotomy	 is	 identified	 by	 Sridharan	 and	 Varshney,	 who	
describe	 Indian	 national	 identity	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 three	 distinct	 themes	 of	
geography,	culture,	and	religion:	“These	three	themes	have	yielded	two	principal	
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attitudes	about	 India’s	national	 identity—the	secular	nationalist	and	 the	Hindu	
nationalist.	 The	 former	 combines	 geography	 and	 culture;	 the	 latter	 geography	
and	religion”	(Sridharan	&	Varshney,	2001,	pp.	225–6)	
These	two	perspectives	have	very	different	opinions	on	two	key	questions	
of	culture	and	history:	firstly,	what	does	it	mean	to	be	Indian,	and	secondly,	what	
does	the	trajectory	of	Indian	history	look	like?		Indian	policymakers	draw	on	these	
concepts	both	in	order	to	connect	with	their	constituencies	and	to	explain	their	
nation	 to	 the	world.	Therefore,	 the	 importance	of	 the	 intended	audience	of	 the	
discourse	is	 important.	 	Each	perspective	on	Indian	identity	and	history	will	be	
explored,	 starting	 with	 the	 Nehruvian	 view	 and	 then	moving	 on	 to	 the	 Hindu	
Nationalist	view.			
	
Nehruvian	View	
Few	 have	 shaped	 the	modern	 face	 of	 India	more	 dramatically	 than	 the	
nation’s	forceful	first	prime	minister,	Jawaharlal	Nehru.		Born	into	a	Westernized	
and	wealthy	Kashmiri	 Bhraman	 family,	 Nehru	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	
struggle	for	India’s	independence	(Power,	1964).		He	was	jailed	eight	times	for	a	
total	 of	 nine	 years	 by	 the	 British	 colonial	 administration	 for	 participating	 in	
Gandhi’s	civil	disobedience	movement	(Gokhale,	2014,	p.	312).		Gandhi,	Nehru’s	
senior	 by	 almost	 20	 years,	 drew	 the	 inspiration	 for	 his	 philosophy	 and	
movement	solely	from	Indian	cultural	and	religious	sources.	 	While	adhering	to	
the	 Mahatma’s	 philosophy	 of	 Satyagraha,	 Nehru	 was	 keen	 to	 adopt	 Gandhi’s	
views	to	the	question	of	how	India	should	behave	 internationally.	 	Thus	he	 felt	
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comfortable	 also	 viewing	 India	 in	 light	 of	 the	 tradition	 of	 Western	 thought,	
including	Marxism.			
Nehru	was	enamored	by	the	“mighty	experiment”	of	Soviet	modernization	
efforts	 in	 the	 1930s.	 	 Yet	 he	 did	 not	 feel	 that	 Marxism	 was	 the	 solution	 to	
humanity’s	 problems	 because	 of	 its	 exclusively	 materialistic	 focus:	 “Life	 is	
something	more	than	economic	growth,	though	it	is	well	to	realize	that	economic	
growth	 is	 a	 basic	 foundation	 of	 growth	 and	progress”	 (Gokhale,	 2014,	 p.	 313).		
Still	 he	 was	 deeply	 distrustful	 of	 capitalism’s	 “law	 of	 the	 jungle”;	 under	 the	
British	 Raj	 he	 had	witnessed	 all	 too	 often	 the	 exploitation	 of	 the	weak	 by	 the	
powerful	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 material	 gain.	 	 Overall,	 Nehru’s	 admiration	 of	
Marxism	and	its	ability	to	explain	India’s	experience	of	colonial	exploitation	had	
a	deep	impact	on	both	his	domestic	and	foreign	policy.			
For	Nehru,	who	grew	up	in	a	multi‐ethnic,	multi‐religious	environment	in	
Kashmir,	 viewed	 Indian	 identity	as	an	over‐arching	 synthesis	of	 its	 constituent	
ethno‐religious	components.		The	Indian	people,	according	to	Nehru,	are	an	“odd	
mixture	of	many	races”	driven	by	a	desire	for	“synthesis	between	old	and	new”	
(Nehru,	1994).		He	saw	all	the	diverse	peoples	of	India—Muslim,	Hindu,	Jain,	or	
Christian—as	“distinctly	Indian”,	with	the	same	national	heritage	(Nehru,	1994).		
This	 view	 fueled	his	 concept	 of	 Indian	 secularism,	where	 a	 shared	history	 and	
geography	unite	an	incredibly	diverse	population.					
Nehru’s	understanding	of	what	India’s	shared	national	heritage	consisted	
of	 was	 shaped	 by	 his	 explorations	 of	 India’s	 rich	 past.	 	 A	 large	 section	 of	 his	
memoir,	 The	 Discovery	 of	 India,	 is	 devoted	 to	 tracing	 the	 trajectory	 of	 Indian	
history	from	the	Indus	Valley	Civilization	through	the	colonial	occupation.		Nehru	
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saw	the	trajectory	of	Indian	history	as	cyclical;	periods	of	glory	were	followed	by	
periods	of	stagnation.		These	periods	of	stagnation	corresponded	to	times	when	
India	 closed	 its	 mind	 to	 the	 outside	 world	 (Gokhale,	 2014,	 pp.	 321–22).		
According	 to	Nehru,	 India	 fell	 behind	 and	become	 a	 “slave	 country”	 because	 it	
lost	 its	 technical	and	developmental	parity	with	the	West	(Nehru,	1994).	 	 India	
should	 progress	 technologically	 so	 as	 not	 to	 remain	 weak,	 while	 retaining	 its	
independence	and	“self‐reliance”	in	relation	to	other	states.			
Nehru’s	 influence	 on	 Indian	 foreign	 policy	 as	 a	 whole	 cannot	 be	
understated.		The	principles	he	instilled	confidently	and	forcefully	on	the	newly‐
independent	 nation	 have	 left	 their	 mark—to	 this	 day	 Nehruvian	 themes	
dominate	the	Indian	foreign	policy	discourse.	 	Nehru	himself	clearly	spelled	out	
the	 goals	 of	 Indian	 foreign	 policy	 in	 a	 1949	 address	 at	 Columbia	 University:	
Indian	 foreign	 policy	 should	 merge	 “enlightened	 self‐interest”	 with	 a	 form	 of	
homegrown	idealism	(Nehru,	1949).		For	Nehru,	these	supported	India’s	rightful	
central	place	on	the	stage	of	world	affairs:	“India…cannot	play	a	secondary	part	
in	the	world.		No	middle	position	attracted	me”	(Nehru,	1994,	p.	56).	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 he	 stated	 his	 perception	 of	 the	 inevitability	 of	 Indian	
foreign	policy:		
I	have	not	originated	it.		It	is	a	policy	inherent	in	the	circumstances	
of	 India,	 inherent	 in	 the	 past	 thinking	 of	 India,	 inherent	 in	 the	
whole	 mental	 outlook	 of	 India,	 inherent	 in	 the	 condition	 of	 the	
Indian	 mind	 during	 the	 freedom	 struggle	 and	 inherent	 in	 the	
circumstances	of	the	world	today.		I	come	by	in	the	mere	accidental	
fact	 that	during	these	 few	years	 I	have	represented	that	policy	as	
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foreign	minister.	 	 I	 am	quite	 convinced	 that	whoever	might	 have	
been	 in	 charge	of	 the	 foreign	 affairs	 of	 India	 and	whatever	party	
might	have	been	 in	power	 in	 India,	 they	 could	not	have	deviated	
very	much	from	this	policy	(Cohen,	2001,	p.	39)	
As	 a	 land	 shaped	by	Gandhi’s	message	of	ahisma,	 or	non‐violence,	 India	
should	pursue	a	policy	of	peace,	non‐alignment,	and	liberation	for	the	colonized	
peoples	of	 the	world,	according	to	Nehruvian	thought.	 	Still,	Nehru	rejected	the	
doctrine	of	non‐violence	in	foreign	policy:	“No	Government	of	any	country	dare	
allow	its	country	to	be	unprepared	for	contingencies”	(Sagar,	2009,	p.	803)	
The	 non‐aligned	 status,	 the	 reluctance	 to	 modernize	 the	 armed	 forces,	
and	intense	participation	in	international	fora	are	all	examples	of	Nehru’s	vision	
of	carrying	on	the	vision	for	the	country	that	he	shared	with	Gandhi.		The	legacy	
he	left	behind	cannot	be	underestimated—the	Nehruvian	worldview	of	distrust	
of	 international	 power	 politics	 continued	 as	 the	 dominant	 foreign	 policy	
discourse	 for	many	decades	 after	his	death.	 	This	 “Nehruvian	mainstream”	has	
been	challenged	by	those	adhering	to	a	revitalist	Hindu	ideology	(Cohen,	2001,	p.	
43),	a	group	whose	ideology	will	be	unpacked	in	the	next	section.			
	
Hindu	Nationalist	View	 	
The	 origins	 of	 the	 modern	 Hindu	 nationalist	 movement	 also	 lie	 in	 the	
resistance	to	British	colonial	rule	in	the	first	half	of	the	20th	Century.		The	history	
of	 this	 movement	 can	 be	 traced	 from	 1925,	 the	 year	 that	 the	 Rashtriya	
Swayamsevak	 Sangh	 (RSS)	 organization	 was	 founded	 by	 Keshav	 Baliram	
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Hedgewar	(Cohen,	2001,	p.	45).	 	The	RSS	coordinated	opposition	 to	the	British	
Raj	 according	 to	 its	 stated	 goal	 of	 uniting	 the	 Hindu	 community	 and	 fought	
Muslim	 efforts	 to	 break	 away	 and	 form	 their	 own	 state.	 	 Central	 to	 the	 RSS’s	
ideology	is	the	notion	of	Hindutva,	which	they	interpret	as	the	struggle	to	return	
to	India’s	Hindu	roots	and	restore	the	country	to	its	former	splendor	(Das,	2003;	
Nanda,	 2007).	 	 	 Hindutva	 is	 expressed	 in	 Hindu	 nationalist	 discourse	 most	
frequently	through	the	statement	‘one	nation,	one	culture,	one	people’—seeking	
to	place	Hindu	identity	at	the	center	of	what	it	means	to	be	Indian	(Das,	2003,	p.	
85).			
Members	of	the	RSS	founded	the	Bharatiya	Jana	Sangh	(BJS)	in	1951	as	a	
right‐wing	nationalist	 party.	 	 The	BJS	was	most	 successful	 as	 a	member	 of	 the	
Janata	 Party	 coalition	 which	 wrested	 control	 of	 the	 Lok	 Sabha	 from	 Indira	
Gandhi’s	INC	for	the	first	time	in	1977.	 	That	year,	Atal	Bihari	Vajpayee,	(future	
leader	of	the	BJP),	was	appointed	as	minister	of	external	affairs	by	the	coalition	
government.		After	the	dissolution	of	the	Janata	Party,	the	BJS	was	reconsolidated	
into	 the	 Bharatiya	 Janata	 Party	 in	 1980	 (Cohen,	 2001).	 	 Although	 steadily	
enlarging	its	share	of	seats	in	the	Lok	Sabha	and	voter	base	across	the	country,	
the	BJP	did	not	lead	a	coalition	government	until	1998	(Perkovich,	1999).	 	That	
coalition,	 the	National	Democratic	 Alliance	 (NDA),	 continued	 until	 its	 defeat	 in	
2004.	 	 Almost	 immediately	 after	 its	 rise	 to	 power	 in	 1998,	 Vajpayee’s	
government	began	planning	for	a	nuclear	test,	and	in	May	of	the	same	year,	five	
separate	 nuclear	 tests	 were	 conducted	 on	 the	 orders	 of	 the	 prime	 minister	
(Abraham,	1998).			
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The	 BJP	 and	 RSS	 have	 been	 accused	 of	 inciting	 religious	 violence	
repeatedly	throughout	their	history.		At	the	end	of	the	1980s,	the	BJP	and	the	RSS	
became	involved	in	a	movement	calling	for	the	construction	of	a	Hindu	temple	at	
the	site	of	believed	by	some	Hindus	as	the	birthplace	of	Rama,	a	site	occupied	by	
the	Babri	Mosque	built	in	1527	(Cohen,	2001,	p.	120).		In	1992,	a	rally	organized	
by	 BJP	 and	 RSS	 leaders	 turned	 into	 a	 riot	 in	 which	mobs	 of	 thousands	 Hindu	
nationalists	destroyed	 the	mosque,	 triggering	 sectarian	 riots	across	 India.	 	The	
BJP	was	able	 to	 turn	 the	 sectarian	 tensions	 into	 a	 substantial	 electoral	 victory,	
and	expanded	its	seat	count	in	the	1996	elections.			
Central	 to	 the	 ideology	 of	 the	 BJP	 is	 the	 afore‐mentioned	 concept	 of	
Hindutva.	 	 This	 ideology	 understands	 Indian	 identity	 in	 terms	 of	 religion	 and	
geography,	 equating	 Indian	 identity	 with	 Hindu	 identity	 (Chaulia,	 2002).	 	 The	
concept	of	Hindutva	received	guidance	from	the	two‐nation	theory,	which	holds	
that	the	primary	identity	of	Muslim	residents	of	the	Indian	Subcontinent	is	their	
religion,	a	view	which	led	to	the	partition	of	India.		Today,	this	understanding	of	
identity	 continues	 to	 fuel	 Hindu	 suspicion	 of	 Indian	 Muslims’	 patriotism	 and	
sympathies	 for	 Pakistan	 and	 equate	 Indian	 citizenship	 with	 Hindu	 religious	
identity.		BJP	senior	leader	L.K.	Advani	states:	
Democracy	 and	 liberalism	 as	 preached	 by	Nehru	 are	 denuded	 of	
their	 Indianness…I	 believe	 that	 India	 is	 what	 it	 is	 because	 of	 its	
ancient	 heritage—call	 it	 Hindu,	 or	 call	 it	 Bharatiya	 (Indian).	 	 If	
nationalism	is	stripped	of	its	Hinduism,	it	would	lose	its	dynamism	
(Das,	2003,	p.	85).	
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The	 BJP’s	 founders	 strongly	 criticized	 the	 non‐violent	 base	 of	
Gandhian/Nehruvian	 ideology.	 	M.S.	Golwalkar,	one	of	 the	 founders	of	 the	RSS,	
for	example,	rejected	the	Gandhian	practice	of	ahimsa	on	the	grounds	that	“every	
Hindu	 god	 is	 armed”	 (Chaulia,	 2002,	 p.	 220).	 	 Sometimes	 this	 criticism	 uses	
sexual	or	gendered	language.		For	example,	in	October	1964,	in	its	weekly	party	
periodical,	Organiser,	the	BJS	wrote	that:		
…the	eunuch	government	decided	years	ago	 in	 its	ahimisic	 idiocy	
to	spend	crores	on	nuclear	power	but	not	to	use	the	same	crores	on	
developing	 the	 nuclear	 bomb.	We	had	 the	 chance	 to	 do	 it	 before	
China	did	it…In	our	criminal	folly	we	missed	it”	(Poulose,	1978,	p.	
105).	
For	 BJP	 ideologues,	 the	 trajectory	 of	 Indian	 history	 is	 seen	 through	 the	
lens	of	the	Hindu‐Muslim	conflict.		They	view	the	Muslim	“other”	through	a	post‐
colonial	lens,	creating	an	oppositional	Hindu	identity.		BJP	adherents	use	similar	
language	 to	 speak	 of	 both	 British	 colonialism	 and	 the	 Muslim	Mughal	 Empire	
which	reigned	in	India	for	roughly	300	years	(Das,	2003).	 	In	order	to	return	to	
the	golden	Vedic	age,	 they	argue,	 the	 forces	of	hegemony—whether	colonial	or	
Muslim—must	be	struggled	against	(Das,	2003).			
Overall,	 Hindu	 nationalist	 adherents	 merge	 this	 narrow	 definition	 of	
Indian	 identity	 with	 a	 strong	 realist	 perception	 of	 force	 and	 the	 nature	 of	
international	relations.		Cohen	upholds	Vajpayee	as	an	example	of	this	synthesis:		
Vajpayee	 was	 once	 a	 member	 of	 the	 RSS	 and	 still	 attends	 RSS	
functions,	where	he	is	widely	revered.		But	he	is	also	a	political	and	
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strategic	 realist,	 able	 to	 force	 workable	 alliances	 at	 home	 with	
disparate	 partners	 and	 improve	 relations	 with	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	
states	 hitherto	 regarded	 as	 anathema,	 among	 them	 the	 United	
States	(Cohen,	2001,	p.	47).			
	 Overall,	 these	 two	 distinct	 perspectives	 have	 left	 their	 mark	 on	 Indian	
foreign	policy.	 	 In	the	next	section,	 the	role	conceptions	held	by	Nehruvian	and	
Hindu	nationalist	 leaders	will	be	presented,	after	which	 their	nuclear	decision‐
making	will	be	evaluated.			
	
5.5.	 National	Role	Conceptions	in	Indian	Foreign	Policy	
In	 this	 chapter’s	 final	 section,	 I	 propose	 national	 role	 conceptions	 for	
Indian	foreign	policy	relevant	to	the	area	of	nuclear	weaponry.		First,	the	national	
role	conceptions	for	India	as	assigned	by	Holsti	(1970)	and	Chafetz	et	al.	(1996)	
will	be	discussed	in	detail,	followed	by	my	own	modified	role	conceptions.		Then	
the	 model	 is	 traced	 throughout	 the	 Indian	 case	 and	 the	 hypothesized	 policy	
outcomes	are	discussed.	
	
Role	Scholarship	on	India	
In	his	1970	paper,	Holsti	finds	evidence	for	three	roles	for	India:	regional	
leader,	 subsystem	 leader,	 active	 independent,	 liberation‐supporter,	 mediator‐
integrator,	 independent,	and	 internal	developer	(pg.	276).	 	The	regional	 leader	 is	
described	as	a	state	which	understands	“special	responsibilities	for	itself”	within	
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the	context	of	its	region	(Holsti,	1970,	p.	261).		Holsti	lists	Egypt,	Japan,	Ethiopia,	
the	United	Arab	Republic,	and	France	as	expressing	this	role	conception	(1970).		
The	 subsystem	 leader	 NRC	 is	 closely	 related—according	 to	 Holsti,	 subsystem	
leaders	 seek	 to	 gather	 states	 not	 around	 a	 common	 bond	 of	 geography,	 but	
rather	 by	 a	 particular	 ideology	 or	 issue	 which	 transcends	 the	 Cold	 War	 bloc	
structure	(1970).			
The	 liberation	supporter	 conception	 is	defined	as	having	a	 foreign	policy	
guided	 by	 anti‐colonial	 attitudes	 and	 ideological	 principles.	 	 At	 the	 time	 of	
Holsti’s	writing	(1970),	this	characterized	“most	African,	Asian,	and	Communist	
states	 in	 the	 sample”,	 including	 India	 (Holsti,	 1970,	 p.	 296).	 	 The	 mediator‐
integrator	NRC,	on	the	other	hand,	emphasizes	its	national	role	within	historical	
and	 cultural	 context,	 history	 of	 not	 participating	 in	 conflicts,	 and	 geographic	
location	 (Holsti,	 1970,	 p.	 296).	 	 Holsti	 lists	 India,	 Lebanon,	 and	 Sweden	 as	
examples	of	this	type	(1970).			
Holsti	characterizes	the	Internal	Developer	as	being	focused	on	its	socio‐
economic	needs	and	perceiving	threats	through	unwelcome	foreign	involvement	
in	 its	 chosen	 development	 strategy.	 	 In	 addition	 to	 India,	 Holsti	 lists	 Brazil,	
Finland,	 Indonesia,	 and	 Pakistan	 as	 displaying	 developer	 tendencies	 (Holsti,	
1970,	p.	297).			
The	 last	 and	 most	 broad	 role	 that	 Holsti	 assigns	 India	 is	 that	 of	
Independent.	 	 Independent	 states	 emphasize	 the	 preeminence	 of	 their	 own	
interests	in	foreign	policy	making,	rather	than	doing	the	bidding	of	other	states.		
In	 pursuing	 this	 “policy	 self‐determination”,	 independent	 states	 generally	 are	
identifying	with	the	non‐aligned	movement	 in	some	way	(Holsti,	1970,	p.	268).		
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He	lists	the	sources	of	this	role	as	anti‐bloc	or	anti‐colonial	sentiments,	economic	
needs,	and	threat	perception	and	holds	up	most	of	the	Non‐Aligned	Movement	as	
examples	(Holsti,	1970,	p.	297).	
As	has	been	 stated	 in	 the	methodology	 chapter,	 the	 role‐based	 typology	
employed	 by	 Chafetz	 et	 al.	 (1996)	 takes	 a	 modified	 set	 of	 Holsti’s	 roles	 and	
categorizes	them	as	leading	towards,	away	from,	or	having	no	effect	on,	nuclear	
proliferation.	 	 They	 identified	 the	 Regional	 Leader,	 Global	 System	 Leader,	
Regional	 Protector,	 and	 Anti‐Imperialist	 role	 conceptions	 as	 tending	 towards	
nuclear	 status,	 with	 Independent	 having	 no	 correlation	 with	 proliferation	
(Chafetz	 et	 al.,	 1996,	 p.	 734).	 	 The	 main	 factor	 behind	 their	 identification	 of	
proliferation‐prone	roles	was	the	perception	of	some	states	of	nuclear	weapons	
as	 a	 symbol	 of	 global	 leadership	 as	 modeled	 by	 the	 “legal”	 nuclear	 weapons	
states	(Chafetz	et	al.,	1996,	p.	733).			
Chafetz	 et	 al.	 classify	 India	 as	 a	 regional	 protector,	 regional	 leader	 and	
anti‐imperialist	 (Chafetz	et	al.,	1996,	p.	733).	 	They	describe	 the	 function	of	 the	
regional	 leader	as	“providing	leadership	in	a	delimited	geographic	or	functional	
area”	 and	 list	 Brazil,	 Argentina,	 Libya,	 Iran,	 and	 Iraq	 as	 examples	 of	 states	
displaying	 that	conception	(Chafetz	et	al.,	1996,	p.	734).	 	The	anti‐imperialist	 is	
described	as	acting	as	an	“agent	of	struggle	against	imperialist	threats”	and	Iran,	
North	Korea,	Iraq,	India,	and	Libya	are	listed	as	examples	(Chafetz	et	al.,	1996,	p.	
734).		The	national	role	conceptions	attributed	to	India	by	Holsti	and	Chafetz	et	
al.	are	listed	in	Table	8	below:	
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Table	8:	Summary	of	Indian	NRCs	from	(Holsti,	1970)	and	(Chafetz	et	al.,	1996)	
Role	Type	 Role	Description	 Source	
Regional	Leader	 Provide	leadership	in	delimited	geographic	or	functional	area	 (Chafetz	et	al.,	1996;	Holsti,	1970)	
Regional	Protector	 Provide	protection	for	adjacent	regions	outside	of	immediate	neighborhood	 (Chafetz	et	al.,	1996)	
Anti‐Imperialist	 Act	as	agent	of	struggle	against	imperialist	threats	 (Chafetz	et	al.,	1996)	
Internal	Developer	
focused	on	socio‐economic	needs;	
perceiving	threats	through	foreign	
involvement	
(Holsti,	1970)	
Subsystem	Leader	
Unite	states	based	on	ideology	or	issue	
which	transcends	the	Cold	War	bloc	
structure	
(Holsti,	1970)	
Liberation	Supporter	 guided	by	anti‐colonial	attitudes	and	ideological	principles.	 (Holsti,	1970)	
Mediator‐Integrator	
historical	and	cultural	context,	history	of	
not	participating	in	conflicts,	
geographic	location	
(Holsti,	1970)	
Independent	
“self‐determined	foreign	policy”;	
preeminence	of	own	interests	in	foreign	
policy	making	
(Holsti,	1970)	
	
I	argue	that	these	conceptions,	while	valuable,	are	not	specific	enough	to	
yield	 insight	 into	 why	 India	 pursued	 the	 nuclear	 trajectory	 that	 it	 did.		
Specifically,	 the	role	concepts	cited	by	(Holsti,	1970)	and	(Chafetz,	et	al.,	1996)	
do	 not	 adequately	 explain	 why	 India	 first	 detonated	 a	 PNE	 before	 finally	
weaponization	 after	 the	 1998	 tests.	 	 Specifically,	 these	 roles	 do	 not	 take	 into	
consideration	the	unique	domestic	dynamics	present	in	the	Indian	case	and	how	
they	approach	the	nuclear	issue	from	fundamentally	different	positions.		I	argue	
that	the	Nehruvian	and	Hindu	Nationalist	perspectives’	differing	views	on	Indian	
identity	are	reflected	in	their	NRCs	and	therefore	in	the	nuclear	policy	pursued	
by	the	two	governments.		In	the	next	section,	these	NRCs	are	discussed.		
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Indian	National	Role	Conceptions	
Indian	policymakers	have	held	a	variety	of	national	role	conceptions	 for	
their	 nation	 over	 the	 years.	 	 In	 this	 section,	 I	 present	 three	 Nehruvian	 roles	
(Asian	standard	bearer,	Leader	of	 the	NAM/third	way,	and	 internal	developer),	
and	one	Hindu	Nationalist	role	(autonomous	power	center).	
Asian	Standard	Bearer	
	 Nehru’s	 conception	 of	 Indian	 regional	 identity	 was	 one	 of	 a	 “standard‐
bearer”	 for	Asia	 in	 the	post‐colonial	 era.	 	Nehru	expressed	his	vision	of	 India’s	
role	in	Asia	at	the	convening	of	the	Asian	Relations	Conference	in	March	1947:	
All	countries	of	Asia	have	to	meet	together	on	an	equal	basis	 in	a	
common	task	and	endeavor.		It	is	fitting	that	India	should	play	her	
part	in	this	new	phase	of	Asian	development.	 	Apart	from	the	fact	
that	India	herself	is	emerging	into	freedom	and	independence,	she	
is	the	natural	center	and	focal	point	of	the	many	forces	at	work	in	
Asia.	 	Geography	 is	a	compelling	 factor,	and	geographically	she	 is	
situated	as	 to	be	 the	meeting	point	of	Western	and	Northern	and	
Eastern	Asia	and	Southeast	Asia	(SarDesai,	2008,	p.	428).	
	 Nehru	 saw	 this	 location	 for	 India	 as	 crucial	 given	 that	 the	 formerly	
colonized	peoples	of	Asia	were	prevented	from	engaging	 in	discourse	with	one	
another	because	of	their	imperialist	overlords.			
India	has	always	had	contacts	and	intercourse	with	her	neighbour	
countries….[w]ith	the	coming	of	British	rule	in	India	these	contacts	
were	broken	off	and	India	was	almost	completely	isolated	from	the	
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rest	of	Asia....[t]his	Conference	itself	is	significant	as	an	expression	
of	 that	 deeper	 urge	 of	 the	 mind	 and	 spirit	 of	 Asia	 which	 has	
persisted	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 isolationism	 which	 grew	 up	 during	 the	
years	of	European	domination	(Abraham,	2008,	p.	199).	
	 For	 Nehru	 (until	 1959),	 India	 and	 China	 had	 a	 unique	 roles	 to	 play	 in	
introducing	 these	 formerly	 isolated	 states	 to	 each	 other	 and	 fostering	 regional	
unity	and	cooperation	 for	development	and	representation	 in	 the	 international	
system.		This	policy	was	hit	hard	by	the	tensions	with	China	over	Tibet	and	the	
1962	 Indo‐Chinese	War.	 	 Still,	 the	discourse	of	 India’s	 geographic	 location	as	a	
focal	 point	 of	 Asia	 has	 continued	 to	 the	 present	 day.	 	 India	 has	 been	 quick	 to	
assert	 its	pre‐eminence	over	South	Asia,	exercising	considerable	sway	over	 the	
domestic	 politics	 of	 states	 in	 the	 immediate	 region,	 like	 Bhutan	 and	 Nepal	
(Mehta,	2009,	p.	216).	
Leader	of	the	NAM/Third	Way	
For	Nehru	and	his	successors,	India	was	destined	to	be	a	great	power	on	
the	 world	 scene.	 	 He	 described	 India	 achieving	 its	 independence	 as	 a	 “major	
consequence	in	world	history”	(Nizamani,	2000,	p.	27).		The	route	to	recognition	
of	 this	 status	 led	 through	 the	 leadership	of	 the	non‐aligned	group	of	 countries.		
Nehru	believed	that	by	providing	a	third	way	alternative	to	the	bipolar	Cold	War	
bloc	system,	India	could	catalyze	support	from	other	emerging	nations	and	gain	
widespread	recognition	for	its	rightful	place	in	the	world.		In	a	fiery	speech	to	the	
Bandung	Conference	in	1955,	he	condemned	memberships	in	blocs	and	asserted	
Indian	self‐reliance	in	foreign	affairs:			
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I	am	afraid	of	nobody.	 I	 suffer	 from	no	 fear	complex;	my	country	
suffers	 from	 no	 fear	 complex.	 We	 rely	 on	 nobody	 except	 the	
friendship	of	others;	we	rely	on	ourselves	and	none	others	[sic]....	
Am	 I	 to	 lose	 my	 freedom	 and	 individuality	 and	 become	 a	 camp	
follower	 of	 others?	 I	 have	 absolutely	 no	 intention	 of	 doing	 that	
(Abraham,	2008,	p.	206).	
This	 anti‐bloc	 sentiment	 took	 the	 form	of	 an	 independent	 expression	of	
Indian	self‐interest.		Nothing	could	be	more	detrimental	to	India	“than	to	become	
camp	followers	in	the	hope	that	some	crumbs	might	fall	from	their	table”	(Sagar,	
2009,	p.	803).		In	presenting	this	third	way	in	international	relations,	Nehru	was	
also	issuing	an	invitation	to	other	emerging	countries	to	follow	India’s	lead	into	
full	 statehood.	 	 Speaking	 at	 the	 Bandung	 Conference	 in	 1955,	 he	 strongly	
condemned	association	with	blocs	or	pacts:	
If	 I	 join	 any	 of	 these	 big	 groups	 I	 lose	 my	 identity....It	 is	 an	
intolerable	 thought	 to	 me	 that	 the	 great	 countries	 of	 Asia	 and	
Africa	 should	 come	out	of	bondage	 into	 freedom	only	 to	degrade	
themselves	 and	humiliate	 themselves	 in	 this	way.	 	Well,	 I	 do	not	
criticize	 these	 powers.	 They...know	 what	 is	 best	 for	 themselves	
(Abraham,	2008,	pp.	206–207).	
	 While	Nehru’s	successors	charted	a	more	pragmatic	course	in	the	decades	
following	independence,	India	has	continued	to	stand	for	a	non‐aligned	position	
in	world	politics,	refusing	to	have	its	sovereignty	constrained	by	membership	or	
a	close	relationship	with	one	of	the	superpowers.				
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Internal	Developer	
Both	 Nehruvians	 and	 Hindu	 Nationalists	 express	 the	 importance	 of	
autonomy	 in	 economic	 development.	 	 Nehru	 believed	 strongly	 that	 acquiring	
nuclear	 technology	 was	 the	 right	 path	 for	 energy‐starved	 India,	 while	
vehemently	 condemning	 nuclear	weapons	 and	 the	 threat	 of	 their	 use	 by	 their	
possessors	 (Abraham,	 2009,	 p.	 116).	 	 	 However,	 Nehru	 perceived	 technical	
dependency	on	the	West	as	a	supply	for	nuclear	energy	and	military	hardware	as	
traps	 set	 for	 India	 by	Western	 (read	 colonial)	 powers	 to	 keep	 it	 in	 a	 cycle	 of	
dependency.	 	 In	 fact,	Hymans	makes	 the	point	 that	 this	policy	had	undesirable	
consequences	for	India	in	its	war	with	China:	Nehru	was	opposed	to	expansion	
and	modernization	of	the	Indian	armed	forces	in	general,	a	policy	which	left	the	
Indian	military	ill‐prepared	for	the	1962	border	war	with	China	(2006).	
Through	harnessing	 the	 same	Gandhian	 swadeshi	 self‐reliance	discourse	
as	the	Nehruvians,	the	BJP	seeks	to	develop	India’s	influence	on	the	international	
stage	 largely	 through	 domestic	 investment	 in	 the	 economy	 and	 in	 national	
defense	capabilities.	 	For	 the	BJP,	a	strong	 India	means	a	resurgent,	 self‐reliant	
economy,	 a	 well‐equipped	 military,	 and	 domination	 of	 Pakistan	 in	 the	 region.		
This	 conception	 of	 India	 has	 been	 summarized	 by	 the	BJP’s	 own	 strategists	 as	
that	of	an	“autonomous	power	center.”	
Autonomous	Power	Center	
The	primary	role	conception	of	BJP’s	policymakers	 is	 that	of	 India	as	an	
“autonomous	power	center”	(Ghosh,	1999,	p.	354).	 	According	to	the	BJP’s	own	
manifestos,	 only	 a	 strong	 India	 will	 win	 the	 respect	 of	 the	 great	 powers:	
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“strength	 respects	 strength”	 (BJP,	2004).	 	This	 realist	 language	 is	 employed	by	
pro‐bomb	 strategist	 K.	 Subrahmanyam	 in	 his	 book	 on	 perspectives	 on	 Indian	
security	(quoted	in	Nizamani,	2000):		
The	 subcontinent	 is	 a	 strategic	 unity	 and	 India	 as	 the	 biggest	
nation	has	 a	 special	 responsibility	 in	 ensuring	 the	 integrity	 of	 all	
states	 within	 the	 subcontinent	 especially	 against	 the	 inroads	 of	
extra‐subcontinental	powers	(Nizamani,	2000,	p.	49).	
For	the	pro‐bomb	voices	in	India,	the	1998	tests	cemented	India’s	status	
in	the	eyes	of	the	region	and	world.	 	Nizamani	quotes	Indian	security	analyst	R.	
R.	Subramanian:	
If	[its]	neighbors	think	that	India	should	not	act	like	a	big	brother	
in	South	Asia	then	they	are	 living	 in	a	utopia	because	 ‘it	does	not	
occur	 to	 those	 who	 advocate	 that	 India	 should	 not	 behave	 as	 a	
great	 power	 that	 any	 other	 role	 for	 this	 country	 will	 not	 be	
credible’	(Nizamani,	2000,	pp.	49–50).	
	 In	June	1998,	BJP	Minister	of	External	Affairs	Jaswant	Singh	described	the	
BJP’s	logic	in	acquiring	a	nuclear	weapon,	describing	it	as	a	symbol	of	power:	
We	cannot	have	a	situation	in	which	some	countries	say,	“We	have	
a	permanent	right	to	these	symbols	of	deterrence	and	of	power,	all	
of	 the	 rest	 of	 you…do	 not	 have	 that	 right.	 	We	will	 decide	 what	
your	 security	 is	 and	 how	 you	 are	 to	 deal	 with	 that	 security.”	 A	
country	the	size	of	India—not	simply	a	sixth	of	the	human	race,	but	
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also	 an	 ancient	 civilization—cannot	 in	 this	 fashion	 abdicate	 its	
responsibility	(Perkovich,	1999,	p.	441).	
	 For	the	BJP	the	bomb	has	been	a	focal	point	of	their	criticisms	of	the	INC’s	
policy	 of	 an	 ‘ahimistic’	 defense	 policy.	 	 For	 Vajpayee,	 the	 bomb	 represented	
India’s	strength	and	a	step	to	a	reinvigorated	emphasis	on	national	defense.	 	 In	
stating,	“We	have	a	big	bomb	now,”	Vajpayee	was	proclaiming	to	the	world	that	
India	 should	 be	 taken	 seriously	 as	 one	 of	 the	 elite	 nations	with	 a	 full	 nuclear	
capability.		In	his	words	after	the	test:	
Millions	of	 Indians	have	viewed	 this	occasion	as	 the	beginning	of	
the	 rise	 of	 a	 strong	 and	 self‐confident	 India.	 	 I	 fully	 share	 this	
assessment	 and	 this	 dream.	 	 India	 has	 never	 considered	military	
might	 as	 the	 ultimate	 measure	 of	 national	 strength.	 	 It	 is	 a	
necessary	 component	 of	 overall	 national	 strength.	 	 I	 would	
therefore	 say	 that	 the	 greatest	 meaning	 of	 the	 tests	 is	 that	 they	
have	given	India	shakti,	 they	have	given	India	strength,	they	have	
given	India	self‐confidence	(India	Today,	1998).	
In	using	 the	 term	 shakti	 (Operation	Shakti	was	also	 the	name	of	 the	1998	
test	shots),	a	Sanskrit	religious	term	meaning	energy	or	empowerment,	Vajpayee	
was	 communicating	 how	 the	 nuclear	 tests	 at	 Pokhran	 symbolized	 his	 party’s	
vision	of	a	new	and	dynamic	India.			
Elsewhere,	Vajpayee	used	the	famous	phrase	“Jai	Jawan,	Jai	Kisan”	(Hail	the	
soldier,	 hail	 the	 farmer),	 coined	 by	 PM	 Shastri	 during	 the	 1965	 war	 with	
Pakistan.	 	 This	phrase	 is	 very	 commonly	used	by	 Indian	politicians	 in	 times	of	
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war	 to	 rally	 public	 opinon,	 but	 Vajpayee	 added	 his	 own	 twist:	 “Jai	 jawan,	 jai	
kisan,	 aur	 jai	 vigyan”	 (Hail	 the	 soldier,	 hail	 the	 farmer,	 and	 hail	 [scientific]	
knowledge)	 (UNI,	 1998).	 	 In	 the	 statement,	 all	 three	 concepts	 are	 being	 re‐
conceptualized	 as	 serving	 the	 security	 of	 the	 state—soldiers	 in	 armed	 combat,	
farmers	 in	 feeding	 the	 population	 during	 wartime,	 and	 scientific	 knowledge	
providing	 new	 weapons	 technology.	 	 Especially	 noteworthy	 is	 that	 Vajpayee	
made	this	statement	during	peacetime.	 	This	stance	can	be	interpreted	as	being	
informed	by	the	Hindu	nationalist	oppositional	role	conception	with	Pakistan.		In	
the	Hindu	nationalist	view,	a	strong	India	will	command	the	respect	of	Pakistan.		
For	Vajpayee	and	the	Hindu	nationalist	camp,	Operation	Shakti	represented	the	
empowerment	 needed	 to	 propel	 India	 to	 achieve	 its	 aspirations	 at	 both	 the	
regional	and	international	levels.				
	
A	role‐based	model	of	Indian	nuclear	policy	
This	 final	 section	 of	 the	 chapter	 sketches	 out	 the	 “big	 picture”	 of	 the	
national	role	conception	process	in	the	Indian	case	and	discusses	its	implications	
for	the	actual	policy	pursued	by	India	during	the	period.		The	hypothesized	role‐
based	mechanism	is	discussed	and	the	hypothesis	for	India	is	evaluated.			
	 The	 inputs	 section	 of	 the	 model	 considered	 two	 sources	 policymakers	
draw	from	when	forming	national	role	conceptions—these	were	categorized	as	
ideational	 and	 material.	 	 Material	 inputs	 were	 defined	 as	 decisionmakers’	
perceptions	 of	 their	 state’s	 nuclear	 technical	 capability	 and	 security	
environment,	 whereas	 ideational	 inputs	 were	 defined	 as	 decisionmakers’	
perceptions	of	their	state’s	national	identity	and	cultural	heritage.			
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	 With	 regards	 to	 technical	 capabilities,	 India	 progressed	 quickly	 and	
focused	on	acquiring	autonomy	 in	 the	nuclear	 fuel	 cycle.	 	 India	benefited	 from	
the	eagerness	of	developed	countries	to	sell	nuclear	technology	in	the	1950s	and	
1960s,	 but	 was	 slowed	 down	 considerably	 when	 hit	 with	 sanctions	 after	 the	
1974	 tests.	 	 Still,	 Indian	 scientists	 were	 given	 a	 level	 of	 independence	 which	
allowed	them	to	pursue	the	solidification	of	the	policy	of	putting	India	technically	
within	 reach	 of	 quickly	 building	 and	 testing	 a	 nuclear	 explosive	 when	 the	
political	 directive	 came.	 	 This	 technical	 competency	 and	 the	 close	 relations	
between	 the	 Prime	 Minister	 and	 the	 leader(s)	 of	 the	 scientific	 establishment	
meant	 that	 the	 PM	was	 able	 to	make	 nuclear	 decisions	 in	 confidence	 that	 the	
technical	 capability	 did	 indeed	 exist.	 	 The	 technical	 capability	 acquired	 and	
maintained	 by	 India’s	 scientists	 enabled	 the	 “nuclear	 option”	 discourse	 of	 the	
1980s	and	90s.			
	 From	the	perspective	of	 the	security	environment,	 India’s	viewpoint	has	
been	shaped	by	several	key	events.		India	fought	two	wars	in	the	1960s,	one	with	
China	 in	 1962	 and	 one	 with	 Pakistan	 in	 1965.	 	 This	 history	 with	 China	 and	
Pakistan	 has	 resulted	 in	 an	 understanding	 that	 it	 must	 build	 up	 its	 material	
capability	and	prevent	great	power	 intervention	 in	 the	 region.	 	The	Brasstacks	
crisis	 of	 the	 late	 1980s	 shifted	 the	 debate	 from	 the	 philosophical	 and	 moral	
implications	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 to	 a	 debate	 over	 the	 security	 threat	 and	
whether	 India	 should	 acquire	 weaponized	 nuclear	 capability.	 	 This	 debate	
intensified	throughout	the	1990s	until	the	tests	of	1998.			
	 In	 the	 timeframe	 of	 analysis,	 two	 main	 ideological	 perspectives	 have	
dominated	the	Indian	political	landscape.		The	Nehruvian	worldview	is	based	on	
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a	 secular	 identity	 for	 India,	 one	 that	 emphasizes	 scientific	 progress	 and	
development.	 	 Nehru	 believed	 that	 India	 became	 a	 “slave	 country”	 when	 its	
development	 level	 vis	 a	 vis	 other	 states	 lagged—therefore	 the	way	 forward	 in	
the	 20th	 Century	was	 through	 rebuilding	 Indian	 science	 to	 serve	 development	
goals.	 	Nehru	and	his	 followers	 see	 India	as	a	moral	 great	power	 in	 the	world,	
speaking	 out	 for	 disarmament	 and	 against	 interventionism	 in	 world	 politics.		
Hindu	nationalists,	on	the	other	hand,	view	the	world	through	a	civilizational	and	
religious	 lens.	 	 Their	hindutva	 ideology	 envisions	 ‘one	 nation,	 one	 culture,	 one	
people’	and	places	Hinduness	at	the	heart	of	what	it	means	to	be	Indian.			
	 Indian	 policymakers	 draw	 on	 these	 inputs	 in	 forming	 their	 conceptions	
about	what	role	their	nation	should	play	in	the	international	arena.		These	roles	
are	repeated	in	Table	9	below:		
Table	9:	Indian	Nuclear	Policy	NRCs		
Role	Type	 Role	Description	
Asian	Standard	Bearer	
(Nehruvian)
fostering	regional	unity	and	cooperation	for	
development	and	representation	in	the	international	
system
Leader	of	the	NAM/Third	
Way
(Nehruvian)
Serve	as	example	to	emerging	nations;	
Activism	against	imperialism	and	bloc	structure;
Function	as	rally	point	for	smaller	3rd	World	nations
Internal	Developer
(Nehruvian)
focused	on	socio‐economic	needs;	perceiving	threats	
through	foreign	involvement	in	domestic	economy
Autonomous	Power	Center
(Hindu	Nationalist)
Independent	world	power	grounded	in	dominance	of	
region;	command	the	respect	of	other	world	powers
	
	 These	 role	 conceptions	 have	 implications	 for	 the	 course	 set	 by	 Indian	
policymakers	when	 it	comes	 to	nuclear	decisionmaking.	 	Nehru’s	conception	of	
India	 as	 a	 standard	bearer	 for	Asia	 in	 the	 international	 system	became	 largely	
irrelevant	after	the	war	between	India	and	China	in	1962.		India’s	total	defeat	at	
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the	hands	of	the	Chinese	in	1962	showed	the	region	that	Indian	rhetoric	was	not	
backed	 by	 military	 might.	 	 This	 role	 conception	 gradually	 merged	 with	 the	
general		understanding	of	India’s	role	in	its	immediate	region.		During	the	decade	
of	the	1950s	when	this	role	conception	was	active,	however,	the	Indian	nuclear	
establishment	was	making	swift	progress	towards	acquiring	nuclear	technology,	
operating	 the	 first	 research	 reactor	 in	 the	 continent	 of	 Asia	 and	 signing	 deals	
with	multiple	countries	for	technology	transfer.		Overall,	this	role	conception	did	
not	directly	affect	Indian	progress	towards	the	bomb,	but	rather	established	the	
groundwork	 for	 an	 understanding	 of	 India’s	 place	 in	 the	 region	which	 looked	
beyond	its	conflict	with	Pakistan	towards	a	greater	representative	role.		This	role	
was	challenged	in	1971	by	the	USS	Enterprise	incident,	which	India	perceived	as	
an	American	attempt	at	blackmail	during	the	Bangladesh	War.	 	The	humiliation	
of	that	 incident	 led	Indira	Gandhi	to	give	the	go‐ahead	for	a	nuclear	test,	which	
was	then	conducted	three	years	later.			
	 As	the	leader	of	the	non‐aligned	movement,	India	sought	to	portray	itself	
as	 an	 example	 to	 developing	 nations	 emerging	 from	 under	 colonial	 rule.		
Through	virulent	anti‐bloc	and	anti‐imperialist	language,	Indian	policymakers	of	
the	 Nehruvian	 tradition	 conceived	 of	 their	 country	 acting	 as	 a	 rally	 point	 for	
smaller	 nations	 in	 the	 opposition	 of	 the	 bipolar	 international	 structure	 during	
the	Cold	War.	 	This	opposition	often	took	the	form	of	condemning	the	threat	of	
nuclear	warfare	by	 the	nuclear‐armed	super	powers,	along	with	 their	attempts	
to	 cement	 their	 status	 as	 members	 of	 a	 legal	 ‘nuclear	 club’.	 	 Still,	 in	 order	 to	
command	 such	 a	 leadership	 position,	 India	 needed	 symbols	 of	 its	 power.	 	 An	
atomic	energy	program,	especially	one	developed	 independently	by	a	 recently‐
180	
	
colonized	nation	exercising	“nuclear	restraint”	was	a	powerful	symbol	for	Indian	
leadership	of	the	anti‐bloc	group	of	countries.			
As	an	internal	developer,	India	was	focused	on	its	socio‐economic	needs;	
and	interpreted	foreign	involvement	in	its	economy	as	a	threat	to	its	sovereignty.		
The	 nuclear	 issue	 became	 connected	 with	 India’s	 quest	 to	 lift	 millions	 of	 its	
citizens	 out	 of	 poverty	 by	 providing	 cheap	 electricity,	 not	 unlike	 many	 other	
states.	 	 Yet	 the	 development	 discourse	 in	Nehruvian	 India	 took	 on	 a	 distinctly	
nationalistic	 tone	 in	 its	 connection	with	 the	 swadeshi	 tradition	 of	 self‐reliance	
and	resistance	to	 imperialism.	 	For	Indian	policymakers,	 the	impediment	of	the	
progress	of	 their	nation’s	nuclear	program	by	the	Western	powers	was	seen	 in	
this	 context—encouraging,	 rather	 than	 inhibiting,	 continued	 progress	 towards	
acquisition	of	a	PNE	in	the	1960s	and	70s.			
	 Elements	of	 these	Nehruvian	 role	 conceptions	 can	be	 seen	 in	 the	Hindu	
nationalists’	 conception	 of	 India	 as	 an	 autonomous	 power	 center.	 	 As	 an	
autonomous	power	center,	India	should	behave	as	an	independent	world	power	
grounded	in	the	dominance	of	its	immediate	region	and	command	the	respect	of	
other	 world	 powers.	 	 In	 dominance	 of	 its	 region,	 India	 should	 assert	 its	
superiority	over	Pakistan	and	present	a	 self‐confident	and	dynamic	 face	 to	 the	
world	 from	 a	 position	 of	 strength.	 	 For	 the	 BJP’s	 policymakers,	 this	 strength	
emanates	 from	 the	 symbolism	 of	 nuclear	weapons.	 	 To	 Vajpayee	 and	 the	 BJP,	
nuclear	 weapons	 were	 not	 just	 the	 status	 symbol	 of	 the	 rulers	 of	 the	
international	 order,	 but	 also	 represented	 the	 triumph	 of	 Indian	 scientists	 to	
domestically	master	one	of	the	world’s	most	difficult	technologies.		In	their	view,	
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only	an	India	which	has	“exercised	the	nuclear	option”	can	receive	the	respect	it	
deserves	from	Pakistan	and	from	the	world	at	large.			
	
Evaluation	of	the	Model	
Overall,	 the	 model	 illustrates	 several	 key	 aspects	 of	 the	 Indian	 case.		
Throughout	 the	 analysis,	 the	 contrast	 between	 the	 Nehruvian	 and	 Hindu	
Nationalist		viewpoints,	specifically	in	their	understanding	of	Indian	identity	and	
its	relationship	to	the	world	on	the	one	hand	and	Pakistan	on	the	other.	 	From	
the	Nehruvian	perspective,	India’s	future	lay	in	understanding	its	multi‐cultural	
past	 through	 a	 modernist	 and	 secular	 lens.	 	 Hindu	 Nationalists,	 on	 the	 other	
hand,	conceive	of	Indian	and	Hindu	identities	as	being	virtually	synonymous,	and	
understand	Pakistan	in	an	oppositional	frame	of	reference.			
For	 both	 perspectives,	 their	 understanding	 of	 the	 trajectory	 of	 Indian	
history	 and	 its	 place	 in	 the	world	 leads	 them	 to	 conclude	 that	 India	 should	 be	
recognized	as	a	great	power—a	strong	India	commands	the	respect	of	the	strong	
powers	in	the	international	system.		The	Hindu	Nationalists,	however,	go	further	
to	define	 this	conception	of	a	strong	 India	 in	 terms	of	dominance	of	 the	region	
and	 Pakistan	 in	 particular.	 	 This	 has	 specific	 implications	 for	 the	 two	
perspectives’	 understandings	 of	 India’s	 security	 environment.	 	 Nehruvian	
policymakers	 viewed	 the	 nuclear	 issue	 primarily	 as	 a	message	 to	 send	 to	 the	
super	 powers	 about	 India’s	 understanding	 of	 itself	 as	 an	 equal	 capable	 of	
“nuclear	 restraint”.	 	 This	 resulted	 in	 the	 policy	 decision	 to	 go	 ahead	 with	 the	
“Smiling	Buddha”	test	of	1974	while	refraining	from	weaponization.		In	contrast,	
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the	Hindu	Nationalists	were	most	concerned	about	sending	a	strong	message	to	
Pakistan	and	the	world	about	Indian	supremacy	in	the	region.			
In	this	thesis,	I	hypothesized	that	Indian	nuclear	policy	could	be	split	into	
two	 phases.	 	 In	 the	 first	 phase,	 a	 regional	 role	 conception	 dominated	 by	 an	
oppositional	attitude	towards	the	international	system	would	result	in	attempts	
to	 acquire	 nuclear	 explosives	 for	 peaceful	 purposes,	 given	 the	 presence	 of	
sufficient	 technical	 capacity	 and	 the	presence	of	 a	 threat	 from	a	 regional	 rival.		
This	 is	 seen	 in	 the	 lead‐up	 to	 the	Smiling	Buddha	 tests	of	1974.	 	 In	 the	second	
phase,	 a	 regional	 role	 conception	 informed	 by	 oppositional	 relationships	 with	
both	the	regional	rival	and	the	international	system	at	large	would	result	in	the	
decision	to	formally	“enter	the	nuclear	club”	and	weaponize	the	technology.		This	
is	 observed	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 1998	 tests.	 	 These	 relationships	 are	 depicted	 in	
Figures	9‐10	below:	
Figure	9:	Relationship	between	hybrid	oppositional	and	competitive	regional	role	
conception	and	nuclear	weapons	acquisition	attempts	
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Figure	 10:	 Relationship	 between	 oppositional	 regional	 role	 conception	 and	
nuclear	weapons	acquisition	attempts	
	
In	 their	 conceptions	 of	 their	 country’s	 role	 in	 the	 world,	 Indian	
policymakers	were	clearly	focused	on	the	international	system	and	employed	an	
oppositional	attitude	towards	great	power	interference	in	their	region.		This	was	
seen	most	clearly	in	the	aftermath	of	the	tumultuous	decade	of	the	1960s,	when	
Indian	policymakers	 came	 to	 resent	 the	United	States’	 support	of	Pakistan	and	
snubbing	 of	 India’s	 dominant	 role	 in	 the	 region.	 	 The	 USS	 Enterprise	 incident	
demonstrated	 to	 Indian	 policymakers	 in	 1971	 that	 the	 United	 States	 did	 not	
respect	Indian	leadership	in	its	region	and	was	willing	to	resort	to	‘blackmail’	in	
order	to	accomplish	its	policy	goals.		This	proved	to	be	a	crucial	decision	point	in	
the	 mind	 of	 Indira	 Gandhi,	 who	 ordered	 that	 the	 preparations	 for	 Smiling	
Buddha	commence	as	a	result	of	the	incident.		Still,	after	the	test,	there	were	no	
immediate	 efforts	 to	weaponize	 the	 technology	 and	 the	 nuclear	 capability	was	
strikingly	 absent	 from	 Indian	 foreign	 policy	 discourse	 for	 well	 over	 a	 decade	
(Frey,	2006).			
			Both	Nehruvians	and	Hindu	nationalists	saw	the	Indian	nuclear	bomb	as	a	
symbol	 which	 supported	 their	 visions	 for	 their	 country	 in	 world	 affairs.	 	 For	
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Nehru,	his	daughter	Indira	Gandhi,	and	others,	India’s	place	in	the	world	was	one	
of	 being	 a	 normative	 power	 against	 colonialism	 and	 racialism.	 	 During	 the	
Nehruvian	 era	 of	 Indian	 foreign	 policy,	 India	 was	 active	 in	 both	 calls	 for	
disarmament	 and	 negotiations	 to	 achieve	 that	 end	 with	 the	 other	 nuclear	
powers.		In	this	context,	the	1974	“Smiling	Buddha”	PNE	was	a	symbol	of	Indian	
technological	capability,	on	the	one	hand,	and	of	Indian	restraint	in	the	hope	of	a	
disarmament	 solution	 on	 the	 other.	 	 As	Hymans	 (2006)	 and	 Perkovich	 (1999)	
both	note,	the	1974	detonation	cannot	be	explained	by	India’s	threat	perception	
from	China	or	Pakistan,	although	those	security	inputs	are	important	for	setting	
the	context.		While	China’s	first	test	was	in	1964,	Indira	Gandhi	did	not	make	the	
decision	 to	go	ahead	with	preparing	a	PNE	until	1972,	and	after	 the	 test,	 there	
was	no	effort	to	weaponize	the	technology.		This	shows	that	the	1974	detonation	
really	 was	 a	 continuation	 of	 the	 Nehruvian	 view	 of	 India	 achieving	 progress	
through	 a	 modernist	 emphasis	 on	 technology	 and	 science	 as	 an	 independent,	
self‐reliant	state.			
	 In	 contrast,	 the	 Hindu	 nationalist	 policymakers	who	 assumed	 power	 in	
1998	held	an	oppositional	understanding	of	India’s	regional	role	with	regards	to	
Pakistan.	 	 Merging	 religion‐centered	 civilizational	 discourse	 with	 the	 logic	 of	
hard	 power	 in	 foreign	 relations,	 the	 BJP’s	 leaders	 made	 exercising	 India’s	
“nuclear	 option”	 a	 campaign	promise.	 	 In	 ordering	 Indian	 scientists	 to	prepare	
for	 the	 test,	 PM	 Vajpayee	was	 sending	 a	message	 about	 Indian	 power	 to	 both	
Pakistan	and	the	other	powers	which	had	kept	India	out	of	the	“nuclear	club.”	
	 Indian	 desires	 for	 increased	 status	 in	 the	 world	 have	witnessed	 a	 shift	
since	the	end	of	 the	Cold	War.	 	While	 the	bipolar	environment	of	the	Cold	War	
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enabled	the	formation	of	India’s	role	as	leader	of	the	non‐aligned	bloc,	the	loose	
ties	between	the	NAM’s	members	and	the	eventual	changes	in	the	international	
landscape	 forced	 Indian	 policymakers	 to	 reassess	 the	 discourse	 of	 how	 their	
country	 should	 relate	 to	 the	 developing	 and	 developed	 worlds.	 	 From	 the	
discourse	of	the	BJP,	 it	 is	clear	that	a	sizable	corps	of	India’s	new	generation	of	
leaders	 view	 India’s	 role	 in	 the	 world	 in	 terms	 of	 strength	 vs.	 strength	 with	
respect	to	its	neighbors.	 	Whereas	the	Nehruvian	conception	of	state	autonomy	
was	 directed	 primarily	 at	 preventing	 colonialist	 interventionism,	 the	 Hindu	
nationalist	 conception	 has	 shifted	 to	 a	 more	 direct	 challenge	 of	 hegemonic	
authority.	 	This	shift	in	role	conceptions	is	accompanied	by	a	significant	change	
in	 Indian	 nuclear	 policy,	 from	 one	 of	 ambiguity	 to	 one	 of	 institutionalization.		
This	change	is	made	possible	by	the	contrasting	symbolisms	of	nuclear	weapons	
in	the	minds	of	both	camps	of	Indian	policymakers.			
For	Nehruvians,	 the	bomb	symbolized	 the	capability	of	 India’s	 science	and	
technology	 establishment,	 firm	 entrenchment	 on	 the	 moral	 high	 ground,	 and	
leadership	of	the	“third	way”	of	the	Cold	War.		All	of	these	symbolisms	existed	on	
the	international	stage,	which	can	clearly	be	seen	from	the	ambivalence	of	public	
opinion	about	the	nuclear	issue	even	after	the	1974	tests.	 	Indeed,	ambivalence	
can	also	be	 seen	at	 the	highest	 level	of	Nehruvian	policymakers,	with	a	 lack	of	
decisive	 decision‐making	 regarding	 the	 timeline	 of	 nuclear	 acquisition	
particularly	evident	in	the	examples	of	Nehru,	and	Indira	Gandhi.		For	the	Hindu	
nationalists,	however,	the	bomb	proved	to	be	a	powerful	symbol	on	two	stages:	
domestically,	 Pokhran	 II	 signified	 the	 BJP’s	 resolve	 and	 supported	 their	
derogation	 of	 the	 INC’s	 defense	 policy.	 	 Internationally,	 the	 1998	 tests	 were	
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intended	to	show	India’s	aspirations	to	become	an	autonomous	power	center,	a	
sign	 of	 the	 new	 “strong	 India”	 taking	 a	 stand	 against	 both	Western	 hegemony	
and	the	oppositional	Muslim	threat	in	their	own	backyard.			
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CHAPTER	6	
	
CONCLUSIONS	AND	IMPLICATIONS	
	 	
In	 this	 final	chapter,	 the	 findings	and	 implications	of	 the	 thesis	research	
are	 discussed.	 	 In	 this	 study,	 one	 country	 (Brazil)	 considered,	 but	 then	
abandoned,	 nuclear	 weapons,	 while	 another	 (India)	 first	 acquired	 nuclear	
weapons	capability	 in	1974,	but	did	not	weaponize	 that	 technology	until	1998,	
much	later.	 	Leaders	of	both	countries	held	understandings	of	their	history	and	
culture	 which	 put	 them	 at	 odds	 with	 the	 bipolar	 Cold	 War	 environment.		
Brazilian	leaders	perceived	their	country’s	relation	with	the	world	in	terms	of	a	
North‐South	 divide,	 one	 based	 on	 a	 discourse	 of	 industrialized	 core	 vs.	
dependent	periphery	in	the	world	economy.	 	 Indian	policymakers,	on	the	other	
hand,	saw	their	state’s	relations	with	the	international	system	as	a	continuation	
of	its	bitter	experience	with	colonialism	at	the	hands	of	a	Western	power.		Both	
states	 sought	 leadership	 in	 the	 world	 system	 based	 on	 these	 understandings:	
Brazil	 sought	 to	 promote	 itself	 as	 the	 voice	 of	 the	 global	 South	 to	 improve	 its	
position	 vis	 a	 vis	 the	 industrialized	 North,	 	 while	 India	 situated	 itself	 as	 the	
leader	 of	 the	 non‐aligned	movement,	 placing	 itself	 as	 a	model	 for	 other	 states	
emerging	from	under	colonial	rule.	
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	 Both	 states	 also	 experienced	 significant	 hardships	 due	 to	
underdevelopment,	 and	 development	 needs	 drove	 the	 foreign	 policies	 of	 both	
Brazil	and	India	during	the	period	of	analysis.		In	addressing	those	development	
needs,	 however,	 India	 and	 Brazil	 refused	 to	 become	 dependent	 on	 the	
industrialized	 nations,	 opting	 instead	 for	 more	 costly	 domestic	 technology	
development	strategies	which	emphasized	state	autonomy	and	independence.		In	
the	case	of	Brazil	this	occurred	after	an	unwise	technology	transfer	deal	left	the	
country	dependent	on	West	Germany	and	at	 the	whims	of	 the	Ford	and	Carter	
Administrations’	nonproliferation	policies.	 	 Informed	by	the	notion	of	swadeshi,	
or	 self‐reliance,	 Indian	 policymakers	 were	 wary	 of	 being	 too	 dependent	 on	
foreign	 suppliers	 of	 technology,	 although	 without	 them	 the	 Indian	 nuclear	
program	certainly	never	would	have	gotten	off	the	ground.		
	 In	 the	 case	of	Brazil,	 the	 aspirations	of	 greatness	which	 led	 the	military	
regime	to	take	steps	towards	developing	a	nuclear	explosive	were	not	shared	by	
the	wider	domestic	 foreign	policy	community.	 	 In	 the	case	of	 India,	however,	a	
lively	 debate	 over	 the	 role	 of	 nuclear	weapons	 and	 a	 pro‐bomb	 lobby	 of	 sorts	
developed	over	the	two	and	a	half	decades	between	its	first	and	second	nuclear	
tests.	 	 This	 pro‐bomb	 activism	 was	 enabled	 by	 the	 oppositional	 senses	 of	
nationalism	in	the	strategic	community	and	the	larger	population	as	a	whole.		In	
contrast,	 the	 general	 population	 of	 Brazil	 had	 a	 negative	 bias	 towards	 any	
program	of	the	military	regime.	 	President	Sarney	was	able	to	justify	the	navy’s	
enrichment	 program	 because	 of	 its	 contribution	 to	 national	 autonomy,	 a	
discourse	that	the	other	services’	programs	could	not	tap	into	as	easily.			
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Overall,	 the	methodological	 approach	 utilized	 in	 this	 thesis	 has	 yielded	
several	 important	 insights	 into	the	phenomenon	of	nuclear	proliferation.	 	First,	
this	analysis	has	shown	that	viewing	complex	issues	which	involve	questions	of	
national	 identity	such	as	nuclear	proliferation,	 the	national	role	conception	 is	a	
powerful	 analytical	 tool	 because	 of	 its	 ability	 to	 include	 both	 material	 and	
ideational	 inputs	 in	 its	 description	 of	 the	 decisionmaking	 mindset	 of	 national	
leaders.		Additionally,	by	bridging	the	divide	between	structural	level	discussions	
on	 strategy	 with	 domestic	 politics	 and	 individual	 agency,	 role	 theory	 shows	
promise	for	future	studies	on	a	wide	variety	of	themes	in	international	politics.	
By	establishing	a	comparison	of	two	cases,	this	analysis	provides	several	
points	for	structuring	a	more	effective	non‐proliferation	policy.		First,	as	Hymans	
points	 out	 in	 his	 2012	 book,	 starting	 an	 ambitious	 nuclear	 program	 is	 easy;	
creating	the	right	environment	for	scientists	to	flourish	and	conduct	the	research	
needed	is	difficult	(Hymans,	2012).		This	is	not	to	discount	the	technical	difficulty	
of	 the	 endeavor,	 however.	 	 Brazil	 tried	 and	 struggled	 mightily	 with	 many	
technical	and	institutional	obstacles	in	its	efforts	to	acquire	the	full	nuclear	fuel	
cycle,	 a	 project	 which	 remains	 incomplete	 today.	 	 India,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	
experienced	much	more	success,	but	was	also	more	motivated	and	had	an	earlier	
start	on	acquiring	technology	when	international	controls	were	lax.		This	leads	to	
the	 second	point:	 the	nonproliferation	 regime	has	made	 it	much	more	difficult	
for	a	state	to	acquire	a	nuclear	bomb	today	than	it	was	30	years	ago.		Even	with	a	
significant	 scientific	 base	 and	 extensive	 experience	 in	 the	 chemical	 industry,	
India	took	decades	to	develop	the	technology	necessary	for	Smiling	Buddha	and	
Pokhran	 II.	 	 The	 enormous	 material	 and	 diplomatic	 costs	 of	 embarking	 on	 a	
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nuclear	 weapons	 program	 alone	 are	 enough	 to	 dissuade	 most	 states	 from	
beginning	one.		
Third,	as	Sagan	(2011)	points	out,	nonproliferation	policy	and	scholarship	
have	 both	 focused	 on	 the	 supply	 side	 of	 the	 problem,	 seeking	 to	 understand	
which	 technologies	 need	 to	 be	 controlled	 and	 how	 to	 convince	 states	 not	 to	
acquire	sensitive	technologies	which	could	lead	to	nuclear	weapons.		This	thesis	
has	 attempted	 to	 show	 that	 a	 focus	 on	 the	 demand	 side	 of	 the	 proliferation	
problem	yields	much	more	meaningful	 results.	 	 Specifically,	 some	discontented	
states	perceive	nuclear	weapons	as	symbols	of	status	and	a	guarantee	that	they	
will	 be	 taken	 seriously	 by	 the	 international	 community.	 	 A	 more	 effective	
nonproliferation	policy	would	address	the	demand	side	of	the	equation	as	well	as	
covering	 the	 spread	of	 sensitive	 technologies.	 	 Specifically,	 the	 knowledge	 that	
states	seek	nuclear	weapons	not	 just	as	a	solution	 to	 their	 insecurity	problems	
but	 as	 status	 symbols	 should	 inform	 nonproliferation	 policy.	 	 Bilateral	 and	
multilateral	 efforts	 to	 address	 the	 question	 of	 status	 can	 relieve	 some	 of	 the	
threat	of	nuclear	acquisition	by	dissatisfied	states.		Overall,	comparing	the	cases	
of	Brazil	and	India	has	yielded	several	policy‐relevant	points.	 	These	points	will	
be	briefly	applied	to	the	currently‐unfolding	case	of	Iran’s	nuclear	program.	
	 Iran’s	nuclear	program	has	been	 in	 the	 international	 spotlight	 for	many	
years.		In	August	2002,	Iran	was	forced	to	admit	that	it	had	hidden	facilities	and	
activities	from	the	IAEA	in	violation	of	its	NPT	obligations	(Pabian,	2008,	p.	234).		
This	 was	 followed	 by	 a	 2006	 announcement	 that	 Iran	 was	 going	 to	 begin	
enrichment	 of	 uranium	 (NTI,	 2014a).	 	 In	 response,	 the	 Security	 Council	 has	
issued	multiple	resolutions	and	a	US‐led	coalition	has	enacted	crippling	financial	
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sanctions	on	Iran.		Current	negotiations	have	been	ongoing	since	the	election	of	
President	Rouhani,	who	replaced	Mahmoud	Ahmadinejad	in	2013.	In	September	
2013,	Presidents	Rouhani	and	Obama	held	the	first	direct	talks	between	US	and	
Iranian	 leaders	 since	 the	1979	 Islamic	Revolution	 (NTI,	2014a).	 	 Following	 the	
model	 employed	 in	 this	 thesis,	 the	 material	 and	 ideational	 inputs	 of	 Iranian	
nuclear	policy	will	be	explored,	 followed	by	a	discussion	of	possible	 routes	 for	
future	events	surrounding	the	Iranian	nuclear	program.		In	Table	10	below,	the	
Iranian	case	is	compared	with	Brazil	and	India:	
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Table	10:	Most	Similar	Systems	Design	Comparison	of	Iran	with	Brazil	and	India	
	 Brazil		 India	 Iran	 Source(s)	
General	
Industry/Technology	
Sufficient	 Sufficient Sufficient	 (Jo	&	Gartzke	2007)
	
Latent	Nuclear	Capability	 Sufficient	 Sufficient Sufficient	 (Jo	&	Gartzke	2007)	
(NTI,	2014a)	
Sensitive	nuclear	
assistance	
West	Germany,	
United	States	
Canada,	United	States	
		
West	Germany	
(pre‐1979)	
Russia	
(Solingen	1993)	
(NTI,	2014a)	
	
	
NPT	Status	 Late	ratification	
(waited	until	
1998)	
Unratified	 Ratified	since	
1970	
(UNODA,	2014)	
Nuclear	allies/security	
guarantees	
None	 None	 None	 (Solingen,	2007)	
	
Desire	for	great	power	
status/UNSC	permanent	
membership	
	
Yes	 Yes No	 (Alden	&	Vieira,	2005)	
(Stuenkel,	2010,	
2013)	
Regime	type	 Military	
dictatorship	
(until	1985);	
Democracy	
	
Democracy Mixed	
nondemocracy	
(Barletta,	1997)	
(Cohen,	2001)	
(Weeks,	2008)	
Threat	from	nuclear‐
armed	neighbor	
No	 China	(1970s)	
Pakistan	(1990s)	
	
Israel	
United	States	
(Hymans	2006,	2012)	
(Perkovich,	1999)	
Neighbor	with	
threatening	nuclear	
power	program	
	
Yes	(Argentina) Yes	(Pakistan) None	 (Doyle,	2008b)	
History	of	colonialism	
(date	of	independence)	
Portugal	(1822) Great	Britain,	Portugal	
(1947,	1961)	
	
Great	Britain	
intervention	
(Levine,	1999)	
(Cohen,	2001)	
(Kinser,	2007)	
Demographics:	Multi‐
ethnic,	multi‐cultural	
populations,	unequal	
income	distribution	
	
Yes	 Yes No	 (Levine,	1999)	
(Cohen,	2001)	
(CIA,	2014b)	
BRICS	designation	
	
Yes	 Yes No	 (Tett,	2010)	
Nuclear	Test(s)	 None	 1974,	1998 None	 (Perkovich,	1999)
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Material	Inputs	
	 On	 the	 technical	 side,	 Iran	 has	 experienced	 much	 difficulty	 with	 its	
nuclear	 program	 since	 Khomeini	 ordered	 its	 restarting	 in	 1984	 (NTI,	 2014a).		
Still,	despite	opposition	from	the	United	States	and	difficult	working	conditions,	
Iranian	 scientists	 have	 acquired	 uranium	 mining,	 milling,	 conversion,	 and	
enrichment	 capabilities	 (NTI,	 2014a).	 	 Iran	 has	 reportedly	 experienced	 a	 long	
string	 of	 problems	 with	 the	 IR‐1	 centrifuge,	 a	 design	 purchased	 from	 the	 AQ	
Khan	network	and	notorious	for	frequent	breakage	(Albright	&	Walrond,	2011).		
This	 and	 other	 vulnerabilities	 were	 infamously	 exploited	 by	 the	 Stuxnet	
computer	 virus,	 designed	 by	 the	 CIA	 and	 Israeli	 intelligence	 sometime	 after	
2006.		The	Stuxnet	virus	attacked	the	industrial	control	systems	which	regulated	
the	banks	of	centrifuges,	causing	them	to	overspin	and	shatter	(Langner,	2013).		
On	 the	 human	 resources	 side,	 Hymans	 cites	 the	 impact	 on	 the	 project	 of	
ideological	purges	of	technical	experts	in	the	Iranian	economy	in	the	aftermath	of	
the	 1979	 revolution,	 in	 which	 a	 ‘skilled	 workforce	 was	 replaced	 with	 a	 loyal	
workforce’	(Hymans,	2012,	p.	258).		He	suggests	that	it	is	likely	that	the	nuclear	
research	community	experienced	such	personnel	replacements	and	that	this	has	
delayed	 the	 program	 significantly.	 	 He	 concludes	 that	 “there	 is	 no	 other	
reasonable	 interpretation	 that	 but	 that	 this	 has	 been	 an	 extremely	 inefficient	
project”	(Hymans,	2012,	p.	258).	
	 From	the	perspective	of	Iran’s	security	environment,	the	outlook	is	bleak.		
The	United	States	worked	to	isolate	Iran	on	the	world	stage	ever	since	the	1979	
revolution.	 	 In	 2001	 the	 US	 invaded	 Iran’s	 eastern	 neighbor	 Afghanistan,	
followed	 in	 2003	 by	 Iran’s	 neighbor	 to	 the	 west,	 Iraq.	 	 While	 Iran	 certainly	
welcomed	 the	 overthrow	 of	 the	 Taliban	 and	 Saddam	Hussein,	 the	 prospect	 of	
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being	 surrounded	 by	 thousands	 of	 American	 soldiers	 obviously	 did	 not	 please	
Iranian	 leaders	 (Parsi,	 2012).	 	 Iran	 and	 Israel	 have	 traded	 threats	 and	 the	
prospect	of	an	Israeli	airstrike	was	only	recently	averted	with	an	agreement	that	
began	the	current	round	of	talks	in	2013	(Simpson	&	Levs,	2013).			
	 Iran	is	also	embroiled	in	the	Syrian	Civil	War	(ongoing	since	2011)	and	its	
major	 allies	 in	 the	 region	 (former	 Iraqi	 PM	 Nouri	 al‐Maliki,	 Syrian	 President	
Bashar	 al‐Assad,	 and	 Hezbollah)	 have	 all	 experienced	 significant	 turmoil	 in	
recent	years.		In	addition,	the	withering	sanctions	regime	has	taken	its	toll	on	the	
Iranian	economy,	with	85%	of	Iranians	reporting	that	sanctions	have	hurt	them	
personally	in	a	Gallup	poll	in	May‐June	2012	(Loschky,	2013).	
Ideational	Inputs	
	 On	 the	 ideational	 side,	 Iranian	 policymakers	 can	 draw	 on	 a	 proud	
tradition	of	nationalism	which	is	larger	than	just	the	Islamic	Republic.		Heir	to	a	
long	 and	 storied	 history,	 modern‐day	 Iranians	 express	 pride	 in	 their	 nation’s	
nuclear	program	and	support	 its	 continuation,	even	as	 sanctions	 take	 their	 toll	
on	their	livelihoods	(Loschky,	2013).			
Iran’s	Supreme	Leader	Ali	Khamenei	issued	a	fatwa	declaring	production	
or	 use	 of	 weapons	 of	 mass	 destruction	 as	 haram,	 or	 forbidden	 in	 Islam	
(Eisenstadt	&	Khalaji,	2011,	p.	ix).		Still,	as	Supreme	Leader,	he	reserves	the	right	
to	 alter	 or	 reverse	 his	 previous	 fatwas	 and	 could	 invoke	 the	 “expediency”	
doctrine	 of	 Ayatollah	 Khomeini,	 which	 equated	 the	 survival	 of	 the	 Islamic	
republic	with	the	highest	level	of	religious	values	(Eisenstadt	&	Khalaji,	2011,	p.	
ix).	
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When	examining	Iran’s	understanding	of	 its	regional	role,	 it	 is	clear	that	
Iran	 has	 an	 oppositional	 understanding	 of	 its	 relationship	 with	 its	 region	 and	
with	 the	 international	 system	 outside	 of	 its	 region.	 	 Iran	 holds	 oppositional	
conceptions	 of	 its	 regional	 identity	with	 respect	 to	 its	multiple	 regional	 rivals:	
Iraq	 (Saddam‐era),	 Saudi	 Arabia,	 and	 Israel.	 	 The	 Iranian	 perspective	 on	 the	
international	 system	 is	 also	 oppositional,	 having	 experienced	 the	 consistent	
efforts	of	 the	United	States	to	stack	the	tables	against	 Iran	and	isolate	 it	on	the	
world	stage.			
This	analysis	has	several	implications	for	the	outcome	of	the	Iranian	case.		
First,	like	in	the	case	of	India,	Iranian	policymakers	perceive	the	structure	of	the	
nonproliferation	 regime	 and	 the	 IAEA	 itself	 to	 be	merely	 tools	 of	 the	 nuclear‐
armed	 West.	 	 A	 policy	 of	 standing	 up	 to	 this	 imbalanced	 and	 unfair	 order	 is	
consistent	 with	 anti‐imperialist	 and	 anti‐Western	 discourse	 in	 Iran.	 	 Iranian	
leaders	likely	view	their	program	as	“teaching	the	West	a	lesson”	(Frey,	2009,	p.	
210).			
Any	 attempts	 to	 diffuse	 the	 tension	 over	 Iran	need	 to	 acknowledge	 and	
take	into	account	the	isolated	and	threatened	security	environment	of	Iran,	given	
its	current	situation.	 	While	Iran	can	be	brought	to	its	knees	through	sanctions,	
isolation,	 and	 even	military	 action,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 these	 tactics	 could	 backfire,	
pushing	Iran	into	a	situation	where	it	would	withdraw	from	the	NPT	and	seek	a	
nuclear	weapon	in	the	event	of	an	attack.			
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This	thesis	has	been	based	on	a	simple	premise—that	the	value	of	nuclear	
weapons	extends	 far	beyond	 their	material	utility;	nuclear	weapons	are	potent	
symbols	of	power	in	the	international	system.		While	the	vast	majority	of	states	
experience	 threats	 from	 other	 states,	 only	 a	 select	 few	 have	 pursued	 nuclear	
weapons,	 and	 even	 fewer	 have	 actually	 achieved	 a	 weaponizable	 capability.		
These	 states	 frequently	 justify	 their	 programs	 not	 just	 through	 the	 typical	
security‐based	 explanations,	 but	 also	 through	 reference	 to	 notions	 of	 national	
grandeur	 and	 aspirations	 for	 status.	 	 Modern	 nation‐states	 which	 consider	
themselves	 as	 heirs	 to	 civilizations	 may	 use	 this	 discourse	 to	 support	 their	
nuclear	 ambitions.	 	 By	 incorporating	 these	 factors,	 the	 model	 is	 able	 to	 set	
nuclear	 decisionmaking	 in	 a	 wider	 context	 while	 retaining	 a	 degree	 of	
methodological	 parsimony.	 Nonproliferation	 scholarship	 has	 generally	
undervalued	 the	motivations	 of	 proliferative	 states	 in	 favor	 of	 focusing	 on	 the	
acquisition	of	technical	capabilities.		Additional	research	on	the	motivations	and	
worldviews	of	these	states’	leaders	and	elite	policymakers	will	be	able	to	inform	
more	 effective	 policy	 and	 help	 identify	 the	 next	 generation	 of	 potential	
proliferators.			
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